Denny v. Riverbank Court Hotel Co.

• Decision Date: 25 February 1933
• Parties: DENNY, Admix., v. RIVERBANK COURT HOTEL CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

282 Mass. 176

184 N.E. 452

DENNY, Admix.,

v.RIVERBANK COURT HOTEL CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Feb. 25, 1933.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Morton, Judge.

Action by Hannah A. Denny, as administratrix of the estate of Margaret C. Denny, against the Riverbank Court Hotel Company. The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant, and reported the case on agreement of the parties.

Judgment for plaintiff.W. H. McLaughlin and G. A. McLaughlin, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Edward J. Sullivan, of Boston, for defendant.

DONAHUE, Justice.

The plaintiff as administratrix has brought an action to recover damages for the conscious suffering and death of her intestate, Margaret C. Denny, due to injuries received while in a building conducted by the defendant as a hotel. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant and reported the case upon an agreement of the parties that if the verdict was rightly directed it should stand, but if on the evidence the case should have been submitted to the jury, judgment should be entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $2,500.

On the day that Miss Denny was injured the defendant's housekeeper, Miss Riley, who was authorized to employ persons to do chambermaid work and care for rooms in the hotel conducted by the defendant, made application to an employment agency for such help. She had on an earlier occasion made a similar application and the employment agency had sent a person to the hotel who was employed by the defendant. On the day in question, in consequence of Miss Riley's application, the proprietor of the agency sent to the hotel Miss Denny who was seeking employment. The evidence would not warrant the conclusion and the defendant does not argue that when Miss Denny first walked through the doorway of the defendant's hotel she was not rightfully there by invitation of the defendant. In view of the defendant's contention that Miss Denny while in the basement where the accident occurred had only the rights of a mere licensee, it becomes necessary to consider how she came to be in that part of the hotel premises. Opposite the doorway by which she made her entrance into the hotel, in the center of the hotel office, was a desk at which was seated a young lady. In response to Miss Denny's inquiry for Miss Riley the young lady at the desk told her to take the elevator which was pointed out, to go down one flight and that there she would find Miss Riley. Several weeks after the accident the attorney of Miss Denny went to the hotel and talked with the defendant's manager who pointed out the young lady at the desk who had talked with Miss Denny on the day of the accident and said that she had directed Miss Denny to Miss Riley. Miss Denny followed the instructions given her, and entered the elevator where there was an operator who dropped the elevator car one flight and then opened the door of the elevator car and another door in the side of the elevator well. Miss Denny stepped out into the basement and the doors were closed behind her.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that Miss Denny, who was rightfully on the premises for the purpose of meeting Miss Riley, should have acted otherwise than she did. When she entered the hotel office it does not appear that there was present any employee, officer or agent of the defendant other than the young lady at the desk of whom she might make the necessary inquiry, and there was no evidence of any signs or notices displayed which would indicate to a stranger where inquiries pertinent to the business of the defendant might be made if not made at the desk. The office of a hotel generally is the place of initial contact between strangers and the hotel management. Miss Denny came to the hotel as a stranger at the request of the defendant to see its authorized agent, Miss Riley. She was directed to go to the basement for that purpose. The record shows that Miss Riley in fact had an office in that part of the hotel premises and, so far as appears, there were no other means provided for reaching it than by the use of the elevator. The evidence, with the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, would warrant a jury in finding that the young lady at the desk was not only an employee of the defendant but also ostensibly such an employee as might properly be addressed by Miss Denny to obtain the information she needed and one whose directions she was warranted in following. It cannot here be said as a matter of law that Miss Denny was not warranted in trusting in the appearance of the young lady as clerk of the hotel and in assuming that she possessed the authority which she seemed to have. Newman v. British & North American Steamship Co., 113 Mass. 362, 365;McDonald v. Dr. McKnight, Inc., 248 Mass. 43, 48, 142 N. E. 825. As between the plaintiff and the defendant the actual authority of the young lady is immaterial if she was ostensibly clothed with authority to give the directions which she in fact gave to Miss Denny. Rintamaki v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 205 Mass. 115, 120, 91 N. E. 220;Brooks v. Shaw, 197 Mass. 376, 380, 84 N. E. 110;Hosher-Platt Co. v. Miller, 238 Mass. 518, 524, 131 N. E. 310;O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mass. 123, 124, 140 N. E. 282;Boston Food Products Co. v. Wilson & Co., 245 Mass. 550, 560, 139 N. E. 637;Petition of C. F. Hovey Co., 254 Mass. 551, 555, 151 N. E. 66. It was agreed that the defendant's engineer, if present at the trial, would testify that the defendant had established a rule, variable solely by its general manager, that the elevator in question should be...