Denman v. Gans

• Decision Date: 28 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. C0-99-982.,C0-99-982.
• Citation: 607 N.W.2d 788
• Parties: Thomas J. DENMAN, et al., Appellants, v. Carl W. GANS, et al., Respondents, Frank Muelken, Respondent, Robert W. Miles, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

607 N.W.2d 788

Thomas J. DENMAN, et al., Appellants, v. Carl W. GANS, et al., Respondents, Frank Muelken, Respondent, Robert W. Miles, Respondent.

No. C0-99-982.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

March 28, 2000.

M. Gregory Simpson, Patrick H. Elliott, Elliott Law Firm, P.A., Edina, and James D. Bates, Bryce D. Huemoeller, Huemoeller & Bates, Prior Lake, for appellants.

Gary L. Wilson, Vincent J. Moccio, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP, Minneapolis, and Scott D. Lake, Lake Law Firm, Prior Lake, for respondents Gans, et al.

Frank Muelken, Prior Lake, and Robert W. Miles, Prior Lake, pro se respondents.

Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge, PETERSON, Judge, and ANDERSON, Judge.

OPINION

G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge.

In this real property dispute, appellants challenge the district court's conclusion that the subject property could not be adversely possessed or abandoned as a matter of law and findings that appellants failed to establish adverse possession or abandonment. Appellants also challenge the denial of their demand for a jury trial and their motion to amend the complaint. Finally, appellants challenge the district court's declaration excluding them from part of the property. Because evidence supports the district court's findings on adverse possession and abandonment and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a jury trial or amendment of the complaint, we affirm. But, because there was no basis for the challenged portion of the declaration, we modify the court's order.

FACTS

The property in dispute is located in the Green Heights subdivision adjacent to Prior Lake. The subdivision consists of 44 lots, ten of which are on the waterfront. In 1927, Thomas and Helen Simpkins subdivided the property into the 44 parcels along with roads, walkways, and the waterfront. Two walkways provide access from the back lots to the waterfront. In 1928, the Simpkins recorded a document that dedicated "the roads, drives, walks and waterfront as shown on the plat for the use of the respective owners of [Green Heights]."

In 1996, a dispute arose regarding the use and ownership of the waterfront area when a back lot owner installed a dock off one of the walkway accesses. Eventually, waterfront owners Thomas and Judy Denman brought an action asserting that their property ran to the waterline. A number of other waterfront property owners (appellants) filed similar complaints, alleging they had acquired ownership to the waterfront by adverse possession. Appellants also alleged that the back lot owners (respondents) had abandoned their interest in the waterfront.

Appellants demanded a jury trial, a request denied by the district court, and the case proceeded as a bench trial. At trial, a number of present and former residents of the subdivision testified. The waterfront owners generally testified that they believed they owned to the waterline. Through the years, the waterfront lot owners have constructed docks and boathouses on the waterfront. The waterfront owners also claimed that, prior to 1996 and as early as 1948, the back lot owners rarely used the waterfront and did so only with permission. After appellants' case-in-chief, they moved to amend their complaint to add a claim of boundary by practical location.

Respondents presented the testimony of a number of back lot owners. The back lot owners testified that, from as early as the 1950's, they had used the waterfront area without permission on numerous occasions. Many of the back lot owners, however, conceded that they were not aware of the Simpkins dedication until this dispute arose.

Near the end of trial, the parties agreed that the district court would be allowed to issue a declaration of rights, setting forth all of the right's of the parties to the use of the property. Following the trial, the court issued an order and a separate declaration of rights. The district court concluded that: (1) appellants' motion to amend the complaint would prejudice respondents; (2) appellants could not take title by adverse possession because the property was "quasi-public"; (3) appellants failed to prove all the elements of adverse possession; (4) respondents could not abandon the waterfront; and (5) appellants failed to prove abandonment.

In its declaration of rights, the court determined that appellants would be limited to constructing docks, boat-lifts, and fire-rings on the waterfront. With respect to the accesses, the court declared that respondents would have "exclusive" use of them.

