Denny v. Regions Bank
| Decision Date | 25 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 33782,SD 33789 Consolidated,SD 33782 |
| Citation | 479 S.W.3d 781 |
| Parties | David G. Denny and Linda Denny, Trustees of the David G. Denny and Linda J. Denny Revocable Trust Dated June 17, 2003, Appellants/Respondents, v. Regions Bank, d/b/a Regions Mortgage, and Federal National Mortgage Association, Respondents/Cross–Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appellants' attorney: Paul Forrester Sherman, Springfield.
Respondent's attorney: Mark C. Fels, Springfield.
The Dennys appeal and Respondents cross-appeal from a summary judgment declaring their respective ownership interests in foreclosure-sold real estate (the "Property"). Each side charges trial court error in finding that the other has any interest in the Property. We grant Respondents' first point, deny the Dennys' points, reverse the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
In 2003, the Dennys, married owners of the Property, conveyed it into their revocable trust.
Two years later, the Dennys as trustees 1 quitclaimed the Property to relatives, the Richardsons, via deed ("Deed") stating that "Grantors reserve unto themselves a life estate in the land conveyed by this Deed."
Two years after that, the Richardsons granted Respondent Regions Bank ("Bank") a deed of trust on the Property to secure a loan. The Dennys did not sign the note or deed of trust. Bank's title insurance commitment and lender's title policy noted and excepted the life estate mentioned in the Deed.
In 2012, for default on the Richardson loan, the Property was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale without prior written notice to the Dennys. Bank purchased the Property at foreclosure and deeded it to Respondent FNMA.
The Dennys as trustees2 sued to (1) quiet their title to a life estate in the Property, and (2) invalidate Respondents' interest in or to any part of the Property. Respondents denied the Dennys' claims and counterclaimed for judgment declaring, inter alia, that Respondents' title was superior to any interest of the Dennys.
On cross-motions for summary judgment and as relevant to this appeal,3 the trial court made these findings:
The court then entered summary judgment that "Defendant FNMA's title to the Subject Property is upheld subject to the Life Estate of David G. Denny and Linda J. Denny, personally."
Respondents moved to amend or correct the judgment, claiming in part there was no basis in the record, or under the Dennys' petition or summary judgment motion, to declare that the Dennys hold a life estate personally. The trial court denied that and other post-judgment motions. These cross-appeals followed.
Respondents' above-cited complaint, renewed on appeal, is well taken and reason enough to reverse and remand without reaching Respondents' other points.
It is beyond cavil that the Dennys' trustee vs. personal capacities differ legally, and in this circumstance materially. The Dennys exhibited their understanding of this truth at least four times. First, to put the Property into their trust in 2003, they deeded it from themselves personally to themselves as trustees. Second, they filed the underlying action only in their trustee capacities, not as individuals. Third, they asserted in their own summary judgment suggestions (emphasis ours):
Clearly, the land is readily ascertainable and Grantors' desire equally clear that "Grantors reserve unto themselves a life estate" in that land. Exhibit A at page 1. Again, referencing Exhibit A at page 2 thereof, the "Grantors" are David G. Denny and Linda J. Denny executing in their capacities before a Notary "as Trustees of the David G. Denny and Linda J. Denny Trust dated June 17, 2003." See Exhibit A at page 2.
Fourth, and perhaps most tellingly as to the Dennys' understanding and intent, they again urged in their own summary judgment suggestions (emphasis ours):
In the instant case the deed (Exhibit A) clearly evidences an intent by the Grantors to transfer title reserving continued use and possession in themselves as Trustees in their Trust. This intent should and must be given effect.
For that matter, the judgment that the Dennys hold a life estate personally lacks record support in two respects: (1) that they intended to hold such estate personally, not as trustees; and (2) even assuming such intent, that they took appropriate legal action to accomplish this (contrast their 2003 deed of the Property into their trust).
The record does not support the summary judgment entered. We need not reach Respondents' alternative challenges to the judgment or speculate whether the Dennys could prevail on any claim for life estate at a full-blown trial on remand.
These two points charge that the foreclosure sale was void and passed nothing to Respondents because the Dennys as life estate holders did not (1) sign or consent to the Richardson note or deed of trust, or (2) receive actual notice of the foreclosure sale pursuant to RSMo § 443.325. We are skeptical about standing,4 but both points are easier to deny on their merits.
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Denny v. Regions Bank
...and Terah Richardson acting pro se. JEFFREY W. BATES, J.This case is on appeal to this Court for the second time. See Denny v. Regions Bank , 479 S.W.3d 781 (Mo. App. 2016). Regions Bank (Bank) and Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) (hereinafter collectively referred to as Defenda......