Dennehy v. E. Windsor Reg'l Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 26 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-36 September Term 2021,086350 |
| Citation | 252 N.J. 201,284 A.3d 102 |
| Parties | Morgan DENNEHY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EAST WINDSOR REGIONAL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Hightstown High School, James W. Peto, Todd M. Peto, and Dezarae Fillmyer, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Timothy P. Beck, Warren, argued the cause for appellants (DiFrancesco, Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, attorneys; Timothy P. Beck, on the briefs).
Brian A. Heyesey argued the cause for respondent (Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, attorneys; Brian A. Heyesey, of counsel and on the brief).
Kayla Elizabeth Rowe argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (New Jersey Civil Justice Institute, attorneys; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, of counsel and on the brief).
Justin Lee Klein, Eatontown, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Law Office of Justin Lee Klein, attorneys; Justin Lee Klein, of counsel and on the brief).
In this appeal, we consider the standard of care that should apply to a coach's decision to allow a high school field hockey team to practice in an area adjacent to an ongoing soccer practice. We conclude that the coach's acts and omissions alleged here are governed by a simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness we applied in Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994), and Schick v. Ferolito, 167 N.J. 7, 767 A.2d 962 (2001), when one participant injures another during a recreational activity.
In 2015, plaintiff Morgan Dennehy was a seventeen-year-old high school senior and a member of Hightstown High School's girls’ field hockey team coached by defendant Dezarae Fillmyer. The school's athletic director had arranged afterschool sports practices so that the field hockey team's practice on September 9, 2015, would begin when the boys’ soccer team's use of the turf field ended at 3:45 p.m. At 3:00 p.m., Fillmyer instructed the offensive players on her field hockey team to begin warming up in "the D-zone," an area between the "continuous athletic field[s]" and the turf field. A few years earlier, a twenty-foot-high ball stopper net had been installed at the ends of the turf field to prevent "ball interference" in other areas. While the offensive players on the field hockey team were warming up, at least two soccer balls from the soccer practice "landed within the ... D-zone near [the] field hockey players."
Because she was a goalie, plaintiff had not been participating in the informal activities in the D-zone. She asked if she could take a shot on goal and Fillmyer gave her approval. As plaintiff was taking a shot, another errant soccer ball cleared the ball stopper and struck the base of plaintiff's skull, allegedly causing the injuries of which she complains in this lawsuit.
Plaintiff filed this suit against Fillmyer, the board of education, the school, its athletic director, and others. Plaintiff asserted that she sustained injuries through defendants’ alleged failures to supervise; prevent potential and foreseeable dangerous conditions; provide appropriate safeguards; and post suitable warnings of potentially dangerous conditions. After the completion of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment. In opposing summary judgment, plaintiff argued defendants owed her a duty of reasonable supervisory care. Agreeing with defendants, the trial judge held that plaintiff was required to show defendants’ acts or omissions rose at least to the degree of recklessness described in Crawn, 136 N.J. at 507-08, 643 A.2d 600, and Schick, 167 N.J. at 18-20, 767 A.2d 962. Applying that heightened standard, the trial judge determined that the allegations could not support a claim of intentional or reckless conduct.
Plaintiff appealed, challenging only the judge's determination that a recklessness standard applied to Fillmyer's alleged acts and omissions. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding the Crawn recklessness standard was inapplicable because Fillmyer "was not a co-participant" and holding that a simple negligence standard applied because plaintiff's claim was that Fillmyer failed to properly "supervise and oversee the participants of the sport" assigned to her for instruction. Dennehy v. E. Windsor Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 469 N.J. Super. 357, 365, 264 A.3d 312 (App. Div. 2021).
We granted certification, 249 N.J. 550, 267 A.3d 1156 (2022), and now reject Fillmyer's contention that she was entitled to the application of a recklessness standard in these circumstances, a position supported by the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute as amicus curiae. We instead agree with plaintiff's argument, which the New Jersey Association for Justice similarly urges, that her claims should be governed by a simple negligence standard.
