Denison v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen
| Decision Date | 16 May 1921 |
| Docket Number | 33864 |
| Citation | 182 N.W. 873,191 Iowa 698 |
| Parties | JOHN D. DENISON, Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICAN YEOMEN et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.--LAWRENCE DE GRAFF, Judge.
ACTION in equity to enjoin the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the office of general attorney of the Brotherhood of American Yeomen. A temporary injunction was granted, which, on motion of the defendants, was dissolved. Plaintiff appeals from the order dissolving the temporary injunction.--Reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Guy A Miller and John D. Denison, for appellant.
Miller Kelly, Shuttleworth & Seeburger, for appellees.
DE GRAFF, J., takes no part.
I.
The appellant's petition alleges that the appellee Brotherhood of American Yeomen is a fraternal beneficiary association, duly organized under the laws of the state of Iowa; that the other appellees are the board of directors and other officers of said association; that the appellant is the general attorney of the said association, and was appointed as such in the month of June, 1917, by the board of directors; and that he qualified and entered upon the duties of said office. The petition sets out the following by-laws of the association:
The petition alleges that, on or about the first day of July, A. D. 1920, the board of directors passed a resolution as follows:
"Resolved that the employment of John D. Denison as general attorney of the association is terminated as of this date."
It is alleged that, after passing said resolution, the said board of directors appointed the appellee A. H. Hoffman as general attorney; that appellant has reason to believe that said Hoffman will attempt to take possession of files, cases, briefs, claims, and all things pertaining to said office of general attorney, and deprive the appellant by fraud of the honors, emoluments, functions, and properties of said office. The petition recites that the salary of the appellant as general attorney was $ 6,000 per year, payable monthly, together with all necessary traveling and hotel expenses. It is alleged that the appellant, since June, 1917, has had and now has possession of the files, briefs, arguments, cases, claims, and all matters pertaining to the office of general attorney of said association, and has enjoyed the dignities, honors, and emoluments, and has possessed the powers and functions and performed the duties pertaining to said office. It is alleged that the appellees have conspired to fraudulently deprive the appellant of the possession of said office and all the matters and things connected therewith, and to refuse to issue the necessary orders for the payment of his salary and expense account. It is prayed that the appellees be enjoined from interfering in any manner with the properties pertaining to said office, and from failing to allow the proper expense account of appellant; and that the appellee Hoffman be restrained from exercising any of the functions of the office of general attorney until such time as the disputed right to the title to the said office of general attorney shall be judicially determined, after proper proceedings in due course of law.
Upon presentation to one of the judges of the district court, an order for the allowance of a temporary writ of injunction was entered, and, bond being furnished, as provided in said order, a temporary writ of injunction was duly issued. Thereafter, the appellees filed their motion to dissolve said temporary injunction on the ground that the court had no authority to issue an injunction because the same is not a proper remedy under the law, and that the appellant's action is in quo warranto. It is also alleged in said motion that the appellant's right of action, if any, is for breach of his contract of employment, and that the appellant's employment was terminated prior to the filing of the petition; that a successor to the appellant had been appointed by the board of directors; that the writ of injunction was issued in violation of the statute, because signed by a judge before said petition was filed with the clerk of the district court, when the same had not been entered upon the court calendar for the term; and that said injunction was improperly and improvidently issued. Thereafter, the court entered an order sustaining said motion, and vacating and setting aside the said temporary writ of injunction. From said order this appeal is prosecuted to this court; and, on application to the chief justice of this court, a restraining order was issued, restraining the appellees, pending this appeal, from interfering in any way with the appellant in his conduct and possession of the said office of general attorney of the Brotherhood of American Yeomen, pending the institution of judicial proceeding to determine the disputed rights to said office.
The arguments of counsel for both appellant and appellees have taken a very wide range in the presentation of this appeal. As we view it, the ultimate question for our consideration is whether or not the appellant was entitled to a temporary writ of injunction restraining the appellees from interfering with his possession of the office of general attorney of the Brotherhood of American Yeomen, until the title and right to said office should be determined by proper judicial proceedings. There has been, as yet, no trial whatever on the merits of the matters presented in the appellant's petition. No answer has yet been filed thereto, and, for the purpose of this appeal, we must assume that all of the matters alleged in the appellant's petition are true. From said petition it appears affirmatively that the appellant was the duly appointed general attorney of the Brotherhood of American Yeomen. Under the by-laws of said association, as pleaded, he was a supreme officer of said association. It is the contention of the appellees that the appellant was merely an employee of the said association and that he was subject to discharge at any time by the board of directors. The petition, however, controverts this. It is alleged, and for the purpose of this hearing we must assume it to be true, that the appellant was one of the supreme officers of said association, and was appointed for a term of four years, or until the next supreme conclave of said association, in June, 1921; and also that no charges have been preferred against the appellant, and no hearing has been had in regard to his removal from office.
We are not called upon, in this proceeding, to determine the disputed question of the right of the appellant to retain the office of general attorney of the association. We hold that, under the allegations of the petition, the appellant was an officer of the said association, and not a mere employee. What shall be determined to be the status of the appellant upon a final hearing and trial of the cause is not now before us. The allegations of his petition are sufficient to support his contention that he was at least a de facto officer of the association, and not a mere employee. He is seeking by this action to maintain himself in the possession of said office and the matters and things necessarily pertaining thereto until such time as, by proper legal proceedings. it may be determined whether or not he is legally entitled to retain said office.
It is strenuously urged in behalf of the appellees that this cause is merely an action to determine the right to hold a certain office, as between two contestants therefor; and that such an action can only be maintained by proceeding in quo warranto. Such, however, is not the situation. The appellant herein is not seeking by this petition to have a court of equity determine the ultimate question of whether the appellant or the appellee Hoffman is entitled to the possession of the office of general attorney of the association. The appellant alleges by his petition that he is at least a de facto officer of the association, in possession of its property as such officer, and charged with the duties and responsibilities of maintaining said office. The petition charges that the appellees, by fraud and conspiracy, are seeking to oust him from said office, and are claiming that another has the right thereto. He is only asking in this case that the injunctive power of a court of equity be exercised to interpose between him and the contestants and...
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Denison v. Yeomen, 33864.
... 191 Iowa 698 182 N.W. 873 DENISON v. BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICAN YEOMEN ET AL. No. 33864. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 16, 1921 ... Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Lawrence De Graff, ... ...