Department of Public Safety v. MacLafferty
| Decision Date | 04 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 27477,27477 |
| Citation | 230 Ga. 22,195 S.E.2d 748 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. Wanda MacLAFFERTY. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Exhaustion of all administrative remedies available within the Department of Public Safety is necessary for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Ga.L.1964, pp. 338, 339; 1965, pp. 283, 284; Code Ann.Ch. § 3A-1).
2. The scope of judicial review is limited under the aforesaid Act to those objections upon which the agency has had an opportunity to rule.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Dorothy T. Beasley, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellant.
Stack, O'Brien & Neely, John H. Paer, Atlanta, for appellee.
Certiorari was granted in this case because of a question of construction of certain provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (). Specifically involved are Sections 18 and 20 of the Act (Code Ann. §§ 3A-118, 3A-120), authorizing agency and judicial review in the enforcement of the state's 'Implied Consent Law' (Ga.L.1968, pp. 448, 452; Code Ann. § 68-1625.1).
The record shows that the Department of Public Safety notified Wanda MacLafferty that it was suspending her driver's license for failure to submit to a chemical blood or breath test at the request of a police officer who believed she was driving while intoxicated. Mrs. MacLafferty requested and was granted a hearing by an official of the Department of Public Safety who rendered a decision on August 2, 1971, suspending her license. By certified mail on September 14, 1971, Mrs. MacLafferty was 'officially notified that by operation of Law the initial decision rendered under the Implied Consent Law the 2nd day of August, 1971, became the Final Decision of the Department of Public Safety September 2, 1971 . . . Said suspension is effective September 15, 1971 . . .'
On October 14, 1971, without having applied to the Department of Public Safety for review, Mrs. MacLafferty filed a 'Petition for Review of Administrative Decision and Motion to Reverse or Modify Such Decision' in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The petition stated that it was brought 'pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, § 3A-120, and within the time allowed by law . . . for judicial review of the final decision of the Georgia Department of Public Safety . . .'
The petition alleged that the decision of the Department was prejudicial to Mrs. MacLafferty's rights because the administrative findings and inferences, and the decisions based thereupon, were in violation of her right to due process; in excess of its statutory authority; erroneous by law and under the evidence since the Department failed to specifically find that she was properly advised that her failure to submit to a chemical test would result in suspension of her driver's license as required by Code Ann. § 68-1625.1(a); and for other reasons not necessary to state here.
The superior court affirmed the decision of the Department of Public Safety.
The Court of Appeals reversed. MacLafferty v. Department of Public Safety, 126 Ga.App. 631, 632, 191 S.E.2d 490. It held (1) that the hearing officer must make findings of fact that the offending motorist was advised by the arresting officer of the statute requiring submission to a chemical test, and that failure to do so will result in suspension of the driver's license; and also (2) that the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Code Ann. § 3A-120(b); Ga.L.1964, pp. 338, 354) does not require that the offending motorist make a motion for rehearing prior to seeking judicial review.
The Department of Public Safety urges that the Court of Appeals erred because a 'rehearing' as contemplated by the Act is not involved in this case; and that this feature is critical to the question of the superior court's jurisdiction to consider Mrs. MacLafferty's complaint.
The Department contends that agency review provided in the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act is a necessary step in the exhaustion of administrative remedies required by the Act as a prerequisite to judicial review; and that the scope of judicial review is limited under the Act to those objections upon which the agency (the seven member Department of Public Safety) has had an opportunity to rule.
We agree.
Several provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', bear upon the situation here.
Code Ann. § 3A-118(a) states in essential part as follows: 'In contested cases in which the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the agency representative who presided shall initially decide the case or the agency shall require the entire record before the agency representative to be certified to it for initial decision . . . and in absence of an application to the agency within 30 days from the date of notice of the initial decision for review, or an order by the agency within such time for review on its own motion, such initial decision shall, without further proceedings, become the decision of the agency.'
Code Ann. § 3A-120(a) provides:
Code Ann. § 3A-120(b), as pertinent here, states: 'Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition within 30 days after the service of the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within 30 days after the decision thereon.'
Code Ann. § 3A-120(c) recites: 'Irrespective of any provisions of statute or agency rule with respect to motions for rehearing or reconsideration after a final agency decision or order, the filing of such a motion shall not be a prerequisite to the filing of any action for judicial review or relief: Provided, however, no objection to any order or decision of any agency shall be considered by the court upon petition for review unless such objection shall have been urgued before the agency.'
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