Dent v. Adkisson
Decision Date | 30 November 1931 |
Docket Number | 29 |
Citation | 43 S.W.2d 739,184 Ark. 869 |
Parties | DENT v. ADKISSON |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Faulkner Chancery Court; W. E. At-kinson, Chancellor reversed.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded.
George F. Hartje and Patterson & Patterson, for appellant.
R W. Robins, for appellee.
The appellants, R. E. Dent and wife, on December 30, 1927, were the owners of a plantation in Faulkner and Pulaski counties containing approximately 4,200 acres, more than half being fertile lands situated in the Arkansas River bottoms, with a total of approximately 3,000 acres under cultivation upon which was a ginnery and other improvements. The appellants owned, in addition to the plantation, 41 mules, 2 head of horses, 31 head of grown cattle, 31 calves, 57 head of hogs and farming machinery necessary for the cultivation of the plantation. On the date mentioned, they executed two promissory notes to the appellee, one for $ 10,000 due October 1, 1928, and the other for $ 60,000 due December 30, 1928. To secure these notes and such further advances of money as the appellee might make to them, they executed a real estate mortgage on their plantation and also a chattel mortgage covering the property above referred to, together with the crops to be grown during the year 1928.
On January 22, 1929, the appellee, G. W. Adkisson, brought suit to foreclose these mortgages, and on the 26th of January following made application for a receiver to take charge of the property. Thereupon W. W. Bishop was appointed as receiver, who, on February 1, 1929, with the approval of the court, delivered all the said property into the possession of the appellee. Of the original amount loaned and for the moneys advanced during the year 1928 there remained a balance unpaid of $ 56,473.94, for which sum judgment was rendered and a decree of foreclosure entered on February 13, 1929, and an order for the sale of the property embraced in the mortgages. The commissioner appointed by the court to make the sale advertised the property for sale on the 12th of September. On the 11th of September the appellants paid to the appellee $ 10,000, in consideration of which payment the sale was extended to the 12th day of December following. On December 12th the appellant paid the appellee the sum of $ 5,000, and the sale was extended to March 14, 1930. On that date $ 5,000 more was paid with an extension of the sale to April 14th, on which date another $ 5,000 was paid by the appellants and an extension of sale given. On September 3, 1930, the court made an order further extending the sale of the property until November 3, 1930, at which time the appellants paid to the appellee a further sum of $ 5,000. In other words, the date of sale was postponed from time to time in consideration of cash payments, the total of which amounted to $ 30,000 from September 11, 1929, to September 3, 1930. The rents collected by the appellee during and for the years 1929 and 1930, not all being accounted for on October 21, 1930, the appellants waived claim for the balance of these rents, and entered into a written agreement with the appellee by which it was agreed that no further postponement of the sale would be asked, and that at the sale the appellee should bid an amount equal to the balance due in his favor, and that the hearing of the report of sale be postponed until December 15th, at which time confirmation of sale would be made unless the indebtedness should on or before that date be paid. The agreement concluded as follows: "In event the defendants shall, on or before December 15, 1930, pay to the plaintiff the amount that should be then due on the indebtedness, including interest up to that date, and costs, mentioned in and covered by the decree in this case, then plaintiff will join with the defendants in asking the court to refuse to confirm the said sale, or, if the defendants prefer, and shall so direct the plaintiff in writing, upon the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which should then be due on said indebtedness, including interest up to date and costs, the plaintiff will assign and transfer without recourse from him the decree and judgment in this case in his favor to such person or corporation as the defendants may direct in writing."
For some reason no action was taken by the court on December 15th, but on December 29th report of sale was made showing that the property had been purchased by the appellee for the balance due him in the sum of $ 39,659.01, and the report came up for confirmation, when the appellant filed a petition, which, omitting formal parts, is as follows:
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