Denton's Guardians v. Denton's Ex'rs
| Decision Date | 29 October 1861 |
| Citation | 17 Md. 403 |
| Parties | DELIA DENTON'S Guardians, v. JAMES D. DENTON'S Executors. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
A marriage settlement or deed conveyed certain negro slaves belonging to the intended wife, to a trustee, to hold the same to the use of husband and wife during their joint natural lives, and after the death of either, to the use of such person or persons, and for such intents and purposes as the wife, by deed or will, shall direct, limit or appoint, and in default of any such limitation, direction or appointment, then to the use of the wife, her heirs and assigns forever. The wife died in 1846 leaving an only child, an infant daughter, and the husband survived her, and held the negroes till 1856, when he died. The guardians of the infant daughter then brought suit at law against the executors of the husband, for the hire of these negroes from 1846 to 1856. HELD:
1st. That by this deed, the whole equitable interest in the negroes devolved upon the infant daughter upon the death of her mother, but the title was an equitable one only, and gave the guardians of the infant no standing in a court of law to sue for the hires of the negroes.
2nd. The obvious intent and purpose of the deed was, that the trust should continue for the benefit of the child or children of the wife, and the title of the trustee was meant to continue, with the obligation and duty to preserve the property for their benefit, at least until they should become sui juris.
By the common law, a cestui que trust has no standing in court in propria persona; he can only assert his rights in a court of chancery; at law the trustee, though clothed with the mere dry legal title, is regarded as the real owner, and his name must be used in any action or other proceeding affecting the title to the property.
Personalty is not within the statute of uses, and the legal title to such property, under a deed of trust, is unaffected by the operation of that statute.
When a trust has been created in personalty, and all the purposes of the trust have ceased or at an end, the absolute estate is in the person entitled to the last use, but this must depend on the plain intent and meaning of the instrument.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Calvert county.
Assumpsit, brought on the 8th of October 1857, by the appellants against the appellees, to recover the hire of certain negro slaves, alleged to be the property of the plaintiffs' ward. Pleas, non-assumpsit and set-off.
Exception. The plaintiffs proved that in August 1857, James D. Denton, the defendants' testator, intermarried with Charlotte A. Wood; that Charlotte died in September 1846, leaving an only child, the ward of the plaintiffs, who are admitted to be her guardians, and that James D. Denton died in August 1856, leaving the defendants his executors; that at the time of said marriage, the said Charlotte owned sundry valuable slaves, which were in the joint possession of Denton and wife, until the death of the latter, in 1846, from which time they remained in the sole and separate use and possession of the surviving husband until his death, in 1856. They further proved the value of the annual hires of said negroes during the period they so remained in the sole possession of the surviving husband. The plaintiffs then offered to read in evidence the following marriage contract, duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, having first proved that Lavielle, the trustee therein named, had been dead for many years before the institution of this suit.
This deed, dated the 13th of July 1838, was between James D. Denton of the first part, Charlotte A. Wood of the second part, and Uriah Lavielle of the third part. It recites the intended marriage, and that the parties have agreed " that all the real and personal estate" belonging to the said Charlotte, " consisting of a number of slaves, and some other personal property," shall be conveyed to the uses, intents and purposes expressed in the deed, and then conveys " all the estate and property, real and personal, of the said Charlotte, which she now hath, or may hereafter have, any right, title or claim to, either at law or in equity," to Lavielle and his heirs, to hold the same " to the use of the said Charlotte, her heirs and assigns, until the said intended marriage shall be had, and from and immediately after the solemnization thereof, to use of the said James and Charlotte, for and during their joint natural lives, without impeachment of, or for any manner of waste or loss in said property whatsoever, and immediately after the death of either of them, the said James or Charlotte, then to hold the same to the use of such person or persons, or for such intents and purposes as the said Charlotte, whether covert or sole, at any time or times hereafter, during her life, by any deed or instrument of writing to be executed by her, or by her last will and testament in writing, or any writing purporting to be her last will and testament, executed as such, shall, notwithstanding her coverture, limit, direct or appoint, and in default of any such limitation, direction or appointment by her, the said Charlotte, then to use of the said Charlotte, her heirs and assigns forever ; and whereas the said Charlotte is possessed of a considerable personal estate, and by this agreement the said James hath agreed to relinquish the whole interest which the law would give him therein, in case the intended marriage takes place, now, in consideration thereof, the said Charlotte doth hereby covenant and agree to take the provision hereby made for her, as and for her jointure, and in lieu and satisfaction of all such dower or thirds at law which she could or might have claimed or been entitled to, should the intended marriage take place, out of or from any of the lands or personal estate whereof the said James now is or hereafter may be seized or possessed."
The court (BREWER, J.) refused to let the said marriage contract be read to the jury, and was of opinion that it gave...
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