Dennis v. State
| Decision Date | 23 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-18-588,CR-18-588 |
| Citation | 2020 Ark. 28,592 S.W.3d 646 |
| Parties | Darrell DENNIS, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appellant Darrell Dennis appeals from the denial and dismissal by the trial court of his pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2017). He alleges that the trial court erred by denying his numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the petition. We affirm the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. Because we affirm the trial court’s denial of Rule 37.1 relief, Dennis’s motion to stay the appeal is moot.
In 2015, Dennis was convicted of capital murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. Because the State did not seek the death penalty for the crime of capital murder, Dennis automatically received a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for that offense. Dennis was sentenced by the court as a habitual offender to concurrent terms of life in prison for the remaining offenses. Dennis appealed, and this court affirmed. Dennis v. State , 2016 Ark. 395, 503 S.W.3d 761.
The testimony adduced at trial reflects that in the early morning hours on May 10, 2013, Forrest Abrams drove his red Chevrolet Tracker to the Golden Foods store in Little Rock so that Tyler Hodges could buy cigarettes, and while in the parking lot, Hodges met a man, later identified as Dennis, who asked for money. When Hodges returned to the Tracker, he got into the back seat while Dennis got into the front passenger seat. After leaving the parking lot, Abrams discussed purchasing drugs from Dennis, and Dennis pointed a gun at Abrams and made him switch seats. Dennis then drove the Tracker to a location where they met two young black males. The men confiscated Abrams’s and Hodges’s wallets and forced them into another vehicle, a tan Geo Prizm.1
Dennis drove the second vehicle to an ATM and unsuccessfully tried to use Hodges’s debit cards, and to placate Dennis, Hodges told Dennis that he had money at his cousin’s house. Dennis held Abrams as "collateral" and one of the younger males walked Hodges, at gunpoint, to the front door of the cousin’s house. Hodges escaped by going into the house when the cousin answered the door, and he subsequently called 911.
The Little Rock Police Department responded to a call at 5:05 a.m. alerting of shots fired. Abrams was found dead, having been shot four times in the back. Abrams’s Tracker was found later that morning with the cover of the gas tank open and a nozzle from a gas can inserted in the tank.
Detective Hudson disseminated still photographs of the driver from the ATM camera throughout the police department and later received information from another officer that identified the driver as Dennis. Hudson subsequently prepared a photographic spread for Hodges to view, and Hodges selected Dennis from the array. Dennis was arrested on May 23, and on June 5, 2013, Alvin Cooper, an informant, contacted Hudson. Cooper advised Hudson that he was at the Golden Foods on May 10, 2013, purchasing fuel for his Suburban and that he saw an acquaintance, "Red."2 After showing Cooper the photographic spread, Cooper identified Dennis as Red. Detective Hudson also viewed video from the store, and although it was of poor quality, he was able to confirm the presence of Abrams’s Tracker and Cooper’s Suburban were at the store at the same time.
The State also offered testimony from Sylvester Williams, who had been in the Pulaski County jail with Dennis. Williams testified that Dennis told him he was going to beat the charges because the camera from the store did not show that he was there and that Dennis regretted not killing the other victim, Hodges.
This court reviews the trial court’s decision on Rule 37.1 petitions for clear error. Gordon v. State , 2018 Ark. 73, 539 S.W.3d 586. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Lacy v. State , 2018 Ark. 174, 545 S.W.3d 746.
This court’s standard for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Henington v. State , 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55. Pursuant to the Strickland test, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Williams v. State , 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007). A petitioner making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim bears the heavy burden of demonstrating his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Springs v. State , 2012 Ark. 87, 387 S.W.3d 143. A court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.
Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced petitioner’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. Id. The petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Howard v. State , 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. Additionally, conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Reams v. State , 2018 Ark. 324, 560 S.W.3d 441.
Dennis raised numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Rule 37.1 petition, and he renews those arguments on appeal. Dennis contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a continuance to be relieved as counsel; that counsel was unprepared for trial because counsel failed to investigate the case and impeach the State’s witnesses and introduce evidence to establish a viable defense; and that counsel failed to object to the State’s use of false testimony.
Under these general assertions, Dennis makes specific allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach (1) Hodges’s testimony that he was robbed and kidnapped at gunpoint at a convenience store because the store clerk, Johnny Reeves, wrote a statement that no robbery or kidnapping took place and that video surveillance indicated that Hodges and Abrams were approached by an individual but that the individual did not get in the vehicle; (2) Hodges’s testimony that he and Abrams were driven to Hodges’s aunt’s house by Dennis because Hodges’s aunt wrote a statement that she did not see Dennis or Abrams in front of her house and that Carlos Reese was seen on the porch; (3) Hodges’s testimony because Abrams sold drugs and "Hodges set Abrams up for Carlos Reese" and the "fact that Abrams was already dead long before Hodges called police," and Hodges’s testimony due to Carlos Reese texting a friend of Abrams’s, Reese lying about his alibi, Reese’s running from the police, and Reese’s being identified on the front porch; (4) Hodges’s trial testimony that he drove from the store to his aunt’s house, with the 911 call, that indicated he ran from the store to his aunt’s house; (5) Hodges’s and Detective Hudson’s testimony that indicated Hodges identified Dennis in a photo lineup on May 11, 2013, because Hudson allegedly sought assistance in "running ads in jail to identify a suspect in this case" after the identification was made on May 11, 2013; (6) Sylvester Williams’s and Officer Lisa Warner’s testimony about the Pulaski County Detention Center’s policy regarding segregation of jail inmates; (7) Hodges’s testimony that he escaped and called 911 at 5:22 a.m. when Abrams "had been dead a long time before Hodges called police"; (8) Hodges’s testimony because Officer Cassandra Davis’s statement in the newspaper exposed inconsistencies with the actual timeline of events; (9) Hodges’s testimony about the 911 call because Hodges testified that he was forced into another vehicle but the 911 call did not make any such statement; and (10) Hodges’s testimony and credibility because he was under the influence of LSD during the incident, and counsel should have had an expert to testify about the influence of LSD. None of the claims raised by Dennis merit postconviction relief, and the trial court properly denied relief.4
The trial court found that Dennis failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a continuance to be relieved and for going to trial. Trial counsel, Thomas Devine, did seek to be removed as counsel; however, no conflict of interest was found. Dennis , 2016 Ark. 395, 503 S.W.3d 761. This court on direct appeal noted that, even at that time, Id. at 15, 503 S.W.3d at 770. Dennis’s trial had been set and continued five times, and the trial...
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...to argue thePage 11 sufficiency of this evidence, which, as we stated above, is not cognizable in a Rule 37 petition. See Dennis v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d 646. Sixth, Pitts claims that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the prosecutor's aiding a witness in her presenta......
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Pitts v. State
...to argue thesufficiency of this evidence, which, as we stated above, is not cognizable in a Rule 37 petition. See Dennis v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d 646. Sixth, Pitts claims that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the prosecutor's aiding a witness in her presentation of ......