DePaola v. Seamour
Decision Date | 06 June 1972 |
Citation | 303 A.2d 737,163 Conn. 246 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Lucy DePAOLA v. Arthur J. SEAMOUR. |
Alfonse C. Fasano, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Victor P. Fasano, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).
Kevin T. Gormley, New Haven, for appellee (defendant).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and RYAN, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and MacDONALD, JJ.
The plaintiff, while walking across Orange Avenue, also known as the Boston Post Road, in the town of West Haven, was struck by an automobile operated by the defendant and suffered injuries for which she sought to recover damages from the defendant, who pleaded contributory negligence as his sole special defense. From the judgment of the court in denying the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, she has appealed to this court.
The claims of error first pressed relate to the failure of the trial court on the request of the plaintiff to charge the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance, the four necessary elements of which are: Childs v. Blesso, 158 Conn. 389, 392, 260 A.2d 582. Correnti v. Catino, 115 Conn. 213, 216, 160 A. 892, 893; see Childs v. Blesso, supra; Caplan v. Arndt, 123 Conn. 585, 588-589, 196 A. 631.
Claims of error addressed to the charge are to be tested by the claims of proof as they appear in the finding. Practice Book § 635; Intelisano v. Greenwell, 155 Conn. 436, 444, 232 A.2d 490; Morgillo v. Evergreen Cemetery Assn., 152 Conn. 169, 177, 205 A.2d 368; Shulman v. Shulman, 150 Conn. 651, 654, 193 A.2d 525. On the trial, the plaintiff claimed to have proved the following: On February 2, 1966, the plaintiff Lucy DePaola completed her day's work as a waitress at Patty's Restaurant on the south side of Orange Avenue in West Haven at about 6 p.m. and walked across it to a point on the north side of Orange Avenue about fifty feet east of its intersection with Fairfax Street. There, she waited for about fifteen minutes for a bus which customarily stopped at a set of double white lines which extended to the middle of the highway to mark the point at which automobiles were required to stop for a red light at the Fairfax Street intersection, forty feet to the west. She decided to return to Patty's Restaurant and, having observed that the traffic light at Fairfax Street was red against traffic moving on Orange Avenue, she crossed to the middle of the avenue, at which point she observed the light was still red against traffic. She looked to her right, observing the lights of a car 500 to 600 feet to the west moving easterly, and then proceeded to continue to cross the two remaining southerly lanes, walking slowly and looking down at the pavement because the highway was wet and slippery and she was afraid of falling. When she had crossed to a point about five feet from the southerly curb, she was struck by a Chevrolet automobile being operated by the defendant Arthur J. Seamour in an easterly direction on Orange Avenue in the center of the right-hand, or most southerly, lane at a speed of twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. He was operating on low beam lights which gave illumination eighty to one hundred feet ahead of his vehicle, was looking straight ahead as he approached the intersection of Fairfax Street, and visibility was good, but the defendant did not see the plaintiff and the impact was the first notice to him that anyone was in the highway. The defendant continued traveling east in the southerly lane up to the moment the front of his car struck the plaintiff, throwing her forward. She was found lying in the southerly lane forty feet from dirt which fell from fenders following the impact, six and one-half feet from the southerly curb line, and seventeen feet ahead of the front of the defendant's car. The defendant did not sound his horn or give any other signal or warning of his approach.
On the foregoing claims of proof, there was no adequate basis for submitting to the jury the issue of the plaintiff's right to recover under the last clear chance doctrine. It is clear from the claims of proof previously mentioned that the plaintiff was struck by the front of the defendant's car and was, therefore, in the path of the car and obviously in a position of peril at some time prior to the accident. That the jury found her negligent in arriving at that position is apparent from the question submitted to the court during the jury's deliberations, as hereinafter discussed under another assignment of error. It also is clear from the claims of proof cited that the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant, had he been keeping a proper lookout, should have observed the plaintiff before he hit her, but it is equally clear from the same claims of proof that he did not see her until the very moment of impact, and that the plaintiff was in motion, and therefore changing her position in the highway at all times until the moment of impact. There was no direct evidence with respect to either the location of the car or its distance from the plaintiff at the time the plaintiff entered the zone of danger, and, indeed, the plaintiff's claims of proof on these issues are so conflicting and confusing as to make their inference by the jury purely speculative. See Wilson v. Dunbar, 120 Conn. 255, 257, 180 A. 296. From the foregoing, and in the absence of any other claim of proof to support the plaintiff's argument on this point, the trial court was correct in refusing to charge the jury on last clear chance because of the absence of any evidence from which the jury could infer the third element of the doctrine, requiring that the injuring party subsequently has the opportunity by the exercise of reasonable care to save the other from harm.
The next claim of error pursued by the plaintiff is concerned with the court's refusal to permit her to testify as to the custom of people who alighted from a bus on other occasions east of the intersection involved here, and as to where she herself crossed the road earlier on that day and on other occasions. We repeatedly have held such evidence to be admissible when the question of whether a person has exercised the care of a reasonably prudent person requires taking into account circumstances beyond the scope of knowledge and experience of the triers. But Eamiello v. Piscitelli, 133 Conn. 360, 638-369, 51 A.2d 912, 916, and cases cited.
In view of the evidence as to an established crosswalk for pedestrians on the westerly side of the intersection of Orange Avenue and Fairfax Street, with a pedestrian push button located on the northwest corner of that intersection which the plaintiff was free to utilize, it was not error for the court to rule that it was irrelevant and immaterial where the plaintiff or others had crossed on other occasions when alighting from a bus.
The next claim of error arises from a question sent to the court by the jury after some deliberation, reading: To this the court, after repeating the questions responded: ...
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...a narrative of facts claimed to have been proved, designed to test the correctness of the court's charge and rulings. DePaola v. Seamour, 163 Conn. 246, 253, 303 A.2d 737; State v. Raffone, 161 Conn. 117, 129, 285 A.2d 323. This finding is not subject to any material The defendant's motion ......
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