Department of Corrections v. Roseman

• Decision Date: 04 November 1980
• Docket Number: No. UU-192,UU-192
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Andrew J. ROSEMAN, Samuel Washington, Shirley Ann Bell and Anna Holden, Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 394

390 So.2d 394

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Andrew J. ROSEMAN, Samuel Washington, Shirley Ann Bell and Anna Holden, Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

No. UU-192.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 4, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1980.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Gerald B. Curington, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Richard A. Belz and Diana B. McPherson, Gainesville, for appellees and cross-appellants.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Judge.

The Department of Corrections appeals from DOAH hearing officer Tremor's order in Section 120.54(4) proceedings holding that the Department's proposed Rule 33-3.13, Fla.Admin.Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in that it restricts fundamental constitutional rights of the affected citizens-inmates of the Florida prison system and the noninmates whom they wish to marry while still incarcerated-in the absence of a compelling state interest and therefore in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Other points are also raised, but the threshold issue is whether prison inmates such as appellees Roseman and Washington and noninmates such as appellees Bell and Holden, who wish to marry Roseman and Washington, respectively, have a right to marry which is in constitutional terms a fundamental right, subject to restriction only in service of a compelling state interest and then only by means of the least restrictive alternative.

We hold that prison inmates have no fundamental right to marry and that noninmates have no fundamental right to marry inmates while they are yet in prison. Applying the less stringent standard appropriate for Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state action not impairing fundamental rights, we hold that the proposed Rule 33-3.13 has a rational basis in service of a legitimate state interest and that it is constitutionally valid. Neither is the Rule invalid on the other grounds asserted. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and sustain the proposed Rule.

The proposed Rule prohibits marriage by inmates who are sentenced to death, inmates under life sentence who must serve at least 25 years before parole, and inmates who wish to marry other inmates or other prisoners as defined by Section 944.02(5), Florida Statutes (1979). Inmates not within those categories will be permitted to marry under the following circumstances:

(a) In the event of a current pregnancy where both the inmate and the proposed spouse acknowledge they are the expected parents of a child.

(b) To legitimize a child already born.

(c) If the inmate's release date can be determined definitely to be within one (1) year and the inmate is a participant in the community release and furlough program.

The hearing officer's order aptly frames the constitutional issue by these findings of fact:

(13) Testifying on behalf of the Department were various witnesses who were accepted as experts in the areas of prison functioning and administration; religion and marriage counseling as it pertains to inmates; psychological, emotional and mental health of inmates; and prison programs and inmate behavior in regard to rehabilitation. These witnesses gave testimony regarding the Department's bases or rationale for the proposed rule in question. It was considered that the terms contained in the proposed rule were the only logical approach to a difficult social problem and that a completely open policy does not address the problem. The Department's responsibilities include the protection of society from those who commit crimes. This responsibility is carried out by providing adequate security to others and by helping the inmate in the institutional and the noninstitutional setting. A part of the rehabilitation process includes instilling in the inmate a sense of responsibility for his actions. It was considered that, with the exception of the three circumstances wherein marriages are permitted under the proposed rule, there is no justification for an inmate to enter a marriage relationship while incarcerated. The presumptive benefits of marriage, according to one expert's observations, do not accrue when one spouse is in an institutional setting, and a marriage created while the inmate is incarcerated can often have adverse effects with regard to rehabilitation. These effects include stress due to separation, a feeling of helplessness, a lowering of self-esteem and anxieties regarding children, finances, illness and unfaithfulness. From the testimony adduced at the hearing, it appears that a prime rationale for the proposed rule is the agency's conclusion that a new marriage created in a prison setting with an incarcerated spouse lacks any tangible benefits. No studies were offered by any party as to whether marriages assist the rehabilitation of an inmate.

(14) The agency was also concerned with security problems which would surround the actual marriage ceremony. These problems included the pulling of security personnel from other posts or duties, the introduction of contraband from those outside, the shortage and high turnover of security and clerical personnel at the institutions, the distraction provided by the ceremony and the possibility of escapes. Other concerns of the agency included the financial costs involved for an open marriage program and the resulting detraction of funds for other programs. Another area of concern by the agency was an observed characteristic of prison inmates of being manipulative and conniving and the...