Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. B.J.M.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 83067,83067
• Citation: 656 So.2d 906
• Parties: 20 Fla. L. Weekly S188 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Petitioner, v. B.J.M., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 906

656 So.2d 906

20 Fla. L. Weekly S188

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Petitioner, v. B.J.M., Respondent.

No. 83067.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 27, 1995.

Rehearing Denied July 5, 1995.

Kimberly Tucker, Gen. Counsel and Charles T. Collette, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Office of HRS, Tallahassee, Helen Ann Hauser of Dittmar & Hauser, Coconut Grove, and Morton Laitner, HRS Dist. XI Legal Counsel, Miami, for petitioner.

Christina A. Zawisza, Children First Project, Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., and Roy D. Wasson, Miami, for respondent.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Wendy S. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for the State.

ANSTEAD, Justice.

We have for review the following question certified by the Third District Court of Appeal to be of great public importance:

WHETHER AN ADJUDICATED DEPENDENT JUVENILE MAY MAINTAIN AN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES FOR THE LATTER'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE JUVENILE WITH SERVICES?

B.J.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 627 So.2d 512, 519 n. 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the negative.

CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

In December 1990, B.J.M., an adjudicated dependent and delinquent minor, by and through Legal Services of Greater Miami, filed a mandamus action against the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) seeking to compel HRS to place B.J.M. in a specific rehabilitative program. Subsequently, B.J.M. amended his complaint to include a tort action for general damages based on negligence. B.J.M. claimed general damages for the effect that the agency's neglect had on his quality of life. The tort count alleged that HRS had negligently breached a duty to B.J.M. in the following ways: not following recommended psychiatric placement reports; failing to provide proper counseling; failing to provide vocational training or educational services comparable to those provided in nonresidential settings; failing to generally meet B.J.M.'s placement, emotional, and developmental needs; and by the inappropriate labeling of B.J.M HRS answered with a general denial and asserted various affirmative defenses. Subsequently, HRS moved for summary judgment on all claims, asserting sovereign immunity, collateral estoppel, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Legal Services' lack of standing. The trial court entered summary judgment for HRS without specifying the grounds.

On appeal, the Third District held: (1) B.J.M. was not entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling HRS to place him in a more appropriate placement; (2) sovereign immunity barred a negligence action against HRS for improper placement; (3) HRS's negligent failure to provide necessary services was not protected by sovereign immunity; (4) collateral estoppel did not bar B.J.M.'s action for damages; and (5) section 39.455, Florida Statutes (1991), which provides immunity for HRS's failure to comply with a performance agreement, did not bar B.J.M.'s negligence action. The court also certified to this Court the issue of whether HRS may be sued in tort for general damages for failing to provide a minor with services.

FACTS ¹

B.J.M. presents a classic picture of a child in need of help from the community. He is an abused, neglected, and abandoned child who has been diagnosed as borderline retarded, and adjudicated both dependent and delinquent in the juvenile justice system. B.J.M. was born on December 25, 1973, and was subsequently abandoned by his parents. He was raised by a woman whom he knew as his grandmother, although she denied any blood ties to him. In March 1987, at age 13, B.J.M. was adjudicated dependent on the basis of neglect and abandonment. The "grandmother" who raised him refused to continue her care, and another relative also refused to accept him.

Upon being adjudicated dependent, and pursuant to statutory mandate, HRS prepared a performance agreement/permanent placement plan for B.J.M. which was approved by the juvenile court. No relative of B.J.M. was a party to that agreement. In the plan HRS agreed to "see that the child is enrolled in appropriate school setting" and "see that counseling is provided for child at the Health and Rehabilitative Services placement." Thereafter, B.J.M. was placed in three successive foster homes. One returned him to HRS custody because he had exhibited inappropriate sexual behavior, and his foster parent feared for the safety of young female relatives in the home. He ran away from another home, and was claimed to be ungovernable in the third. During this time B.J.M. was also provided counseling, but it was eventually discontinued because he refused to talk to the therapist.

In June 1989, at age 15, B.J.M. was adjudicated delinquent for committing attempted arson. At a disposition hearing to determine sanctions and treatment, the juvenile court recommended, as its first preference, placement of B.J.M. at Hillsborough Alternative Residential Program (HARP), a facility specializing in juvenile sex offenders. ² However, acting within its discretionary authority, HRS placed B.J.M. at Montanari Clinical School, a placement choice ranked third by the court. Montanari is a privately owned residential treatment facility which has its own school on the premises. The district court characterized this facility as a "state sanctioned warehouse for troubled youths." 627 So.2d at 518.

In August 1989, B.J.M. was again adjudicated delinquent, this time for burglary of a dwelling. The court recommended that he remain at Montanari. The court also appointed Christina Zawisza, an attorney with Legal Services of Greater Miami, to thereafter serve as guardian ad litem for B.J.M.

While at Montanari, B.J.M. exhibited inappropriate sexual and other aggressive behavior, and was assigned to the "Paisano" unit, the most restrictive environment at the facility. Although B.J.M. attended classes at Montanari, he did not receive training for a specific vocation. Rather, he was taught general skills such as: learning to relate to Every two weeks B.J.M. received counseling relating to his goals and future plans, although the counseling sessions frequently lasted only ten minutes. Although a referral to Grant Center had been recommended in 1987, it never took place. Grant Center is a highly structured residential treatment center in South Dade County, Florida. It offers a specialized sexual offender/victim treatment program.

others, taking responsibility, and being on time. Montanari discontinued his group therapy because, in the words of his foster care worker, B.J.M. "could not be motivated to face" issues involving his sexual conduct. Consequently, he received no therapy to address his sexual behavior.

Following numerous statutory reviews in the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court consistently found B.J.M.'s placements appropriate. However, the court indicated that although Montanari was not an inappropriate placement, HARP would be preferred by the court. None of the court orders reviewing and approving B.J.M.'s placements were ever appealed.

LAW & ANALYSIS

Jurisdictional Objections

Initially, we address HRS's jurisdictional objections to the action. HRS first claims that collateral estoppel bars any claims by B.J.M. concerning his care by HRS because at each judicial review the

court specifically found that B.J.M. was "appropriately placed" and that HRS had complied with its duties toward him.... In order to find that HRS was "in compliance" with its duties, the juvenile court judge necessarily had to find that the deficiencies alleged in the guardian ad litem's written reports did not constitute violations of the duties imposed upon HRS by law.... Thus, as to all matters relating to B.J.M.'s care and placement ... the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation.

Petitioner's Initial Brief at 39, 40.

Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been decided. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977). The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. The courts have emphasized that collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated in a prior proceeding. See Hochstadt v. Orange Broadcast, 588 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The district court held that collateral estoppel does not bar an action for damages, and reasoned that:

The prior judicial reviews of B.J.M.'s placement did not determine whether HRS had breached a duty of care to B.J.M.; the orders indicate that the court merely noted, with some reluctance, that the placements were not inappropriate. The parties never litigated before the juvenile court the issue of whether HRS breached a duty of care once it placed B.J.M. in Montanari.

627 So.2d at 517-18. We agree with the district court's reasoning and analysis on this issue.

We next consider HRS's claim that the filing of a civil action in the general jurisdiction division of the circuit court constitutes an unlawful interference with the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the circuit court. Again we agree with the district court's rejection of this claim. This case was properly within the circuit court's general jurisdiction division since the complaint sought civil relief in mandamus and tort law. The filing of such a claim does not interfere with the authority of the juvenile division of the court which is organized to consider dependency and delinquency actions. The internal operation of the court system and the assignment of judges to various divisions does not...