Department of Mental Hygiene v. Lucas

• Decision Date: 13 July 1966
• Citation: 243 Cal.App.2d 464,52 Cal.Rptr. 552
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frances C. LUCAS, as administratrix etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 588.

Page 552

52 Cal.Rptr. 552

243 Cal.App.2d 464

DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frances C. LUCAS, as administratrix etc., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 588.

District Court of Appeal, Fifth District California.

July 13, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 9, 1966.

Hearing Denied Sept. 7, 1966.

[243 Cal.App.2d 465] Clarence H. Wilson, Hanford, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., and Edward M. Belasco, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, for respondent.

OPINION

McMURRAY, Justice Pro Tem. ^*

Plaintiff's creditor's claim against the Estate of George Algie Benton, deceased, was rejected by the defendant administratrix and a subsequent suit based thereon resulted in a judgment for $4,839.99 in plaintiff's favor. George Algie Benton, at the time of his death, was a mental patient in a state hospital; the amount of the judgment here represents unpaid charges for his care for four years immediately preceding his death. The action, based on the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6658 was commenced within one year of the issuance of letters of administration.

At the trial the open ledger account of plaintiff was introduced showing all credits and debits to decedent during the four years next preceding his death. Testimony was adduced by the deceased's guardian showing that for approximately 20 years workmen's compensation benefits of $20 per month were paid to the plaintiff by an insurance company which admitted liability for medical payments for the industrial accident that occasioned the deceased's mental condition and subsequent commitment to a state institution; that in addition to the above payments, the guardian received wage payments from the insurer of $26 a month for a short period of time and thereafter received $16 a month until the deceased's death. During the guardianship the guardian was once billed for $180 by plaintiff's predecessor, the Department of Institutions, whereupon he forwarded the bill to the insurer and notified the department that the insurance company would pay and future billings. From time to time thereafter upon being billed or upon a change from institutional care to a family care home, the guardian notified the plaintiff that the insurer would pay all medical expenses; the insurer, however, never indicated any agreement to pay more than $20 per month. The guardian contended, as did defendant, that plaintiff should have looked to the insurance company for any payment of deceased's medical care expenses. The guardian testified that no claim was filed with the Industrial Accident Commission because he doubted his ability to show sufficient wage earnings by deceased to justify any greater payment of benefits than that being then made.

On this appeal appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to justify the finding that there was no equitable estoppel and that the portion of the claim prior to four years of the filing of the complaint was barred by the provisions of the applicable statute of limitations, namely, Code of Civil Procedure section 345.

As to the first contention of appellant, there can be little doubt that whether or not equitable estoppel exists is primarily a question of fact for the trial court's determination, unless the opposite conclusion is the only one that can reasonably be drawn from the facts. (Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.2d 250, 266, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129; Henry v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal.App.2d 299, 306, 20 Cal.Rptr. 440.)

To invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a public entity, '* * * (1) there must be acts or conduct on the part of the part to be estopped which amount to a representation or concealment of material facts made either with knowledge or culpable negligence; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon or must so act as to cause the other party reasonably to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true situation; and (4) he must rely upon that conduct to his prejudice or injury.' (Benson v. Andrews, 138 Cal.App.2d 123, 138, 292 P.2d 39, 48.) Because of the large number of persons dealt with by a public agency, a loose application of the doctrine of estoppel could engender exceedingly difficult administrative problems, and 'Our basic approach in this case, as promulgated by the court in Adler v. City of Pasadena (1962) 57 Cal.2d 609, 615, 21 Cal.Rptr. 579, 582, 371 P.2d 315, 318, * * * must turn upon whether the public agency 'acted in an unconscionable or unreasonable manner or * * * either unintentionally or otherwise * * * set out to, or did, take unfair advantage of plaintiffs. '' (City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Com., 63 Cal.2d 255, 257--258, 46 Cal.Rptr. 105, 106, 404 P.2d 809, 810.) Bearing these rules in mind, we cannot say that a conclusion opposite to the trial court's is the only one that can be '* * * reasonably drawn from the facts.' (Albers v. County of Los Angeles, supra.) (See also City of Imperial Beach v. Algert, 200 Cal.App.2d 48, 52, 19 Cal.Rptr. 144, and cases there cited.)

Indeed, from the facts herein, it would be difficult to sustain a finding of...