Dennett v. Archuleta

• Decision Date: 11 January 2013
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 12–424–S.
• Citation: 915 F.Supp.2d 248
• Parties: Michael DENNETT, Plaintiff, v. Michael ARCHULETA, Jamal Alsaffar, Laurie Higginbotham, Archuleta & Associates, P.C., d/b/a/ Archuleta, Alsaffar & Higginbotham, John Doe(s), ABC Partnership(s), and DEF Corporation(s), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

915 F.Supp.2d 248

Michael DENNETT, Plaintiff,

v.Michael ARCHULETA, Jamal Alsaffar, Laurie Higginbotham, Archuleta & Associates, P.C., d/b/a/ Archuleta, Alsaffar & Higginbotham, John Doe(s), ABC Partnership(s), and DEF Corporation(s), Defendants.

C.A. No. 12–424–S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Jan. 11, 2013.

Arthur P. Loveley, Max Wistow, Benjamin G. Ledsham, Wistow & Barylick Incorporated, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

David A. Grossbaum, Matthew R. Watson, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

I. Facts

In 2009, Michael Dennett, a resident of Middletown, Rhode Island, was being treated by the Providence Veterans Affairs Medical Center (the “Providence VA”) in Providence, Rhode Island when test results showed elevated levels of a prostate-specific antigen (“PSA”). (First Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 7; Pl.'s Obj. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss the Pl.'s First Am. Compl. (“Pl.'s Obj.”) 4, ECF No. 13.) Due to the high PSA, the Providence VA biopsied Dennett's prostate on May 27, 2009. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) Dennett was informed that the samples tested positive for prostate cancer, so on June 18, 2009, his prostate was removed. ( Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Post-operative tests, however, revealed that Dennett did not have prostate cancer. ( Id. ¶ 15.) An investigation into the discrepancy between the two test results led to a comparative DNA test of the tissue samples which revealed that the Providence VA had switched Dennett's biopsy sample with another patient's sample, and it was this patient, not Dennett, who had prostate cancer. ( Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) This misdiagnosis and unnecessary surgery not only left Dennett without a prostate but also left him with infection, painful fluid collection in his pelvis, incontinence, and impotence. ( Id. ¶ 22.)

Dennett began searching for an attorney who would file suit against the Providence VA on his behalf and found the website of Defendant Archuleta, Alsaffar & Higginbotham (“AA & H”), a Texas law firm specializing in Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) cases. ( Id. ¶¶ 5, 19.) Attorneys at AA & H include Defendants Michael Archuleta, Jamal Alsaffar, and Laurie Higginbotham (together, with AA & H, the “Defendants”), all of whom reside in Texas and are licensed to practice law in Texas. ( Id. ¶¶ 2–4.) None of the Defendants are licensed in Rhode Island. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Still, AA & H's website offers to “represent [clients] regardless of where [they] live” and states that the firm “handle[s] claims in all 50 states.” ( Id. ¶ 8.) Indeed, AA & H's website has a section devoted to results where it describes the different forums and cases in which it has participated. (Pl.'s Obj. 8–9.)

Based on his review of the website and multiple correspondences with AA & H, Dennett decided to retain AA & H to represent him in his FTCA claim against the Providence VA for medical malpractice. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) As part of this process, Dennett sent a number of documents to Defendants in Texas for review, including medical records, a narrative of how the experience had affected him, responses to Defendants' client questionnaire, and copies of communications between Dennett and the Department of Veterans Affairs. (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss the Pl.'s First Am. Compl. (“Defs.' Mem. of Law”) Ex. B, ¶ 22, ECF No. 12.) Dennett also signed a Letter of Representation on October 16, 2009, and a written contract on October 19, 2009. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Both of these documents were signed by Dennett in Rhode Island. (Pl.'s Obj. Ex. 1 (“Aff. of Michael Dennett”) ¶¶ 21–22.) Though the representation was explicitly limited to Dennett's FTCA claims, Defendants promised to help Dennett locate a local attorney to pursue other avenues of recovery, such as individual suits against the non-affiliated doctors and surgeons.

