Depreo v. State

Decision Date16 December 1981
Docket NumberNo. 52785,52785
Citation407 So.2d 102
PartiesCharles Edward "Chuck" DEPREO v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

James E. Atchison and Richard D. Horne, Mobile, Ala., for appellant.

Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before SMITH, P. J., and WALKER and BOWLING, JJ.

BOWLING, Justice, for the Court:

Appellant Charles Edward "Chuck" Depreo was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of murder in the Circuit Court of Hancock County, Mississippi. From a sentence of life imprisonment with the Department of Corrections, he appeals to this Court and assigns the following errors, to-wit:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE APPELLANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE SEARCH AND THE RESULTS THEREOF, OF THE HOME OF EIDO DEPREO, APPELLANT'S FATHER.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A HEARING ON APPELLANT'S SPECIAL BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

During the early morning, night-time hours of April 8, 1978, Janice Ladner met her death at her home in Hancock County, Mississippi. She was shot three times with what proved to be a .22 caliber gun, after which the home was set on fire and burned. An autopsy revealed that she was dead prior to the fire. Living with Mrs. Ladner was her six-year-old daughter. At the time of the shooting, a bullet struck the child a glancing blow. She received an injury to her head in some manner not definitely determined. The child was able to leave the house and go to the house of a nearby neighbor and inform the residents there of what had occurred.

There is no need to relate in detail in this opinion all of the evidence presented by the state and appellant at the trial, due to the above stated limited assignments of error. We shall discuss the evidence in the record that relates to each of these assignments.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE APPELLANT.

There was a pre-trial hearing on appellant's motion to suppress an alleged confession given by him at the Navy facilities at Portsmouth, Virginia. Appellant had been in the Navy service since 1977. During the course of the investigation by law enforcement officials after the shooting of Mrs. Ladner, matters were developed which led to a belief by the officials that the appellant had committed the crime. The events occurring thereafter were related on the motion to suppress by Ronnie Peterson, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Hancock County. He testified that he, along with Sheriff Ladner and Mississippi Highway Patrol Investigator Joe Price, went to Portsmouth, Virginia, on April 22, 1978. Arrangements for the trip and the contacting of appellant were made through the Navy authorities in Gulfport, Mississippi, and the Navy authorities in Virginia. The principal authority for the Navy in Virginia who handled the details of appellant meeting the officials from Mississippi was an Officer Mote, who was assigned to the Naval Investigative Service at Portsmouth. Under the arrangements between the Naval officer in Gulfport, Mississippi, and Officer Mote, appellant was detained on his ship by the Naval authorities until the three Mississippi officers arrived at about 12:30 p. m. on April 22, 1978. As hereinafter shall be discussed the Mississippi authorities carried with them a warrant for the arrest of appellant on a charge of arson involving a school building and three "John Doe" warrants. According to the testimony of Mr. Peterson, upon arrival at Portsmouth, they were met by two Navy men, Donovan and Redding, who carried them to the Navy facilities where they met Officer Mote, who handled all further proceedings for the Navy.

Peterson testified that the three officers and appellant were placed in a room at about 1:30 p. m. Peterson testified that Sheriff Ladner initially advised appellant of all of his rights, including all requirements of the so-called Miranda warning; that this was first done verbally and then appellant freely and voluntarily executed a written waiver in which he again was advised of all of his rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present. This statement shows the time of execution as 1:45 p. m., was signed by appellant and witnessed by the three officers.

Appellant had not been advised that he was under suspicion for murder. Officer Mote had advised appellant that he was to be questioned about an arson. Later in the hearing Officer Mote testified that when he was first contacted by the Gulfport Navy authorities he was requested not to advise appellant that he was also subject of a homicide investigation.

Peterson testified that for about two hours appellant was questioned concerning both the arson and the death of Mrs. Ladner. Peterson's testimony was that various breaks were taken during the questioning and refreshments secured, for both the officers and appellant. Peterson's positive testimony was that there were no threats or coercion of any type made by the officers during the questioning of appellant. Upon requesting appellant to return to Mississippi with them for further investigation, appellant requested that he be allowed to talk with Officer Mote. This was done with Officers Mote and Donovan spending about thirty minutes alone with appellant. The three Mississippi officers were never in the room during appellant's conversation with the Navy personnel.

