Depuy Orthopaedics Inc. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 30 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 49A02–1304–CT–332.,49A02–1304–CT–332.
• Citation: 10 N.E.3d 567
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: DePUY ORTHOPAEDICS INC. and, Johnson & Johnson, Appellants–Defendants, v. Travis BROWN, et al., Appellees–Plaintiffs.

10 N.E.3d 567

DePUY ORTHOPAEDICS INC. and, Johnson & Johnson, Appellants–Defendants,

v.Travis BROWN, et al., Appellees–Plaintiffs.

No. 49A02–1304–CT–332.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 30, 2014.

Peter J. Rusthoven, Terri L. Bruksch, Michael R. Conner, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Eric C. Lewis, Lewis Legal Services, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

PYLE, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this interlocutory appeal, DePuy Orthopaedics and Johnson & Johnson (collectively “DePuy”) appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, governed by Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(C).

We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred when it denied DePuy's motion to dismiss.

FACTS

DePuy Orthopaedics, a subsidiary of DePuy Synthes and Johnson & Johnson, provides prosthetic products for hip, knee, and shoulder replacement surgeries. DePuy sells its prosthetic products to hospitalsthrough independent sales contractors. DePuy's principal place of business is located in Warsaw, Indiana, which is located in Kosciusko County. There, DePuy maintains offices, a manufacturing facility, and a warehouse.

The product at issue in this case, the ASR™ XL Acetabular System (“ASR™ XL System”), is a prosthetic hip implant sold in the United States between 2005 and 2010. DePuy International Limited (“DePuy International”), located in Leeds, England, designed and manufactured the ASR™ XL System. Thereafter, DePuy International shipped the ASR™ XL System to DePuy facilities in Warsaw.

Between October 2007 and April 2009, nineteen people residing in Virginia and Mississippi (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) had the ASR™ XL System implanted during hip replacement surgeries; eighteen of the surgeries were performed in Virginia while the remaining surgery took place in Mississippi. On August 24, 2010, DePuy Orthopaedics issued a voluntary global recall of the ASR™ XL System. The Plaintiffs' doctors notified them of the recall and advised them of the potential need for additional surgery.

On February 29, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Indianapolis, Indiana in the Marion County Superior Court for personal injuries alleging negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and fraudulent concealment. DePuy filed a motion to dismiss based on Trial Rule 4.4(C). Pursuant to Trial Rule 4.4(D), it also stipulated that DePuy would submit to the personal jurisdiction of Virginia and Mississippi courts and waive any statute of limitation defenses available in those states.

On January 11, 2013, the trial court heard oral arguments on DePuy's motion. DePuy argued that trial in Marion County would not be convenient because the acts alleged by the Plaintiffs in their complaint took place outside Indiana. Further, DePuy claimed that witnesses and evidence essential to their defense were located beyond the subpoena power of the Indiana trial court. Many of the Plaintiffs' arguments in response focused on the fact that Indiana has personal jurisdiction over DePuy and that filing suit in Marion County was permissible. As to Trial Rule 4.4(C) matters, the Plaintiffs claimed that video depositions could cure any prejudice DePuy would suffer from not having subpoena power over certain witnesses. Finally, the Plaintiffs desired an earlier trial date than could be expected if they proceeded through pending federal multi-district litigation proceedings regarding the ASR™ XL System. ¹

On January 22, 2013, the trial court issued an order summarily denying DePuy's motion to dismiss. DePuy filed a motion to certify the trial court's order for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted DePuy's motion and certified its order. Thereafter, we accepted jurisdiction.

DECISION

Conflict of laws is a body of law governing how disputes which involve the laws of more than one country or state are resolved. Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, inKermit L. Hall & David S. Clark, The Oxford Companion to American Law 138 (Oxford Univ. Press., 2002). A conflict exists because some or all of the elements associated with a plaintiff's claim are connected with more than one jurisdiction. Id. In other words, the facts of a particular case may allow a plaintiff to file suit in one or more states, even a foreign country.

