DePaoli v. Abbott Laboratories

• Decision Date: 26 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2958.,96-2958.
• Parties: Janet M. DePAOLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

140 F.3d 668

Janet M. DePAOLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-2958.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 16, 1997.

Decided March 26, 1998.

Michael G. Logan (argued), Carey M. Stein, Gary D. Ashman, Ashman & Stein, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kimball R. Anderson (argued), David E. Koropp, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

Like many other workers in today's highly specialized world, Janet DePaoli had to perform repetitive motions on her assembly line job. As a result, she developed tendinitis and tenosynovitis in her right hand. She twice underwent surgery for the condition and asked her employer, Abbott Laboratories, to give her a job that accommodated her medical restrictions. Abbott looked for non-assembly line jobs for her, but, having found none after DePaoli had been on disability leave for a year, it terminated her. DePaoli sued Abbott, claiming that it had discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and that it had violated Illinois common law by discharging her in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. The district court granted summary judgment to Abbott on both counts, finding on the ADA claim that DePaoli had not established that she had a "disability" within the meaning of the Act. See DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 1996 WL 197685, at *9 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 22, 1996). She has appealed only the ADA count. Although we disagree with the district court's analysis of the "disability" requirement under the statute, we affirm the judgment for Abbott on other grounds.

I.

DePaoli worked as a production operator in one of Abbott's facilities, where she had an assembly line job that required her to place bottles on a conveyor belt. In early March 1992 she injured her hand during work. In June, she went on disability leave. Her treating physician, Dr. Anoo Patel, diagnosed her as suffering from "chronic tendinitis and tenosynovitis of the flexor tendons of the right hand, especially middle finger." As noted, she eventually had two operations on the hand. Afterwards, Dr. Patel concluded that, although the surgery had enabled her to regain a "good range of functions of the hand," she was unable to return to "the type of work she used to do at Abbott Laboratories." Dr. Henry W. Apfelbach, Abbott's workers' compensation doctor, essentially agreed, writing that:

[t]his patient has had surgery for stenosing tenosynovitis or ganglion of the tendon sheath to the right middle finger. It is my opinion that there is a cause and effect relationship with the patient's type of employment and the development of this condition.

I certainly feel this patient is capable of returning to gainful employment. I do not feel she is capable of doing repetitive motions of her hand but can use her right hand during the course of her employment. I do not feel that this patient's problem necessitates a lifting restriction.

With these opinions in hand, Abbott concluded that DePaoli's injury was one that "affected her ability to perform the essential functions of an assembly line, production job." DePaoli received disability benefits from June 16, 1992, until December 15, 1994, when her eligibility for benefits under Abbott's policy expired.

Following the second surgery, DePaoli's lawyer contacted Abbott's workers' compensation lawyer and requested that Abbott "accommodate" DePaoli's medical restrictions so that she could return to work. The Abbott attorney responded that Abbott was reviewing available job vacancies to accommodate her. Charlene Dibble, Abbott's Human Resources Manager, was supervising the review. Dibble recalled generally that some-one had asked for an accommodation for DePaoli, but she otherwise remembered little about the case. Abbott's disability insurance carrier conducted a transferrable skills analysis, which concluded that DePaoli had the skills for four alternative jobs: (1) sales attendant; (2) office helper; (3) information clerk; and (4) answering service clerk. Under Abbott's Disability Leave of Absence Policy, DePaoli would be considered as an internal candidate for any available jobs for which she was qualified. In the end, however, Abbott did not offer DePaoli any alternative employment.

DePaoli contends that requisition forms prepared by Abbott reveal numerous job openings at the Lake County facility where she had worked. (Although Abbott denies this, we take the facts on summary judgment in the light most favorable to DePaoli and thus assume that job openings existed.) Effective June 15, 1993, Abbott terminated DePaoli, based on its policy of terminating employees after they have been on disability leave for one year. (DePaoli had not taken advantage of an Abbott policy that permitted employees on disability leave who are released to work before the expiration of one year, but for whom no job has become available, to request an unpaid Personal Leave of Absence.) After her termination, DePaoli applied for a line production job at Johnson Wax. She also applied for a variety of other jobs, and as of the time of her deposition in January 1996, she worked as a sales associate at a furniture store.

This suit followed in due course, after DePaoli made the necessary complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and it issued a right-to-sue letter on February 27, 1995. The district court concluded that DePaoli was not "disabled" as a matter of law. See DePaoli, 1996 WL 197685, at *9. It believed that her physical impairment had to "constitute a significant barrier to employment in general," correctly noting that it is not enough to show that one particular job is beyond reach. Id. at *7. It also found that DePaoli had failed to meet her burden of introducing evidence about the requirements, skills, or qualifications of other production line positions in the region. Id. It therefore granted summary judgment to Abbott on this count (as well as on the retaliation count, which is not before us). Id. at *9, 11.

II.

A. Was DePaoli "Disabled" for ADA Purposes?

We agree that the first hurdle DePaoli had to clear was to show that she had a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. See DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7th Cir.1995) (prima facie ADA case). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability"). The Act defines "disability" as follows:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Proof of disability under subpart A involves three elements. First, borrowing from the regulations implementing the analogous Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., the EEOC has defined the term "physical or mental impairment" as:

(1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2)[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). Second, the term "major life activities," as we have noted in other ADA cases, means "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. at § 1630.2(i). See also Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir.1996) (university's refusal to permit student-athlete with heart ailment to play NCAA basketball did not affect "major life activity" within meaning of Rehabilitation Act); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir.1996) (ADA plaintiff with respiratory problems who claimed to suffer adverse effect from environmental tobacco smoke pleaded legally sufficient impairment of major life activity of "breathing"). Finally, the impairment must "substantially limit" one or more major life activities of the individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A substantial limitation, according to the EEOC's regulations, is one that leaves the individual either unable to perform a major life activity, or significantly restricted "as to the condition manner or duration" of performance of that activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).

It is DePaoli's burden on summary judgment to come forward with evidence that indicates she could meet her ultimate burden of showing an ADA recognized disability. We have stated that this question is "an individualized one, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis." Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1992)). It is undisputed (or at least, we take it to be so at the summary judgment stage) that DePaoli is suffering from a physiological disorder or condition that affects her musculoskeletal system — namely, her tendinitis and tenosynovitis. This, we assume for present purposes, is enough to show that she has a "physical impairment" as the term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). The more difficult question is whether her physical impairment substantially limits any of her major life activities. The only major life activity that might be affected, as the case comes to us, is the activity of working. Two general principles bound our analysis here. On one hand, as the district court recognized, it is not enough for an employee to show that her...