Dent v. Railway Mail Ass'n

• Citation: 183 F. 840
• Parties: DENT v. RAILWAY MAIL ASS'N.
• Decision Date: 09 December 1910
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

183 F. 840

DENT v. RAILWAY MAIL ASS'N.

United States Circuit Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

December 9, 1910

This was an action brought by the widow of James Dent, who came to his death from the effects of poison ivy. From the undisputed facts it appeared that on May 2, 1909, the deceased with the plaintiff went to the outskirts of the city of St Paul, where he, leaving his wife, walked into some adjacent woods, and there cut a branch of oak and a little stick, which he brought back to her. Within a day or two he called his wife's attention to a discoloration between the fingers of his hand, which subsequently turned into an eruption that spread to his arms, neck, and chest. This eruption progressed, and in the latter part of the month he called on a physician who prescribed for him. A few days thereafter he saw the physician again who told him that he would have to quit work. About two days later the same physician was summoned and found deceased in a very bad condition, and a nurse was called in. This condition went from bad to worse and grew desperate, so that on June 21st he was removed to a hospital, where he died two days later. The undisputed evidence showed that his death was caused by poison ivy. He held a policy in the defendant company, but it refused to pay on the ground that the death was not accidental.

Owen O'Neil, for plaintiff.

John P Kennedy, for defendant.

WILLARD District Judge (orally, after stating the facts as above).

This case presents some very interesting questions. During the recess I have examined with some care the cases cited by defendant. The questions presented in the case may be reduced to three. The first one relates to the clause in the policy or in the constitution with regard to poison. The second one is whether this was an accident or not. The third relates to that part of the constitution or the policy which provides for external visible marks.

Taking up the clause relating to poison first, it is seen that it reads as follows:

'Nor shall any benefit be paid where death or disability results from voluntarily inflicted injuries, by the member sane or insane; nor from poison or other injurious matter taken or administered accidentally or otherwise.'

If that portion of the certificate or constitution had stopped with the words 'from poison,' another question altogether would have been presented. But it does not say 'no benefit shall be paid if the loss occurs from poison. ' That general clause is qualified by the words 'taken or administered accidentally or otherwise. ' The word 'administered,' of course, has no application to this case, and the question is: In what sense must the word 'taken' be considered? I am very clearly of the opinion, when we consider that the word 'taken' is used in connection with the word 'administered,' and that they are both used in connection with the words 'accidental or otherwise,' that it excludes a case similar to the one that we have here. It must have been, in my judgment, an internal taking, and that taking must be the effect of an act voluntary or involuntary of the person injured.

I think it would shock the ideas of justice of us all to hold that this policy did not include a death by the bite of a poisonous snake. If anything could be considered an accident, I think that would be so considered, and there is no reason why this company should not and should not be willing to pay for such a loss. As said by Mr. O'Neil, this clause was undoubtedly inserted to exclude a case of suicide. It was intended to cover such a case, and exempt the company where death resulted from the taking of the insured's own life by administration of poison by himself; or perhaps to cover such a case as the one in Wisconsin, where a dentist administered some poisonous substance to his patient.

An examination of the authorities cited by the defendant makes it plain that the policies differ in important particulars from the policy here.

The first case cited is McGlother v. Provident Mutual Accident Company of Philadelphia, 89 F. 685, 32 C.C.A. 318. The policy there contained the words 'or from poison, contact with poisonous substances. ' If that clause had stopped with the word 'poison,' the case would have been stronger than this; but it does not stop there, but says also 'contact with poisonous substances,' which makes it much stronger than this case. If those words had been contained in this policy, it would have been very difficult, in my judgment, for the plaintiff to recover.

It was entirely within the power of the company to have made this provision plain. If it had intended to exclude any liability on account of death caused by any poison, in any way, it could have used the language that was before the court in the McGlother Case. But it did not do that.

The same thing may be said of the case cited by defendant from the Supreme Court of Florida, the case of Preferred Accident Insurance Company v. Robinson, 45 Fla. 525, reported in 33 So. 1005, 61 L.R.A. 145.

The words 'absorbed' was not in that case used in connection with the word 'poison.' That policy provided as follows:

'Nor injury, fatal or nonfatal, resulting from any poison or infection, nor from anything whatever, accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled.'

This was a positive provision that the policy did not cover a case which resulted from poison. It went further than this certificate goes in that respect, and also went further than this certificate goes in another respect; for it provided that it should not apply to a case of injury resulting from anything whatever, accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, or absorbed. The word 'absorbed' is not found in this policy.

The case of Bacon v. U.S. Mutual Accident Association, 123 N.Y. 304, 25 N.E. 399, 9 L.R.A. 617, 20 Am.St.Rep. 748, had to do with a policy which contained the simple phrase 'from poison,' without any qualifying words. It being within the power of the company by the use of those words to exempt it from liability from this particular loss, if there is any doubt as to what the policy means, it must be construed against the company. And although Judge Sanborn says in the opinion first cited that this proposition has been very much abused, yet it must be applied, I think, in a case of this kind where there is a real doubt. In that case there was no doubt, because, the person having been killed from poison, whether he took it accidentally or not, he must have died from poison.

But the question here is whether the insured died from poison taken or administered, and I think the construction of these words...