Generally, a plaintiff is free to select the appropriate court or forum to resolve his or her claim. However, there are limitations. One of these limitations is the common law, equitable doctrine known as forum non conveniens. This doctrine grants trial courts the discretionary power to dismiss a case “whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere.” Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo–American Law, 29 Col. L. RevV 1 (1929); See also Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643, 55 S.Ct. 589, 79 L.Ed. 1100 (1935). The early application of this doctrine seems to have been aimed at limiting forum shopping, which is the plaintiff's ability to select a court or jurisdiction that he or she feels would render the most favorable verdict. Blair, supra at 24. (Blair argues that forum shopping frustrates the legislative process of apportioning the necessary number of judges and courts for a particular population, leads to congested court calendars, and burdens local taxpayers with the expense of trying imported controversies.). However, principles of fairness enshrined in various Federal and Indiana constitutional provisions, including the dormant commerce clause and the doctrine of comity, require that citizens, whether or not they are residents of a particular state, be given access to the courts.²1 William F. Harvey, Indiana Practice: Rules of Procedure Annotated § 4.4 at 308 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2013).

Given the natural tension between the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the preference for open access to Indiana's courts, courts have struggled to discern the criteria for dismissing a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens; it has been the subject of “considerable discussion and variance of view.” Id. at 311–12. However, it is generally agreed that the doctrine should be applied sparingly and that its objective should be to “promote the ends of convenience and justice.” Id.

In its effort to find this balance, Indiana has adopted Trial Rule 4.4(C), which, at the time, was taken from the Wisconsin Civil Code.³Id. This Court has stated that the purpose of the rule “is to permit a case to be litigated in another state upon a showing that litigation in Indiana is so inconvenient that substantial injustice is likely to result.” Employers Ins. Of Wausau v. RFC, 716 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added).⁴ “A mere inconvenience to a corporate defendant's employees does not create the type of injustice necessary to warrant a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Desert Palace, Inc., 882 N.E.2d 743, 753 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)trans. denied. However, “[t]he convenience of non-party witnesses is usually the most important factor to consider in deciding whether to depart from the plaintiffs choice of forum.” Id.

In exercising its discretion to decide whether to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds, a trial court may appropriately consider such factors as:

(1) Amenability to personal jurisdiction in this state and in any alternative forum of the parties to the action;

(2) Convenience to the parties and witnesses of the trial in this state and in any alternative forum;

(3) Differences in the conflict of law rules applicable in this state and in the alternative forum; or

(4) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.

T.R. 4.4(C).

We review a trial court's order regarding forum non conveniens motions for an abuse of discretion. Anyango, 971 N.E.2d at 656. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the trial court arrives at a conclusion that is clearly against logic and the natural inference to be drawn therefrom.” Freemond v. Somma, 611 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied.

In deciding this case, we find the facts and reasoning outlined by the United States Supreme Court case of Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), whose reasoning the Indiana Supreme Court adopted in Anyango, to be persuasive. There, several Scottish subjects and residents died in an airplane crash in Scotland. Piper, 454 U.S. at 238–39, 102 S.Ct. 252. Preliminary reports concluded that a mechanical failure in the plane or propeller caused the crash. Id. However, further review found no evidence of defective equipment and indicated that pilot error was to blame. Id. An administrator for the decedents' estates filed a wrongful death suit in California against Piper Aircraft Company, who manufactured the plane, and Hartzell Propeller, the manufacturer of the propellers. Id. at 239–40, 102 S.Ct. 252. Decedents' survivors filed a separate action in the United Kingdom. Id. The plane was manufactured in Pennsylvania, and the propellers were manufactured in Ohio. Id. at 238–39, 102 S.Ct. 252.

The administrator admitted that she filed the lawsuit in California because of its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and because potential damages were more favorable in California than in Scotland. Id. at 240, 102 S.Ct. 252. Defendants first moved to transfer the case to federal court. After the case was moved to the United States District Court, a subsequent motion to transfer to the Middle District of Pennsylvania was granted. Id. Once there, both Piper and Hartzell moved for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. Id. at 241, 102 S.Ct. 252. The district court granted the motion, finding that Scotland was a more convenient forum based on the Supreme Court's balancing test stated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). P...