On October 29, 2009, Defendants filed two claims pursuant to the FTCA—one with the Providence VA and one with the Providence VA Regional Office. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) In connection with these claims, Defendants communicated from their Texas office with both the Department of Veterans Affairs in Providence and Dennett. (Defs.' Mem. of Law Ex. B ¶ 25.) At Defendants' request, the claims were administratively transferred on March 23, 2010 to the VA Office of General Counsel in Washington, D.C. (the “Washington VA”) because the Washington office had the authority to settle for larger amounts than the Providence branch did. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Negotiations continued outside of Rhode Island between Defendants (in Texas) and the Washington VA, and on August 3, 2010, Defendants settled Dennett's claim for $300,000. ( Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.) Dennett signed the settlement agreement in Rhode Island. (Aff. of Michael Dennett ¶¶ 36–37.) Following the settlement, Dennett contacted Defendants to follow up on Defendants' earlier promise to locate a Rhode Island attorney who could help Dennett pursue additional claims against the individual physicians and surgeons; Defendant Archuleta put Dennett in contact with his current counsel. (First Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 24, 28.)

Dennett eventually became unhappy with the settlement negotiated by Defendants and filed suit for legal malpractice in Rhode Island Superior Court on May 2, 2012. Defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court. ( Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) On July 23, 2012, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss the Pl.'s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 10.)

II. Discussion

When a defendant challenges the Court's jurisdiction over him, the First Circuit applies the prima facie standard to determine whether personal jurisdiction is proper. Hainey v. World AM Commc'ns, Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 338, 341 (D.R.I.2003). This approach places the burden on the plaintiff to “make the showing as to every fact required to satisfy ‘both the forum's long-arm statute and the due process clause of the Constitution.’ ” Id. (quoting Boit v. Gar–Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir.1992)); see also Henry v. Sheffield, 749 F.Supp.2d 3, 9 (D.R.I.2010). Because Rhode Island's long-arm statute claims jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment,¹ however, “the question becomes whether asserting personal jurisdiction over Defendants is consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Hainey, 263 F.Supp.2d at 341 (citing Almeida v. Radovsky, 506 A.2d 1373, 1374 (R.I.1986)). In making this determination, the Court must “accept[ ] the plaintiff's properly documented evidentiary proffers as true.” Id. (citing Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.2002); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n., 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.1998)).

Under the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdiction exists when there are “minimum contacts between a nonresident defendant and the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. Schulke, 988 F.Supp. 54, 57 (D.R.I.1997) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). This can be established through one of two ways: general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. Dennett's argument, however, emphasizes specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.² Specific personal jurisdiction is established through a three-part test:

First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or relate to, the defendant's forum-state activities. Second, the defendant's instate contacts must represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state's laws and making the defendant's involuntary presence before the state's courts foreseeable. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must, in light of the Gestalt factors, be reasonable.

Hainey, 263 F.Supp.2d at 341–42 (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir.1995)).

A. Relatedness

The first prong, relatedness, “focuses on the nexus between the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's cause of action.” Id. at 342 (quoting Ticketmaster–New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir.1994)). It is met if “the claim underlying the litigation ... directly arise[s] out of, or relate[s] to, the defendant's forum-state activities.” Id. (quoting Daynard, 290 F.3d at 61).

Here, Defendants' contacts with Rhode Island are intimately related to Dennett's claim. Dennett retained Defendants to represent him in an FTCA case arising out of a botched diagnosis and operation by the Providence VA. The diagnosis occurred in Rhode Island, as did the operation; thus any fact gathering and discovery—a necessity regardless of whether the case went to trial or settled early—would have necessarily involved Defendants establishing contacts in Rhode Island. Moreover, under the FTCA, Dennett was required to file suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which would in turn be required to apply Rhode Island substantive law. See28 U.S.C. §§ 1402, 1346(b)(1). As a result, Defendants' preparation of the case must have (or at least should have) included researching Rhode Island law. This is especially true with respect to damages, the key issue at play during the settlement negotiations. It is hard to argue that these contacts with Rhode Island are unrelated for jurisdictional purposes.

Indeed, at oral argument Defendants essentially conceded that these contacts would ordinarily be sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. According to Defendants, however, the Court is presented with a unique...