Dennis v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. GLR–13–3731. |
| Citation | 21 F.Supp.3d 497 |
| Parties | Graham DENNIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TALBOT COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
John R. Garza, Garza Regan and Associates PC, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew W. Nussbaum, Nussbaum Law LLC, Clarksville, MD, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is Defendants', Board of Education of Talbot County (the “Board”), Karen Salmon, Lynne Duncan, David Stofa, and Sherry Bowen, Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiffs, Graham Dennis and Casey Edsall, are suing Defendants for constitutional violations arising from when they suspended Dennis and Edsall for possessing weapons on school property. Having reviewed the pleadings and supporting documents, the Court finds no hearing necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.2011). For the reasons outlined below, Defendants' Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Dennis and Edsall were students at Easton High School in Talbot County, Maryland, and members of the school's lacrosse team.2 On April 12, 2011, the Department of Juvenile Services informed Duncan, then the Board Student Services Supervisor, that a parent had alleged Easton High lacrosse team members had concealed alcohol in water bottles and consumed it on the bus to and from athletic events. After discussions with senior staff members, Duncan decided to search the lacrosse team bus prior to its departure for an athletic event.
On April 13, 2011, Duncan, Stofa and Bowen, Easton High's principal and assistant principal, respectively, and other security staff boarded the bus and announced to the lacrosse team that they would be conducting a search. While giving the students stickers to mark their belongings, but before any belongings were searched, Dennis told Assistant Principal Bowen he had a pocketknife in his bag. She told Dennis to retrieve it. He complied. Dennis surrendered a two-and-a-half-inch blade to Assistant Principal Bowen, who instructed him to leave his bag on his seat and exit the bus. A subsequent search of his bag returned a Leatherman tool with three tiny blades. Similarly, Edsall left his bag on his seat and exited the bus. When searching Edsall's bag, Assistant Principal Bowen found a butane lighter.
Talbot County Public Schools staff contacted police and handed over the small knives and butane lighter when they arrived. The police arrested Dennis at the scene for possessing the pocketknife on school property.
Following the incident, Principal Stofa suspended Dennis and Edsall for possessing dangerous weapons on school property. Dennis received a ten-day suspension and was further recommended for expulsion from school. Edsall only received a one-day suspension. Dennis and Edsall appealed their suspensions to Salmon, then the Superintendent of Talbot County Public Schools. Superintendent Salmon affirmed Dennis's ten-day suspension but declined to expel him from school. She also affirmed Edsall's one-day suspension.
Dennis and Edsall then appealed their suspensions to the Board, arguing the small knives and butane lighter were tools routinely used to maintain their lacrosse sticks. The Board affirmed their suspensions nonetheless. Undeterred, Dennis and Edsall appealed to the Maryland State Board of Education (the “State Board”). On April 10, 2012, the State Board reversed Dennis and Edsall's suspensions, and ordered that their records be expunged.
A year and a half later, Dennis and Edsall filed this action against Defendants in this Court, alleging unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count I) and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count II). (ECF No. 1). They also allege a violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count III) and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV). They bring the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ask the Court to take pendent jurisdiction of the state constitutional claims. Notably, in addition to the Board, Dennis and Edsall are suing Superintendent Salmon in her individual capacity, and Duncan, Principal Stofa, and Assistant Principal Bowen in their individual and official capacities. Defendants now move to dismiss. (ECF No. 3).
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice and are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
Thus, the Court “must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Monroe v. City of Charlotesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir.2009) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). And in doing so, the Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) ; Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.2005) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ). Lastly, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may rely on documents outside the complaint if they are attached to or referenced in the complaint. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 450 (4th Cir.2011) (citations omitted).
Defendants first argue the § 1983 claims against the Board and individually named Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed because they are not “persons” under § 1983. Dennis and Edsall seem to confuse this argument with the analysis involving the Eleventh Amendment, contending in response that Defendants cannot assert the Eleventh Amendment to avoid liability under § 1983. Regardless, Defendants are more persuasive. Whether Defendants are subject to suit under § 1983 and whether they may assert the Eleventh Amendment are two separate issues. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Of them, the only question relevant here is whether Defendants are “persons” who can be sued under § 1983. The Court concludes they are not.
Section 1983 allows individuals to sue any “person” who violates their constitutional rights while acting under the color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). But state agencies and state officials acting within their official capacities cannot be sued under § 1983 because they are not “persons.” See Will, 491 U.S. at 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304 ; Mayo v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., 797 F.Supp.2d 685, 689 (D.Md.2011), aff'd, 713 F.3d 735 (4th Cir.2013). County school boards and their officials are considered state agencies and state officials. Mayo, 797 F.Supp.2d at 689 ; Rosenfeld v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 41 F.Supp.2d 581, 586 (D.Md.1999) ; Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Md. 194, 18 A.3d 890, 900 (2011). Because the Board and individually named Defendants in their official capacities are a county school board and school officials, they are not “persons” and cannot be sued under § 1983. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims will be dismissed against them accordingly.
Next, Defendants argue the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001 (the “Coverdell Act”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 6731 et seq. (2012), protects the individually named Defendants from suit in their individual capacities. Dennis and Edsall argue the Coverdell Act protection does not extend to claims alleging constitutional violations. The Court agrees.
The Coverdell Act allows school officials to use reasonable measures “to maintain order, discipline, and an appropriate educational environment.” Id. § 6732. Vitally, no teacher, administrator, or individual member of a school board is liable for harm to a student if he was acting within his scope of employment, and the actions complied with the law and were in an effort to discipline a student or maintain control. Id. §§ 6733(6)(A), 6733(6)(D), 6736(a)(1)–(2). The immunity, however, is not absolute. It does not apply to any “misconduct for which the defendant has been found to have violated a Federal or State civil rights law.” Id. § 6736(d)(1)(C).
Without question, Dennis and Edsall assert civil rights violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the parallel Maryland constitutional provisions. These are the very type of claims the Coverdell Act expressly excludes from its protection under § 6736(d)(1)(C). See 78 Frances Amendola et al., C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 505 (2014) (). Defendants are thus not immune from those claims here.
Notwithstanding, Defendants argue this decision “render[s] the [Coverdell] Act meaningless” because it would nullify the Act's protection against all...
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