Knapp v. Northwestern University
| Citation | 101 F.3d 473 |
| Decision Date | 03 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3450,96-3450 |
| Parties | , 114 Ed. Law Rep. 460, 19 A.D.D. 355, 9 NDLR P 32 Nicholas KNAPP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and Rick Taylor, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Robert Andrew Chapman (argued), Chicago, IL, Eldon L. Ham, Northbrook, IL, Robert J. Shapiro, Jamaica Plain, MA, for Nicholas Knapp.
Amy D. Mayber, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, Julian Solotorovsky (argued), Eric F. Quandt, Kelley, Drye & Warren, Chicago, IL, for Northwestern University and Richard Taylor.
Matthew J. Mitten, South Texas College of Law, Houston, TX, for amici American Medical Society for Sports Medicine and American Osteopathic Academy of Sports Medicine.
Before BAUER, DIANE P. WOOD and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
Nicholas Knapp wants to play NCAA basketball for Northwestern University--so badly that he is willing to face an increased risk of death to do so. Knapp is a competent, intelligent adult capable of assessing whether playing intercollegiate basketball is worth the risk to his heart and possible death, and to him the risk is acceptable. Usually, competent, intelligent adults are allowed to make such decisions. This is especially true when, as here, the individual's family approves of the decision and the individual and his parents are willing to sign liability waivers regarding the worst-case scenario should it occur.
Northwestern, however, refuses to allow Knapp to play on or even practice with its men's basketball team. Knapp, currently a sophomore at Northwestern, has the basketball skills to play at the intercollegiate level, but he has never taken the court for his team. Although Northwestern does not restrict him from playing pick-up basketball games, using recreational facilities on campus, or exerting himself physically on his own, the university disqualified Knapp from playing on its intercollegiate basketball team. The issue in this case boils down to whether the school--because of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794--will be forced to let Knapp don a purple uniform and take the floor as a member of Northwestern's basketball team.
Prior to his senior year of high school Knapp was rated among the best basketball players in Illinois. He was recruited by numerous universities, including Northwestern. At the end of Knapp's junior year at Peoria's Woodruff High School, Northwestern orally offered him an athletic scholarship to play basketball. Knapp orally accepted the offer.
A few weeks into his senior year, Knapp suffered sudden cardiac death--meaning his heart stopped--during a pick-up basketball game. Paramedics used cardiopulmonary resuscitation, defibrillation (i.e., electric shocks), and injections of drugs to bring Knapp back to life. A few weeks later, doctors implanted an internal cardioverter-defibrillator in Knapp's abdomen. The device detects heart arrhythmia and delivers a shock to convert the abnormal heart rhythm back to normal. In other words, if Knapp's heart stops again the device is supposed to restart it.
On the day following his sudden cardiac death, Northwestern informed Knapp and his family that whatever the ultimate medical decision, Northwestern would honor its commitment for a scholarship. Seven weeks after his collapse Knapp signed a national letter of intent to attend Northwestern.
Knapp did not play basketball during his senior year in high school, but he was always a superb student, and in June 1995 he graduated as the valedictorian of his class. In September 1995 he enrolled as a Northwestern student.
On November 7, 1995, Dr. Howard Sweeney, Northwestern's head team physician, declared Knapp ineligible to participate on Northwestern's men's basketball team for the 1995-96 school year. 1 Dr. Sweeney based his decision on Knapp's medical records in which several treating physicians recommended that Knapp not play competitive basketball, the report of team physician Dr. Mark Gardner following a physical examination of Knapp, published guidelines and recommendations following two national medical conferences known as the Bethesda Conferences 2 regarding eligibility of athletes with cardiovascular abnormalities, and recommendations of physicians with whom Dr. Gardner and Dr. Sweeney consulted. After the basketball season ended, Northwestern and the Big Ten declared Knapp permanently medically ineligible to play basketball. Northwestern's athletic director, Rick Taylor, later confirmed that Northwestern will never voluntarily let Knapp play intercollegiate basketball as a Wildcat.
As a result, Knapp has never practiced with the Northwestern team nor played in a college game. His scholarship nevertheless continues and he attends practices (though he is not allowed to do anything but watch, apparently). He also receives other benefits afforded to athletes (such as tutoring, counseling, and training table), in addition to the full range of academic and nonacademic offerings the university provides to all students.
On the same day Dr. Sweeney declared him ineligible, Knapp filed a complaint in federal district court asserting that Northwestern's actions violated the Rehabilitation Act. The suit sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and compensatory damages. Knapp's undisputed goal is to force Northwestern to allow him to play varsity basketball.
In May 1996 Northwestern filed a motion for summary judgment, and Knapp thereafter requested a permanent injunction. The district court held a hearing on September 6, 1996, solely to determine whether Knapp presently is medically eligible to play intercollegiate basketball. Presented with conflicting evidence, the district court found Knapp medically eligible and Northwestern in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. After subsequent hearings on the issue of reasonable accommodation, the district court denied Northwestern's motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Northwestern from excluding Knapp from playing on its basketball team for any reason related to his cardiac condition.
The district court's decision was based on the affidavit of Knapp and the testimony and affidavits of two experts presented by Northwestern and three experts presented by Knapp. All the experts agreed Knapp had suffered sudden cardiac death due to ventricular fibrillation; even with the internal defibrillator, playing intercollegiate basketball places Knapp at a higher risk for suffering another event of sudden cardiac death compared to other male college basketball players; the internal defibrillator has never been tested under the conditions of intercollegiate basketball; and no person currently plays or has ever played college or professional basketball after suffering sudden cardiac death and having a defibrillator implanted. Northwestern's experts, cardiologists who participated in at least one of the Bethesda conferences, testified that playing intercollegiate basketball significantly and unacceptably increases Knapp's risk of death. At least one of Northwestern's experts stated that individuals with internal defibrillators should not play intercollegiate basketball. Knapp's expert cardiologists, one of whom, Dr. Lawrence Rink, is Knapp's treating cardiologist and an Indiana University basketball team physician, testified that although Knapp is at an increased risk for sudden cardiac death, that risk, especially with the internal defibrillator in place, is insubstantial or at least acceptable.
After tasting defeat in the district court, Northwestern filed an emergency notice of appeal on September 27, 1996. It also sought a stay of enforcement of the injunction. We expedited the proceedings, granted the stay pending this decision, and heard oral arguments on November 7, 1996, ironically one year to the day after Dr. Sweeney first declared that Knapp could not play basketball for Northwestern.
We review the district court's grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir.1987). Factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and legal conclusions are given de novo review. A factual or legal error may be sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion. Id. Interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act presents legal questions calling for de novo review.
The Rehabilitation Act, which is the sole basis for Knapp's claim, ensures that
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 7(8) [29 USCS § 706(8) ], shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To prevail on his claim for discrimination under the Act, Knapp must prove that: (1) he is disabled as defined by the Act; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position sought; (3) he has been excluded from the position solely because of his disability; and (4) the position exists as part of a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Byrne v. Board of Educ., School of West Allis-West Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir.1992). Northwestern does not dispute that it receives federal financial assistance and that it has excluded Knapp from its intercollegiate basketball program solely because of his cardiac condition, so our focus is on whether Knapp is an "otherwise qualified individual with a disability."
To show that he is disabled under the terms of the Act, Knapp must prove that he
(i) has a physical ... impairment which substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities, (ii)...
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