In Crawn, we considered what a plaintiff-catcher -- injured during a regularly scheduled but informal softball game -- was required to show to prove the liability of the defendant-runner, who collided with the plaintiff while attempting to score. 136 N.J. at 497-98, 643 A.2d 600. In rejecting application of either a simple negligence standard on the one hand or complete immunity on the other, we recognized two policy reasons -- "the promotion of vigorous participation in athletic activities" and the avoidance of "a flood of litigation," id. at 501, 643 A.2d 600 -- and concluded "that the duty of care applicable to participants in informal recreational sports is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct," id. at 497, 643 A.2d 600 (emphasis added). That standard, we noted, was "driven by the perception that the risk of injury is a common and inherent aspect of informal sports activity." Id. at 500, 643 A.2d 600.
Later, in Schick, perceiving that " Crawn may have left open the question of whether the recklessness standard should apply generally to conduct in recreational sporting contexts, including golf," 167 N.J. at 10-11, 767 A.2d 962, we considered whether Crawn’s recklessness standard should apply to a defendant-golfer whose "unannounced and unexpected ... ‘mulligan’ " struck another golfer. Id. at 10, 767 A.2d 962. Reiterating our concern in Crawn -- that "a legal duty of care based on the standard of what, objectively, an average reasonable person would do under the circumstances is illusory, and is not susceptible to sound and consistent application on a case-by-case basis," id. at 13, 767 A.2d 962 (quoting Crawn, 136 N.J. at 507-08, 643 A.2d 600 ) -- we held that "the heightened standard of care for causes of action for personal injuries occurring in recreational sports should not depend on which sport is involved and whether it is commonly perceived as a ‘contact’ or ‘noncontact’ sport." Id. at 18-19, 767 A.2d 962. We reaffirmed that the heightened standard "represented the enunciation of a more modern approach to our common law in actions for personal injuries that generally occur during recreational sporting activities" and constituted "the pertinent standard" -- regardless of the athletic endeavor -- when "assessing the duty of one sports participant to another." Id. at 19, 767 A.2d 962 (emphasis added).
In Schick, we recognized that the recklessness standard applied to more than just those sporting and recreational activities involved there and in Crawn, and we more recently applied the recklessness standard to a collision between a skier and a snowboarder. See Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 213 N.J. 573, 590, 66 A.3d 1252 (2013). The Appellate Division has found the heightened standard applicable to a claim based on an injury occurring during a lacrosse game, C.J.R. v. G.A., 438 N.J. Super. 387, 398, 105 A.3d 628 (App. Div. 2014), as well as injuries resulting from collisions between skydivers, Dare v. Freefall Adventures, Inc., 349 N.J. Super. 205, 214, 793 A.2d 125 (App. Div. 2002), and between roller skaters, Calhanas v. S. Amboy Roller Rink, 292 N.J. Super. 513, 523, 679 A.2d 185 (App. Div. 1996).
But, unlike all those cases, Fillmyer was not actively participating in the recreational activity at issue. Plaintiff alleges tortious conduct by Fillmyer only as to her choice of the location of the impromptu workout prior to the scheduled practice and her failure to supervise her players as they waited their turn on the turf field. Fillmyer argues that Crawn’s recklessness standard should be extended to apply to the acts and omissions of instructors and coaches like herself regardless of the circumstances.
With the exception of Rosania v. Carmona, 308 N.J. Super. 365, 706 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1998), which we will discuss in greater detail momentarily, our case law has not focused on a coach or instructor actively participating in the sporting activity when the injury occurred. Nor do we accept the invitation...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Angeles v. Ruiz
...the significance of probative competent evidence." Dennehy v. E. Windsor Bd. of Educ., 469 N.J.Super. 357, 363 (App. Div. 2021), affd, 252 N.J. 201 (2022) (first and third alterations in original) Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J.Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010)). We review a court's adjudicatio......