Dennis v. State
| Decision Date | 23 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | S16A1600 |
| Parties | DENNIS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert James Dennis, pro se.
J. David Miller, Dist. Atty., Michelle T. Harrison, Kenneth B. Still, Asst. Dist. Atty., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
On October 18, 1998, Robert James Dennis, who was 17 years old, pled guilty to several charges, including malice murder, in connection with the February 22, 1997 shooting death of Louise Carter. Dennis was sentenced, in relevant part to this appeal, to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. On October 14, 2015, the State filed a motion to amend Dennis' sentence based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders" without a sentencing court first "tak[ing] into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 2469 (II). The United States Supreme Court further refined its ruling in Miller , supra, in Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), stating in relevant part:
A hearing where "youth and its attendant characteristics" are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not. The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller's substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.
(Citation omitted.) Id. at 735 (III).
Following a December 9, 2015 resentencing hearing, the trial court reduced Dennis' malice murder sentence from life without the possibility of parole to life with the possibility of parole. Dennis appeals pro se from this resentencing ruling,1 and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by reducing Dennis' malice murder sentence from life without the possibility of parole to life with the possibility of parole.2 In this regard, as this Court has recently made clear:
[A] sentence imposed in violation of th[e] substantive rule [created by Miller , supra] —that is, a[ ] [life-without-the-possibility-of-parole] sentence imposed on a juvenile who is not properly determined to be in the very small class of juveniles for whom such a sentence may be deemed constitutionally proportionate—"is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void." Montgomery , supra, 136 S.Ct. at 731 [ (II) ]. [Accordingly,] ... state collateral review courts that are open to federal law claims must apply Miller retroactively if a petitioner challenges his sentence under the Eighth Amendment.3
(Emphasis omitted.) Veal v. State , 298 Ga. 691, 701 (5) (d), 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016). Indeed, "[w]here a sentence is void, ... the court may resentence the defendant at any time." Crumbley v. State , 261 Ga. 610, 611 (1), 409 S.E.2d 517 (1991) ; see also, e.g., Williams v. State , 271 Ga. 686, 689 (1), 523 S.E.2d 857 (1999).
Here, the transcript of the 1998 guilty plea hearing reveals that the sentencing court did not examine any of the required factors under Miller and Montgomery "before concluding that life without any possibility of parole was the appropriate penalty" for Dennis, who committed malice murder when he was a 17-year-old juvenile. Miller , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (II). See also Veal , supra, 298 Ga. at 702–703 (5)(d), 784 S.E.2d 403 (). Thus, Dennis' 1998 sentence of life without the possibility of parole was void and subject to a challenge on Eighth Amendment grounds at any time. See id.
Because Dennis' original sentence for malice murder was void, the trial court was free to resentence him for malice murder pursuant to Miller and Montgomery . See Veal , supra. In this connection, the trial court properly resentenced Dennis to the legally permissible sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole for the malice murder that he committed as a juvenile.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
1 Although Dennis' resentencing is the only issue properly before us in this appeal, Dennis attempts to raise several other issues in his pro se appellate brief that were either never raised below or are unrelated to his resentencing. Because those issues are unrelated to the trial court's resentencing order,...
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