FOSTER-GLOCESTER v. Board of Review

• Decision Date: 16 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2002-381-M.P.,2002-381-M.P.
• Citation: 854 A.2d 1008
• Parties: FOSTER-GLOCESTER REGIONAL SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. BOARD OF REVIEW, Department of Labor and Training et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

854 A.2d 1008

FOSTER-GLOCESTER REGIONAL SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. BOARD OF REVIEW, Department of Labor and Training et al.

No. 2002-381-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 16, 2004.

Gregory Piccirelli, for Plaintiff.

Donald G. Elbert, Tiverton, (Board of Rev.), John E. DeCubellis, Jr., Narragansett, (for Michael Bailey), for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, and SUTTELL, JJ.

OPINION

SUTTELL, Justice.

The Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee (school committee) seeks review by writ of certiorari of a District Court decision affirming a judgment granting unemployment benefits by the Board of Review of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (board) to a schoolteacher, Michael Bailey (Bailey), whose employment had been terminated for inappropriate conduct involving female students. Having granted the writ and considered the written submissions and oral arguments of the parties, we now proceed to address the three primary issues that the school committee raised on appeal: (1) whether the District Court erred in ruling that the school committee's complaint was moot; (2) whether the board should have been collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether Bailey's discharge was for disqualifying circumstances; and (3) whether the board erred by failing to give any evidentiary weight to the transcripts of a previous arbitration hearing. For the reasons set forth herein, we quash the judgment of the District Court.

Facts and Travel

Michael Bailey had been employed as a teacher by the school committee for approximately sixteen years. On December 14, 1999, he was terminated from his employment as a physical education teacher at Ponaganset High School for alleged inappropriate behavior with four female students. Bailey appealed his termination to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Arbitration hearings were held between August 2000 and January 2001, during which the school committee presented testimony from the students who said they were victims of Bailey's alleged misconduct, the high school principal, the school superintendent, and other witnesses. On April 10, 2001, the arbitrator issued his decision, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Bailey's actions were "inappropriate for a teacher[,]" and that the school committee had just cause to terminate his employment. The arbitration award was confirmed by the Superior Court on October 12, 2001.¹

While the arbitration was still pending, Bailey filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which the director of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training granted on February 27, 2001. The director determined that Bailey was discharged under "non-disqualifying circumstances" as provided by G.L.1956 § 28-44-18. The school committee appealed from the director's decision. A referee of the board held a hearing on March 20, 2001, and subsequently affirmed the director's award of benefits to Bailey. The school committee appealed from the referee's decision, and the board held a de novo hearing on April 25, 2001.

Finding the evidence insufficient to prove that Bailey's discharge was for disqualifying circumstances, the board sustained the director's decision. One member dissented. The board said that the school committee presented "no direct evidence with respect to the alleged misconduct," and chose to rely solely on the transcript from the arbitration hearing. The majority noted that the school committee's counsel had been offered an opportunity to call witnesses, to request that witnesses be subpoenaed, and/or to present evidence demonstrating the unavailability of the witnesses, but that counsel "refused" each of these offers. The board, citing its long-held policy that "uncorroborated hearsay evidence alone is not sufficient to establish a finding of fact," held that the school committee had not met its burden of proof because the committee had presented no direct evidence to corroborate the hearsay evidence in the transcript. Undaunted by its 0-3 record in the Department of Labor and Training, the school committee filed an appeal in District Court.

After a hearing and conference before a magistrate, the District Court remanded the proceedings to the board to consider the admissibility of the "previously excluded sworn testimony contained in the transcripts before the Arbitrator." The District Court also directed the board to reconsider its per se exclusion of the transcripts as hearsay evidence in light of this Court's decision in DePasquale v. Harrington, 599 A.2d 314 (R.I.1991). The board responded that it had accepted the transcript into evidence for full review before issuing its decision. The board also noted the transcript had been admitted as hearsay evidence, and no other direct evidence had been presented before the board. The earlier decision of the board was then adopted and incorporated by reference.

The school committee, once again, filed an appeal with the District Court. On appeal, the District Court ruled that the school committee's complaint was moot and that it presented no justiciable case or controversy because Bailey already had received all the benefits to which he was entitled, and those benefits were not recoverable by the school committee. The court also ruled that collateral estoppel did not apply in this case because the arbitration decision had not been confirmed at the time when the board issued its decision. Finally, the court ruled that the board's decision to grant unemployment benefits to Bailey was not clearly erroneous, nor arbitrary and capricious, particularly in light of the broad discretion given to the board in examining evidence.

We granted the school committee's petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to § 28-44-55 on November 22, 2002.

Standard of Review

This Court, in reviewing cases brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 chapter 35 of title 42, is limited to reviewing questions of law. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 479 A.2d 740, 742 (R.I.1984) (citing Powell v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 477 A.2d 93, 95-96 (R.I.1984)). On certiorari, this Court will not weigh the evidence; "we limit the scope of our review to the record as a whole to determine whether any legally competent evidence exists therein to support the trial court's decision or whether the trial court committed error of law in reaching its decision." Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Training, Board of Review, 749 A.2d 1121, 1124 (R.I.2000) (per curiam) (citing Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I.1996)). Legally competent evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Id. at 1125 (quoting Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I.1998)). "This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact." Tierney v. Department of Human Services, 793 A.2d 210, 213 (R.I.2002) (citing Technic, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training, 669 A.2d 1156, 1158 (R.I.1996)).

Pursuant to § 42-35-15(g), which also governs our review, this Court may:

"affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

See, e.g., Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training Board of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 167 (R.I.2003)

; Rhode Island Temps, Inc.,

749 A.2d at 1124.

Mootness

The school committee argues that the District Court erred in ruling that the complaint was moot. The District Court held that the complaint was moot because all of the unemployment benefits had been paid to Bailey before a final decision was made on the appeal and are not reimbursable. Furthermore, the school committee has elected to be a reimbursable employer and therefore must reimburse the employment security fund for the money paid to Bailey; thus the school committee no longer has a financial stake in the proceedings.

The school committee contends that such a finding "effectively precludes any municipal reimbursable employer from appealing an adverse decision of the Board." It maintains that the Court should review this case because the same circumstances are capable of repetition, yet may evade review. The District Court reasoned that these same facts are not likely to recur, stating that:

"in order for the same issue to be revisited, a party (1) having been informed that a hearing officer would not find uncorroborated hearsay (in the form of prior testimony) to be persuasive and (2) having been invited to present live witnesses would have to (3) adamantly refuse to do so and also (4) refuse to make a showing of the unavailability of those same witnesses."

We conclude, however, that instead of the narrow set of circumstances set out by the District Court, the focus of our appellate review should center on the more general question of whether the board abused its discretion by disregarding hearsay evidence because no corroborating evidence was offered. We examine, therefore, whether in this context the issue is moot under our established...