Peterson testified that after appellant's conversation with the Navy officers, he, Peterson, returned to the room alone. He first secured another waiver of rights signed by appellant, the same type as was secured originally. According to Peterson, the execution of this instrument was without any type of force or duress upon appellant and he fully understood what he was doing. This waiver was executed according to its terms at 5:15 p.m. Peterson talked with appellant further and according to Peterson, appellant admitted that he killed Mrs. Ladner and would write a confession statement. Sheriff Ladner and Officer Price were then called into the room. Peterson and the others witnessed the writing of the statement by appellant with a pen and in his own handwriting. The statement set out details of what occurred when Mrs. Ladner was killed, including the shooting with a .22 caliber pistol using .22 long hollow points, and the fact that the young child was struck by mistake. According to his statement, he then set the house on fire and walked back home. He gave the time as about 1:30 a.m. and he reached home at about 2:15 or 2:30 and put the gun in a closet and went to bed.

After Peterson's testimony the state rested its presentation of evidence on the motion to suppress. Defendant placed on the stand Officer Robert M. Mote, whose connection with the matter has already been developed. Officer Mote reiterated that he was first contacted by the Navy Investigative Service representative in Gulfport. Later he talked by telephone with Chief Deputy Peterson regarding the trip of the officers to Portsmouth and that appellant would be available. His testimony was that prior to the officers coming to Virginia, he had only told appellant he was being investigated for arson. He was requested to do this by Officer Peterson. After the Mississippi officers had talked with appellant for about two hours, Mote was advised that appellant wished to talk with a Navy representative. Officer Mote went into the room with appellant and the Mississippi officers stayed outside. Mote talked with appellant, according to him, for fifteen or twenty minutes. Mote secured from appellant a Navy form waiver of rights, which is similar to the form ordinarily used by law enforcement officials and advised appellant, among other things, that he had the right to remain silent and had the right to consult with a lawyer and have the lawyer present during the interview. This was signed by appellant at 3:50 p.m. and witnessed by Officer Mote and Officer Donovan. Mote testified that appellant asked if he could talk with a Navy attorney. Mote advised appellant that the matter was solely a civil matter and not service connected; therefore, he could not be furnished a Navy lawyer, but he could have a civilian lawyer. According to Mote, appellant advised him that he did not want a civilian lawyer. Mote suggested to appellant that he accompany the officers back to Mississippi to try to straighten out the entire matter. Mote admitted that he and appellant principally were talking about the arson charge at that time. Appellant agreed with Mote that he should accompany the officers back to Mississippi. He then signed a typewritten statement in which he stated that he would voluntarily agree to accompany the Mississippi officers to Hancock County for questioning in a criminal matter. The instrument further stated he had been advised of his right against self-incrimination and the action was freely and voluntarily done on his part. It stated that he had been advised that they wished to question him concerning an arson that occurred in Hancock County. After initialling two typographical errors in the statement, appellant signed it; the same as he had done on the other three instruments. This was sworn to by Officer Mote, an official authorized to administer oaths.

Mote testified that, after he had left the room and the officers again talked with appellant, he was advised that appellant had executed a confession.

Officer Joe Price was called as a witness for the defendant. His brief testimony corroborated that of Officer Peterson.

Appellant did not testify on the motion to suppress. He did testify at the trial. The gist of his testimony, giving the reason for executing the confession in Virginia, was that he did not want the officers to search the apartment where he and others lived because his roommates had marijuana in the apartment. He also testified that his reason for...

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  • Jones v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 28 Noviembre 1984
    ...212 (1979); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885-6 n. 9, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 387 n. 9 (1981); Depreo v. State, 407 So.2d 102, 106 (Miss.1981). Until compliance with the strictures of Miranda has been shown, however, the question of voluntariness is never In connectio......
  • Turner v. State
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    ...by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. See also Depreo v. State, 407 So.2d 102 (Miss.1981). We are of the opinion that the search was legal and that there was no Fourth Amendment violation of appellant's Hampton advised......
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    • Mississippi Supreme Court
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