Jones v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 01 July 1918 |
| Docket Number | 30597 |
| Citation | 168 N.W. 305,184 Iowa 1299 |
| Parties | L. MYRTLE JONES, Appellant, v. HAWKEYE COMMERCIAL MEN'S ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED DECEMBER 14, 1918.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--W. H. MCHENRY, Judge.
ACTION to recover benefits under an accident insurance certificate. The defense was that the death of the insured resulted from a cause which was excepted from the operation of the insurance certificate, in that the insured died from asphyxiation by gas. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Stipp Perry & Starzinger, for appellant.
Bradford & Johnson and Parsons & Mills, for appellee.
The defendant is a mutual accident association. The deceased was concededly a member in good standing at the time of his death. The plaintiff was the beneficiary under the certificate. The death of the deceased resulted from asphyxiation from escaping gas in a hotel room wherein he slept. It was, therefore, presumably accidental. The insurance certificate specifically excepted from its operation death from certain specified causes, including the inhalation of gas. This particular exception was set forth in the insurance certificate as follows:
.
The contention of the appellant is that the foregoing provisions of the certificate should not be held to except from its operation a case of accidental asphyxiation by gas, but that the same were intended to cover only cases of intentional inhalation of gas. The following authorities are cited in support of the contention: Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N.Y. 472, 20 N.E. 347; Menneiley v. Employers' L. Ass. Corp., 148 N.Y. 596, 43 N.E. 54; Pickett v. Pacific M. L. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79, 22 A. 871; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Waterman, 161 Ill. 632, 44 N.E. 283; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 217 Ill. 390, 75 N.E. 506; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lowenstein, 38 C. C. A. 29.
Though some of these cases may be differentiated, in some respects, from the case at bar, on the whole they fairly sustain the appellant's argument, and we face the responsibility of agreeing or disagreeing with them. We are unable to yield our assent to the soundness of the reasoning put forth in the cited cases. To our minds, it is a clear and arbitrary contradiction of the very terms of the certificate, as above quoted. We see no room for candid dispute as to the meaning or construction of the terms used. If the language above quoted does not unequivocally, by its terms, except from the operation of the certificate accidents of this class, then we are unable to conceive of any language which could be used to such end. It is clearly true that all doubtful construction should be solved in favor of the insured, but such rule does not warrant an arbitrary judicial contradiction of the terms of the instrument. The right of the association to make such exception is not questioned, there being no legislative inhibition against it. As a matter of public policy, much could be said in favor of such legislative inhibition. But that question belongs to the legislative field, and does not come within the scope of judicial power. In the absence of inhibitive legislation, we are in duty bound to give effect to these exceptions as they are written. To say that the clause, "death resulting wholly or in part from gas accidentally or otherwise taken or inhaled," should be construed to mean, "gas accidentally and voluntarily inhaled," is not only a contradiction of the terms of the certificate, but is a self-contradiction. The exception covers the taking or inhalation of gas, "accidental or otherwise." The asphyxiation involved in this case was confessedly caused by the taking or inhalation of gas, accidentally "or otherwise. " If this were an action upon a life insurance policy, a somewhat different question would be presented; but accident insurance only is involved. If the death did not result from accident, there was no liability. The presumption obtains in favor of the plaintiff that the taking was accidental. For the purpose of this case, then, it was accidental. If the gas was inhaled accidentally, it was not inhaled voluntarily. How, then, could the provision of the exception be construed to mean, "gas accidentally and voluntarily inhaled?" Such a construction simply inserts arbitrary contradiction into the plain terms of the exception.
The unsoundness of the holding was well set forth by Judge Sanborn, in his dissenting opinion in Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lowenstein, supra, as follows:
We can conceive of no fair answer that can be made to the above reasoning.
To award recovery in this case would be to make arbitrarily a new contract between the parties. This is a mutual association. By the terms of its certificate, its members have clearly chosen not to insure each other against death from the cause here indicated. By these provisions, the insured was at all times protected against assessments for death from such cause. He had the full benefit of the exception during his lifetime. Why, therefore, should not his co-members continue to have the benefit of it, now as well as hitherto? We think the trial court properly directed the verdict, and its order is--Affirmed.
DISSENT BY: WEAVER
The majority, while conceding that the death of the insured was produced by an accidental cause, deny plaintiff the right to recover, on the sole ground that the insurer is exempt from liability because of certain exceptions embodied in the contract of insurance. It is proper, therefore, at the outset, to look to the law governing an exception in an insurance policy which takes away or neutralizes a right of recovery which, but for such clause, would be indisputable under the general terms of the contract. It is universally held (or perhaps I should say it was the universal holding until the majority in this case said otherwise) that, a policy of insurance being framed in language chosen by the insurer, every exception and condition embodied therein to relieve it from liability is to be given the construction most favorable to the insured. The precedents to this effect are too numerous and too familiar to call for citation; but see authorities collated in Goodwin v. Provident Sav. L. Ass. Assn., 97 Iowa 226, 66 N.W. 157; also, Burkhard v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 102 Pa. 262. For illustration of the application of this rule to fact conditions, I call attention to the following: Not infrequently, accident policies provide exception from liability if death or injury is caused by voluntary exposure to danger; but this is construed by the courts to mean, not a voluntary act, in the ordinary sense, but an act done intentionally, knowing the risk, and recklessly taking the chances. It has also been held that such an exception does not include a case where the insured is injured or loses his life in attempting to save the life of another, even though he acts with knowledge of the danger to himself. Keene v. New England Mut. Acc. Assn., 161 Mass. 149, 36 N.E. 891; Da Rin v. Casualty Co., 41 Mont. 175, 108 P. 649; Tucker v. Mutual Ben. L. Co., 50 Hun 50, 4 N.Y.S. 505 (affirmed 121 N.Y. 718); DeLoy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 171 Pa. 1 (50 Am. St. 787, 32 A. 1108); 1 Labatt on Master & Servant (1st Ed.), Section 360; Thompson on Negligence (2d Ed.), 5435; 1 C. J. 447. A provision against liability where death has been caused wholly or in part by a surgical operation or treatment, does not apply where such operation or treatment is reasonably necessary. Westmoreland v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 75 F. 244; Vernon v. Iowa St. Trav. Men's Assn., 158 Iowa 597, 607, 138 N.W. 696; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Murray, 16 Colo. 296, 26...
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