DePasquale v. Harrington

• Decision Date: 14 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-119-M,90-119-M
• Citation: 599 A.2d 314
• Parties: Mark P. DePASQUALE v. Thomas M. HARRINGTON, Deputy Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of Transportation, State of Rhode Island. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 314

599 A.2d 314

Mark P. DePASQUALE v. Thomas M. HARRINGTON, Deputy Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of Transportation, State of Rhode Island.

No. 90-119-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 14, 1991.

John L. Quigley, Jr., Domenic Tudino, Providence, for plaintiff.

F. Thomas O'Halloran, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes to us on a petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the District Court affirming a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles (Registry), suspending the petitioner's driver's license. We affirm the judgment of the District Court. The facts insofar as relevant to this petition are as follows.

On March 15, 1988, the State of New Hampshire ordered the suspension of petitioner's driving privileges as a result of his conviction for driving while intoxicated in New Hampshire. Thereafter, on August 10, 1988, petitioner was notified by the Registry that his Rhode Island driver's license and registrations would be suspended, effective August 12, 1988, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-11-3 because of his out-of-state conviction.

On August 17, 1988, the Registry held a hearing at petitioner's request under § 31- 11-7(b), as amended by P.L.1986, ch. 494, § 3, to review the order of suspension. At this hearing the Registry offered a photostatic copy of the New Hampshire Notice of Action that had been sent to the Registry by the New Hampshire authorities. This document was written on official stationery and signed by the director of the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles. The document indicated that petitioner had been convicted of driving while intoxicated. The Registry presented no other evidence of petitioner's conviction. The petitioner did not challenge the accuracy of the information contained in the document at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing the suspension of petitioner's license was upheld. The petitioner then filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order in the District Court, seeking to prevent the suspension from taking effect. This motion was granted. However, after a subsequent hearing the District Court ordered that the ruling of the Registry be affirmed and that the temporary restraining order be vacated. The petitioner then sought review in this court by petition for certiorari.

The petitioner challenges the Registry's action on the grounds that the photostatic copy of the New Hampshire Notice of Action constituted incompetent hearsay evidence and additionally had not been properly authenticated. We conclude that petitioner's arguments are not persuasive.

Section 31-11-3, which grants the Registry the authority to suspend the driver's license of a Rhode Island citizen on the basis of an out-of-state conviction, provides:

"The registry is authorized to suspend or revoke the license of any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to drive a motor vehicle in this state upon receiving notice of the conviction of such person in another state of an offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the license of an operator or chauffeur." (Emphasis added.)

The requirements of § 31-11-3 speak in terms of "notice," without defining the type of notice adequate for the Registry to suspend or revoke a driver's license. Accordingly we must consider what constitutes reliable notice sufficient to uphold a license suspension and whether that standard of competency has been met in this case. ¹

A license-suspension proceeding is an administrative hearing, not a criminal trial. Considine v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation, 564 A.2d 1343, 1344 (R.I.1989); Beaudoin v. Petit, 122 R.I. 469, 472, 409 A.2d 536, 538 (1979). Hence we look to the procedures set out in the General Laws for conducting administrative proceedings to determine the rule of competency applicable here.

General Laws 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-10(a) ("Rules of Evidence--Official Notice") reads in part:

"Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. The rules of evidence as applied in civil cases in the superior courts in this state shall be followed; but, when necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules, evidence not admissible under those rules may be submitted (except where precluded by statute) if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs * * *."

It is significant that § 42-35-10(a) does not proscribe the reception of incompetent evidence along with "[i]rrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence." The omission is a deliberate one. The language of § 42-35-10(a), based on § 10(1) of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961, follows the provisions of § 556(d) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, which allows federal administrative agencies to consider hearsay evidence when making a determination. ² 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d) (West 1977). See Veg-Mix, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture, 832 F.2d 601, 606 (D.C.Cir.1987) ("if hearsay evidence meets the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act by being relevant, material, and unrepetitious * * * agencies are entitled to weigh it according it its 'truthfulness, reasonableness, and credibility' "). Cooper, State Administrative Law at 384 (1965); 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.2 at 222-24, § 16.5 at 235 (2d ed. 1980); see also McCormick on Evidence, §§ 351-352 at 1006-12 (3d ed. Cleary 1984). Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have stated directly that hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative proceedings. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409-410, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1431, 28 L.Ed.2d 842, 857 (1971); Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06, 68 S.Ct. 793, 805-06, 92 L.Ed. 1010, 1037 (1948); Craig v. Pare, 497 A.2d 316, 320 (R.I.1985).

The admission of hearsay evidence in an administrative forum is reflective of the traditional division of function between judge and jury. Many of the rules surrounding the exclusion of hearsay in jury trials are meant to prevent juries, uninitiated in the evaluation of evidence, from hearing unreliable or confusing testimony and rendering a verdict based on such evidence. See McCormick on Evidence, §§ 351-352 at 1006-12. Such protection is far less necessary when evidence is presented to a judge sitting without a jury or, as in this case, a hearing officer with substantial expertise in the matters falling within his or her agency's jurisdiction.

There is surely some tension between the ability of an expert administrative agency to consider hearsay evidence, as allowed by § 42-35-10(a), and the need to ensure that such a body act upon reliable evidence. Hearsay evidence may vary significantly in its credibility and probative value, depending on its source and its similarity to evidence that is intrinsically trustworthy. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349, 355-56 (D.Mass.1950). The reliability of hearsay evidence in a particular instance is also linked to the purpose for which it is offered and the policies underlying the statute being enforced. See McCormick on Evidence, § 353 at 1015. In this vein the provisions of § 42-35-10(a) limit the sort of hearsay evidence admissible in administrative proceedings to that "necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under [the rules of evidence as applied in civil cases in the Superior Courts of Rhode Island] if it is a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." (Emphasis added.) ³

This is a somewhat imprecise standard of competency, but it is a realistic one. An expert administrative tribunal concerned with advancing the public welfare should not be rigidly governed by rules of evidence designed for juries. The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence are to provide the usual and most helpful standard for a hearing officer in adjudging the competency of evidence. However, a hearing officer may take into account evidence that would be excluded from a trial by jury if it would be prudent to do so, given the requirements of the statute being enforced. Such a balancing between inherent reliability and requisite efficiency, as embodied in § 42-35-10(a), is sensible in light of everyday experience. Prudent persons regularly rely upon hearsay information in determining matters of their most important private concerns. The provisions of § 42-35-10(a) entrust the hearing officer with both the ability to exercise prudence in considering evidence and the reliability that must condition its admissibility.

We conclude here that the photostatic copy provided notice of a conviction sufficient to suspend petitioner's license under § 31-11-3. The document had every appearance of being genuine. It was written on official stationery and contained the signature of the director of the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles. It had been transmitted to the Rhode Island Division of Motor Vehicles by the State of New Hampshire in accordance with the Interstate Driver License Compact, which Rhode Island signed in 1987. ⁴ The Notice of Action indicated that petitioner had been convicted of driving while intoxicated, an offense that would be grounds for a suspension under § 31-11-3. At the hearing, petitioner did not challenge the accuracy of the information contained in the document. Section 31-11-3 requires a low threshold of evidence--"notice"--for the Registry of Motor Vehicles to suspend a petitioner's license without a preliminary hearing. This relaxed standard of proof reflects the state's considerable concern with the threat to public safety presented by a driver who has already been convicted in another jurisdiction of a serious highway offense. See Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d...