Dent v. Renaissance Mktg. Corp.

• Decision Date: 01 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14 C 02999,14 C 02999
• Parties: RICHARD DENT, STEVE FULLER WILLE GAULT, JIM MCMAHON, MIKE RICHARDSON, and OTIS WILSON, Plaintiffs, v. RENAISSANCE MARKETING CORPORATION and JULIA MEYER, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

RICHARD DENT, STEVE FULLER WILLE GAULT, JIM MCMAHON,MIKE RICHARDSON, and OTIS WILSON, Plaintiffs, v. RENAISSANCE MARKETING CORPORATION and JULIA MEYER, Defendants.

No. 14 C 02999

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

June 1, 2015

Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Six members of the 1985 Chicago Bears football team, Richard Dent, Steve Fuller, Willie Gault, Jim McMahon, Mike Richardson, and Otis Wilson (collectively Plaintiffs or the Shufflin' Crew), filed this suit in state court against Renaissance Marketing Corporation and Julia Meyer. R. 1-1, State Court Compl. ¶ 1.¹ Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used Plaintiffs' personas in the "Super Bowl Shuffle" without authorization. Renaissance and its sole officer, Julia Meyer, removed the original complaint to federal court, arguing that it was preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. R. 1, Defs.' Notice of Removal. Plaintiffs moved to remand. R. 15, Pls.' First Mot. Remand. This Court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and conversion were preempted, but that the claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and an accounting were not. R. 36, Order on First Mot. Remand. The Court therefore had federal-questionjurisdiction over the preempted claims and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Id.

After the denial of the motion to remand, Plaintiffs amended their complaint, removing the preempted claims and adding a claim under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq. R. 51, Am. Compl. Plaintiffs moved to remand the amended complaint, R. 53, Pls.' Second Mot. Remand, and Defendants again opposed the motion, R. 92, Defs.' Resp. Br. Red Label Publishing, Inc., a proposed third-party intervenor² and owner of the copyrights involved in this suit, also opposed the motion to remand. R. 94, Red Label Resp. Br. Both the Defendants and the intervenor (represented by the same counsel) argue that the Publicity Act claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, Red Label Resp. at 4-8; Defs.' Resp. Br. at 5-19, and Defendants argue that forum-manipulation concerns counsel against relinquishing subject-matter jurisdiction over the state-law claims, Defs.' Resp. Br. at 1-5. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' motion to remand is granted.

I. Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the dispute between the Shufflin' Crew and Defendants as described more fully in the order denying the first motion to remand. See Dent v. Renaissance Marketing Corp., 2014 WL 5465006, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2014) (R. 36 on the Court's docket). In short, the Shufflin' Crew—six former members of the Chicago Bears—agreed to perform in the Super Bowl Shuffle, a video and song celebrating the Chicago Bears' 1985 Super Bowlvictory. R. 51, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. Red Label Records and its president, Richard Meyer, were to develop and produce the video. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. The parties entered into a Royalty Agreement to define each party's rights in the work and to ensure that the Shuffle's charitable purpose would be carried out. Id. ¶¶ 12-13; see also R. 51-1, Pls.' Exh. A, Royalty Agreement. The agreement expired on March 31, 1989. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. In 1986, Red Label assigned its rights in the Shuffle to Richard Meyer individually without the Shufflin' Crew's consent. Id. ¶ 19. Richard Meyer's widow, Defendant Julia Meyer, now claims survivorship rights in the Shuffle. State Court Compl. ¶ 11.

In 2014, the Shufflin' Crew filed this lawsuit in Illinois court against Julia Meyer and her licensing company, Defendant Renaissance Marketing. Id. at 1. Defendants removed the state-court case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of complete preemption by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Defs.' Notice of Removal at 2-20. Plaintiffs moved to remand, Pls.' First Mot. Remand, and the Court denied the motion, Dent, 2014 WL 5465006 at *1. In that order, the Court concluded that although some of Plaintiffs' claims against Renaissance and Meyer were not preempted by the Copyright Act (the claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and an accounting), other claims were preempted, so remand was denied. Id. at *3-6. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint, eliminating the preempted claims and including a claim under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq.³ See Am. Compl. Plaintiffs moved to remand. Pls.' SecondMot. Remand. Defendants and the proposed intervenors oppose remand. Defs.' Resp. Br.; Red Label Resp. Br.

II. Legal Standard

Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides, in pertinent part, that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district ... embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). After a case is removed, it may be remanded based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time before a final judgment is issued. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal, however, see In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), so post-removal amendments will not ordinarily strip the court of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639-41 (2009) (holding that, although the claims over which the court had original jurisdiction had been dismissed, the court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims; the decision to relinquish jurisdiction over those claims was therefore discretionary and not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). This is true even if the claims giving rise to original jurisdiction were dismissed voluntarily. Anderson v. Aon Corp., 614 F.3d 361, 364-65 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a court retains supplemental jurisdictionover related state-law claims even when the federal claims are voluntarily dismissed). But even if a district court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed case on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the court may relinquish that jurisdiction if all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction are dismissed. RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. North America, Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2012).

In general, federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The usual test for federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 is the "well pleaded complaint rule," which requires federal courts to look only at the complaint itself "to determine if the case arises under federal law." Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc., 272 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, "[c]omplete preemption 'confers exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain instances where Congress intended the scope of a federal law to be so broad as to entirely replace any state-law claim.'" Nelson v. Welch (In re Repository Techs.), 601 F.3d 710, 722 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2008)). "Under this jurisdictional doctrine, certain federal statutes have such 'extraordinary pre-emptive power' that they 'convert [ ] an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim.'" Id. (citing Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, 538 F.3d at 596; Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004)). "Complete preemption, therefore, creates an exception to the rule that courts look only to the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint to determinewhether federal jurisdiction exists. If the complaint pleads a state-law claim that is completely preempted by federal law, the claim is removable to federal court." Id. (citing Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, 538 F.3d at 596-97).

The federal Copyright Act preempts "all legal and equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106" and are "in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). "Even though [a] claim is created by state law, a case may 'arise under' a law of the United States if the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of ... [federal] law." See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964); accord Int'l Armor & Limousine Co. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 272 F.3d 912, 915-16 (7th Cir. 2001). But not every claim that involves a copyright will be preempted by the Copyright Act. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825-27; Nova Design Build, Inc. v. Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2011). Preemption applies when "establishing the plaintiff's right [under the state-law cause of action] will require interpreting federal law." Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987).

Two conditions must be satisfied for copyright preemption of a state-law cause of action under § 301. "First, the work in which the right is asserted must be fixed in tangible form and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified in § 102. Second, the right asserted must be equivalent to any of the rights specified in § 106." Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986). Section 106 of the Copyright Act specifies five exclusive and fundamental rights in a copyrighted work: reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106; Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., ...