Department of Transp. v. Simon
Decision Date | 26 November 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 57985,57985 |
Citation | 151 Ga.App. 807,261 S.E.2d 710 |
Parties | DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. SIMON et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., William C. Joy, Asst. Atty. Gen., D. Field Yow, Augusta, for appellant.
Patrick J. Rice, Augusta, for appellees.
Condemnation proceedings were instituted against a portion of a lot owned by Mrs. Simon (condemnee). By its "Declaration of Taking," the Department of Transportation (condemnor) estimated the "just and adequate compensation" for the portion to be $14,900 and paid that sum into court. Thereafter, an order condemning the property, some .097 acres, was entered and the land taken. Mrs. Simon, being dissatisfied with the compensation, filed her notice of appeal, praying for a jury trial "as to the value of the property taken and the prospective and consequential damages to the remaining property," attorney fees and expenses of litigation.
The case came on for trial and the jury returned a verdict for $42,912 and attorney fees and costs. The condemnor appeals.
1. Mrs. Simon's property was condemned for construction of a limited access highway project. It appears that the same project also necessitated the condemnation of a portion of a lot adjoining Mrs. Simon's, as a result of which taking, the adjacent lot became landlocked. The owner of the allegedly landlocked parcel is not a party to this in rem action which in no way involves the taking of or damage to such adjacent property. In his opening statement, the attorney for Mrs. Simon made reference to the landlocked nature of the adjoining property. The condemnor objected to references to property other than the condemnee's and moved for a mistrial. This motion was overruled, the court instructing the jury on the right of a landlocked property owner to condemn a 20-foot easement across the land of another upon payment of just and adequate compensation. His instructions concluded:
During the trial on the issue of just and adequate compensation for the taking and damage to the condemnee's property, testimony as to the landlocked nature of the adjoining property and the possibility that a private right-of-way would be sought over the condemnee's remaining property was admitted into evidence, over the condemnor's strenuous objections and in his closing argument, the attorney for Mrs. Simon made the following statements: The condemnor again objected and moved for a mistrial, but its motion was overruled.
Finally, in his charge to the jury, the trial judge stated: The condemnor timely objected to this charge, on the grounds that "to inject the question of the right of some other property owner adjacent to the property involved in this taking to condemn an easement across it is prejudicial to the (condemnor) and, . . . , is contrary to law . . ."
The condemnor enumerates as error the various rulings and actions of the trial court made with regard to the propriety of argument and admissibility of evidence concerning the landlocking of Mrs. Simon's neighbor and the possibility that, as the result, a private right-of-way would be sought across her remaining property. In other words, the condemnor contends that the landlocking of the adjoining property by the project, resulting in the possibility that a future easement might be taken over Mrs. Simon's remaining property, is not a "taking or a damaging" of that remainder which is compensable in this condemnation proceeding. Mrs. Simon argues that the fact that the highway project landlocked her neighbor and created the possibility that a 20-foot right-of-way will be sought over her property is a "circumstance" which adversely affects the present market value of her property remaining after the taking here at issue. It is thus urged that argument and evidence on this issue was proper as an element of "consequential damage" to her remainder, which she can recover in this condemnation proceeding.
The question presented for resolution is whether the taking of property adjoining Mrs. Simon's, resulting in the possible private condemnation of a right-of-way across her remaining property, is a compensable element of consequential damage to her remainder which may be recovered in this condemnation action. Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia provides, inter alia: "Private property shall not be taken, or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate compensation being first paid . . ." Code Ann. § 2-301(1). (Emphasis supplied.) McArthur v. State Hwy. Dept., 85 Ga.App. 500, 69 S.E.2d 781 (1952).
Thus in order for a condemnee to recover consequential damages to the remainder of his property when only a part is taken, it must appear that the damages to the remainder proximately and naturally arose from the condemnation and taking of the Condemnee's own property. (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Power Co. v. Bray, 232 Ga. 558, 560, 207 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1974). See also Southwire Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 147 Ga.App. 606, 607(1), 249 S.E.2d 650 (1978).
In the case at bar it is apparent that Mrs. Simon's claim for consequential damages was based not only on the "taking" of her property by the condemnor but also in part on the taking of the property of her adjoining landowner. It is because a portion of the adjacent lot was taken that the remainder of that property became landlocked; that egress and ingress to the remainder of that property is now impossible is an element of consequential damage to it, for which the adjoining landowner can receive compensation in a condemnation proceeding. See, e. g., State Hwy. Dept. v. Howard, 119 Ga.App. 298, 299(7, 8, 9), 167 S.E.2d 177 (1969). The possibility that, as the result of this "taking" of his property, the adjoining landowner might condemn a private right-of-way across Mrs. Simon's property "may be real and may in fact exist." That there now exists the possibility that a private right-of-way will be condemned across her property may be a "circumstance" of Mrs. Simon's remaining property. But the fact remains that this real and existing circumstance did not arise proximately from the "taking" of Her property and a claim for consequential damages which is based thereon may not be recovered in this condemnation proceeding. McArthur, supra; Bray, supra. Compare State Hwy. Dept. v. Hood, 118 Ga.App. 720, 165 S.E.2d 601 (1968). While in the instant case, unlike Bray, Mrs. Simon is not attempting to recover consequential damages to a contiguous tract having a different ownership, she does seek to increase consequential damages to her remainder by showing the loss of access of the adjoining property. See Southwire Co., supra. If Mrs. Simon's remaining property has suffered damage by virtue of the taking which occurred on the adjoining...
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