Department of Medical Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Center, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | A91A2170,Nos. A91A2169,s. A91A2169 |
| Citation | 203 Ga.App. 535,417 S.E.2d 195 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE v. COLUMBIA CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC. et al. COLUMBIA CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC. et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., William C. Joy, Kathryn L. Allen, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.
Heard, Leverett & Phelps, E. Freeman Leverett, Elberton, Dallas, Fowler & Wills, Albert H. Dallas, Thomson, for appellees.
Defendant Georgia Department of Medical Assistance is the state agency designated pursuant to federal law to supervise administration of Medicaid nursing home reimbursement. The seven plaintiffs are nursing homes which contested a change implemented in the limits for reimbursement in the property and related cost centers for those nursing homes having property transactions after May 6, 1981. A hearing officer concluded that the change in reimbursement rate had been accomplished in compliance with applicable state and federal statutes and regulations. A review by the Commissioner of the Department of Medical Assistance upheld the hearing officer's decision and the nursing homes filed their petition for judicial review on October 12, 1984.
The superior court overturned the hearing officer's decision and ordered reinstatement of the previous rate of reimbursement. Defendant moved to set aside the superior court's order on the ground that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter such an order since the plaintiffs' case was automatically dismissed by operation of law because no written order was properly entered for a period of over five years. After the superior court denied defendant's motion to set aside, this court granted defendant's application for permission to appeal. Defendant Georgia Department of Medical Assistance appeals in Case No. A91A2169 while plaintiffs cross-appeal in Case No. A91A2170. Held:
1. OCGA § 9-2-60(b) provides that: "Any action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismissed...." The operation of this provision cannot be waived by the parties. Harris v. Moody, 144 Ga.App. 656, 242 S.E.2d 321.
OCGA § 9-10-2 provides that: "Any verdict, decision, judgment, decree, order, ruling, or other judicial action by any court in this state in any matter in which this state or an official of this state in his official capacity is a party defendant, intervenor, respondent, appellee, or plaintiff in fi. fa. shall be void unless it affirmatively appears as a matter of record either: (1) That the Attorney General was given five days' advance written notice by the adverse party or his attorney of the time set for the particular trial, hearing, or other proceeding as a result of which the verdict, decision, judgment, decree, order, ruling, or other judicial action was entered; or (2) That the Attorney General or an assistant attorney general was present in person at the trial, hearing, or other proceeding; or (3) That the Attorney General or an assistant attorney general has, in writing, waived the notice." See generally Caldwell v. Atlanta Bd. of Educ., 152 Ga.App. 291, 292(3), 293, 262 S.E.2d 573; Cofer v. Williams, 141 Ga.App. 72, 232 S.E.2d 610.
In the five-year interval following the filing of the plaintiffs' petition for judicial review on October 12, 1984, two orders of the superior court were entered. However, in neither instance was there compliance with the notice provisions of OCGA § 9-10-2. Therefore, the two orders are void and ineffective to prevent an automatic dismissal pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-60(b). Thus, the case sub judice was dismissed by operation of law on October 12, 1989, and any further action in the case other than dismissal is a mere nullity. Stephens v. Stovall & Co., 184 Ga.App. 78, 79(1), 360 S.E.2d 638; Bainbridge & Assoc., Architects, P.A. v. Johnson, 183 Ga.App. 784, 360 S.E.2d 273. It follows that the ...
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...before it. Republic Claims Svc. Co. v. Hoyal, supra at 128, 441 S.E.2d 755; see also Dept. of Med. Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Center, 203 Ga.App. 535, 536(1), 417 S.E.2d 195 (1992). The automatic dismissal is not with prejudice and does not act as res judicata. Kalin v. Pfarner, 12......
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