Dennison v. Dennison
| Decision Date | 18 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 34474,34474 |
| Citation | 59 O.O. 210,165 Ohio St. 146,134 N.E.2d 574 |
| Parties | , 59 O.O. 210 DENNISON, Appellee. v. DENNISON, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under Section 8003-19, General Code, Section 3105.18, Revised Code, the allowance of permanent alimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review by the Court of Appeals upon the questions of the weight of the evidence and abuse of discretion.
Appellant herein, Glenn Jennings Dennison, hereinafter designated plaintiff, instituted an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County against appellee herein, Ethelda Dennison, hereinafter designated defendant, and in his petition plaintiff prays for a divorce from defendant, permanent care, custody and control of the minor child of plaintiff and defendant, a division of property, and all equitable relief.
Defendant filed an answer and a crosspetition for a divorce from plaintiff, temporary and permanent alimony, custody of the minor child of plaintiff and defendant, and all other proper relief.
It appears that plaintiff, a man 52 years of age, was married to defendant, a woman 29 years of age, on August 26, 1949. Both parties had been married and divorced previously, and by their former marriages plaintiff has two adult children and defendant has three minor children.
During the marriage of plaintiff and defendant, their daughter was born, with whom defendant was pregnant at the time of the marriage.
The record discloses contradictory testimony as to the domestic troubles of plaintiff and defendant and as to who was at fault, but, at the conclusion of the hotly contested trial, the trial judge entered a judgment granting defendant a divorce from plaintiff and the permanent custody, care and control of the minor child of the parties, with rights of visitation to plaintiff; ordering that plaintiff pay defendant the sum of $14.14 per week for the support and maintenance of the minor child; awarding a $350 attorney fee to defendant's counsel; and denying permanent alimony to defendant.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas as to the refusal to award her permanent alimony, and the Court of Appeals entered a judgment reversing so much of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas as denied to defent an award of permanent alimony and remanding the cause to the Court of Common Pleas with instructions to award permanent alimony to defendant.
The entry of the Court of Appeals, entered on its docket, reads:
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Parke G. Thompson, Akron, for appellant.
E. H. Hauenstein, Akron, for appellee.
The sole question before this court is the interpretation to be given Section 8003-19, General Code, Section 3105.18, Revised Code, which reads:
'Alimony may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing a sum of money, payable either in gross or installments, as the court deems equitable.'
It is the contention of defendant, and her contention was apparently adopted by the Court of Appeals, that under this statute it is mandatory upon the trial court to award some permanent alimony to a wife who has been awarded a decree of divorce for her husband's aggression, whereas it is the contention of plaintiff that under this statute it is within the discretion of the trial court whether it will award such alimony.
Section 11990, General Code, read:
'When a divorce is granted because of the husband's aggression, the court shall, if the wife so desires, restore to her any name she had before such marriage, and allow such alimony out of her husband's property as it deems reasonable, having due regard to property which came to him by marriage and...
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State ex rel. [Deceased v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio
...to the contrary"); Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist. , 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), citing Dennison v. Dennison , 165 Ohio St. 146, 134 N.E.2d 574 (1956) (stating that "[t]he word ‘shall’ is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory").{......
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State v. Banks
...is a mandatory one, whereas “may” denotes the granting of discretion.’ ” Dorrian at 108, 271 N.E.2d 834, quoting Dennison v. Dennison, 165 Ohio St. 146, 134 N.E.2d 574 (1956). {¶ 28} R.C. 2941.149(B) is devoid of any legislative intent that the word “shall” should be construed as anything o......
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State v. Herbert
...not to be mandatory, it is only given that meaning when the intention that it be permissive 'clearly' appears. Dennison v. Dennison (1956), 165 Ohio St. 146, 149, 134 N.E.2d 574. Nothing in the $50,000,000 limitation provision of R.C. 135.14 shows such a 'clear' legislative intent to make t......
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Lee v. Lee, 45809
...the evidence is conflicting or where there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision. Dennison v. Dennison (1956), 165 Ohio St. 146, 134 N.E.2d 574 ; Hine v. Hine (1927), 25 Ohio App. 120, 157 N.E. The referee's findings reflect that wife's living expenses increased ......