Holman v. Walls
| Decision Date | 26 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-1 MMS. |
| Citation | 648 F. Supp. 947 |
| Parties | Roseann C. HOLMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Riley Jesse Holman, Jr., Deceased, as Administratrix and on her own behalf; Jami Holman and Tanya Holman, minor children or Riley Jesse Holman, Deceased, by Roseann C. Holman, their natural guardian, Plaintiffs, v. William Wayne WALLS, individually and as a Police Officer of the City of Dover; James Edward Kurtz, individually and as a Police Officer of the City of Dover; Mitch M. Hill, individually and as Police Officer of the City of Dover; Joe A. Klenoski, individually and as Police Chief of the City of Dover; City of Dover, Defendants, and Joe A. KLENOSKI, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Charles CASSELL, individually and as administrator of the Council on Police Training; James L. Ford, Jr., individually and as a member of the Council on Police training; Daniel L. Simpson, individually, as a member of the Council on Police Training and as Superintendent of the Delaware State Police; Joseph N. Pennell, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training; John R. McCarnan, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training; William M. Redd, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training; William B. Keene, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training; Nancy Tieman, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training; W. Layton Johnson, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training; and Charles M. Oberly, individually and as a member of the Council on Police Training, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
A. Richard Barros, of Barros, McNamara & Scanlon, Dover, Del., for plaintiffs.
Myron T. Steele, of Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Dover, Del., for defendants Walls, Kurtz, Hill and City of Dover.
Nicholas H. Rodriguez, and William W. Pepper, of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Dover, Del., for defendant and third-party plaintiff Klenoski.
Keith R. Brady, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for third-party defendants Ford, Pennell, McCarnan, Redd, Keene, Tieman, Johnson, Oberly, Cassell and Simpson in their official capacities.
Roger A. Akin, and Bruce C. Herron, of Sawyer & Akin, P.A., Wilmington, Del., for third-party defendants Cassell and Simpson in their individual capacities.
Before the Court are two motions to dismiss a third-party complaint arising out of an action against certain police officers and the police chief of the City of Dover, Delaware, and the City itself, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 14(a), defendant Chief of Police Joe A. Klenoski has impleaded as third-party defendants the administrator and members of the Council on Police Training of the State of Delaware in their individual capacities and official capacities, and in the case of Council member Daniel L. Simpson, also in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Delaware State Police. For the reasons that follow, the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted.
The parties to the third-party action do not dispute the underlying facts. On the morning of June 21, 1985, Riley J. Holman, plaintiffs' decedent, went to the office of a Dover dentist to receive dental treatment. While at the dentist's office, Holman apparently decided not to undergo treatment and secluded himself in an operatory room. When the dentist noticed that Holman was holding a penknife, he cleared all persons from his office and called the 911 emergency telephone number to report that a disturbed person with a penknife was in his office at 1071 South Governors Avenue.
Thereafter, an officer of the Delaware State Police notified the Dover City Police Department of the problem. Dover police officers William Walls and Mitch Hill were dispatched to the scene, and Dover police officer James Kurtz also responded to the call. When the three officers arrived at 1071 South Governors Avenue, they were just outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the City of Dover.
The police officers briefly questioned the dentist outside of his office and learned that Holman was alone inside. They then entered and searched the office and located the operatory room in which Holman had secluded himself with a penknife. After once requesting Holman to leave the operatory room, the officers attempted to force open the door of the room. Holman finally emerged through the door, carrying the penknife. The police officers fired fourteen shots at Holman, striking him twelve times and killing him.
On January 2, 1986, plaintiffs Roseann, Jami and Tanya Holman filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Walls, Kurtz, and Hill, Chief of Police Klenoski, and the City of Dover, alleging violations of Riley Holman's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On March 7, 1986, Chief Klenoski filed a third-party complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a), against the administrator and members of the Council on Police Training in their individual and official capacities, and against Council member Simpson in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Delaware State Police as well. Count I of the third-party complaint alleges that Klenoski is entitled to indemnification or contribution from the third-party defendants because of their breach of a duty to provide proper and adequate training to Officers Walls, Hill, and Kurtz. Count II of the third-party complaint alleges that Klenoski is entitled to indemnification or contribution from third-party defendant Simpson because of Simpson's breach of a duty to supervise and control the defendant police officers.
Affidavits filed in the case reveal that Officer Walls was serving as a full-time Dover police officer on July 11, 1969, and thus was not required to receive mandatory training under the Delaware police training program. See 11 Del.C. § 8405(b). Although Officers Hill and Kurtz received mandatory training between March 2 and May 21, 1981, third-party defendants Simpson, Charles W. Cassell, Charles M. Oberly, James L. Ford, Joseph N. Pennell, William M. Redd, and Nancy Tieman were at that time in no way associated with the Council on Police Training.1
Third-party defendants have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The parties, however, have referred to matters outside of the pleadings. Rule 12(b) therefore requires that the motion to dismiss be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Rule 56(c) permits a court to render summary judgment if it is "shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Nevertheless, "when a motion is made and supported, the nonmoving party must produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, rather than resting upon the assertions of pleading." Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1190, 89 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Assertions in the form of legal conclusions are insufficient to create issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 914 (3d Cir.1980).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a), a defendant may implead "a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Third-party plaintiff Klenoski seeks contribution or indemnity from the third-party defendants in the event he is found liable under § 1983 to the primary plaintiffs. The threshold issue before the Court is whether state or federal law governs the third-party action.
Generally, where the third-party claim is not based on a theory of federal law, the right to contribution or indemnity is determined under applicable state law, even if the main action is based on federal question jurisdiction. Where the third-party claim is based on a theory of federal law, however, federal law governs the right to contribution or indemnity. 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 14.033; see Kennedy v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 705 (3d Cir.1960).
On its face, the third-party complaint appears to articulate a theory of liability based solely on Delaware law, although the main § 1983 action is covered by federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Count I of the third-party complaint alleges that the third-party defendants had a duty, imposed by Delaware statutes, to provide proper and adequate training to the defendant police officers, and that they breached this state law duty by "negligently, recklessly or wantonly" failing to provide such training. Similarly, Count II of the third-party complaint alleges that third-party defendant Simpson had a duty, also imposed by Delaware statutes, to supervise and control the defendant police officers, and that he breached this duty by "negligently, recklessly or wantonly" failing to provide proper and adequate supervision.2 The complaint alleges no violations of duties imposed by federal law.3
On the other hand, the gravamen of the complaint may be that the third-party defendants, because Delaware law imposed on them a duty to train and/or supervise, were the state actors responsible for the violation of Riley Holman's rights under the Constitution. The third-party claim thus would be...
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