ISSUES

1. Were appellants entitled to a jury trial?

2. Did the district court err in concluding that the property could not be adversely possessed?

3. Were the district court's findings that appellants failed to establish adverse possession clearly erroneous?

4. Did the district court err by concluding that the property could not be abandoned?

5. Were the district court's findings that appellants failed to establish abandonment clearly erroneous?

6. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit amendment of the complaint?

7. Did the district court err by excluding appellants from the accesses?

ANALYSIS

1. Right to a jury trial

Our constitution guarantees a jury trial in "all cases at law." Minn. Const. art. 1, § 4. Additionally, Minn. R. Civ. P. 38.01 provides:

In actions for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property, the issues of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived.

Appellants imply that, under rule 38.01, a jury trial is guaranteed in all actions involving specific real property. The rule, however, does not enlarge the constitutional right to a jury trial. State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn.App.1992), aff'd, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn.1993). The rule serves only as an attempt to list those actions that are "legal" in nature. Rognrud v. Zubert, 282 Minn. 430, 434, 165 N.W.2d 244, 247 (1969). Moreover, the supreme court has recognized that the right does not apply to every action involving title to property. Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 105, 137 N.W. 390, 394 (1912).

At oral argument, counsel for respondents claimed that appellants were not entitled to a jury trial because the case was a declaratory judgment action. As our rules make clear, however, parties to a declaratory judgment action may be entitled to a jury trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 57 (right to jury trial exists for declaratory judgment actions in manner provided for by rule 38); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skluzacek, 208 Minn. 443, 447, 294 N.W. 413, 415 (1940) ("[T]he right of jury trial in its appropriate sphere is safeguarded.").

In determining whether the right to a jury trial applies, this court must consider the nature and character of the controversy as set forth in the pleadings. Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn.1993). Although a number of decisions note that "the question of adverse possession is usually one for the jury," those cases, and the cases cited by appellant, involve circumstances where the court has taken the case away from the jury by directing a verdict or entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See, e.g., Glover v. Sage, 87 Minn. 526, 528, 92 N.W. 471, 471 (1902); Village of Glencoe v. Wadsworth, 48 Minn. 402, 403, 51 N.W. 377, 378 (1892). Thus, those decisions stand only for the proposition that the question of adverse possession is for the fact finder, whether it be the jury or the court.

Determining the nature of the present action is critical. An ejectment action, in which the "recovery of * * * specific real * * * property" is sought, is an action at law to which the right to a jury trial applies. Rognrud, 282 Minn. at 434, 165 N.W.2d at 247 (emphasis added). On the other hand, where the plaintiff is in possession of the property and brings an action to determine an adverse claim to the property, the case is equitable and triable by the court. Johnson v. Peterson, 90 Minn. 503, 505-06, 97 N.W. 384, 384-85 (1903).

The supreme court's treatment of an action to register title to real property in Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 137 N.W. 390 (1912), is also instructive. The court noted that the purpose of such actions was to clear land titles. Id. at 103, 137 N.W. at 393. Because this was akin to the equitable action of quieting title, the court determined that the right to a jury trial did not apply, even though the ultimate right of possession of the property may have been involved. Id. at 104-05, 137 N.W. at 393.¹

Appellants claim that their action is one for ejectment. But their pleadings do not allege that they have been ousted from possession of the property or that respondents are in possession. In fact, appellants allege that they are in actual possession of the property. Simply stated, appellants are not seeking "recovery" of the property.

The purpose of appellants' action is similar to that of an action to quiet title or to determine an adverse claim. As with Peters, appellants are merely attempting to clear their title, which, at this point, reflects that their property does not extend to the waterline. Although the ultimate right of possession of the property turns upon the court's decision, the nature of the case nevertheless remains focused upon clearing title. Because appellant's action was fundamentally to quiet title or to determine an adverse claim, the action is one that would traditionally be considered equitable. Accordingly, appellants were not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.

If the nature of an action is such that no right to a jury trial exists, the decision to submit the case to a jury is within the district court's discretion. Alpine Air Prods., 490 N.W.2d at 895. Given the absence of a bright-line rule and because of the factual and legal complexities in this dispute, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a jury trial.

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