DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown
Decision Date | 24 April 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 49S02–1504–CT–225.,49S02–1504–CT–225. |
Citation | 29 N.E.3d 729 |
Parties | DePUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC. and Johnson & Johnson, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Travis BROWN et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Peter J. Rusthoven, Terri L. Bruksch, Michael R. Conner, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for appellants.
Eric C. Lewis, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for appellees.
, Justice.
Plaintiffs Travis Brown et al. filed suit against DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. in Marion Superior Court, alleging injuries related to certain hip replacement equipment. DePuy moved to transfer venue to Virginia and Mississippi on the grounds of forum non conveniens, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(C)
. The trial court denied the motion, and certified the question for interlocutory appeal. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 4.4(C), and thus affirm.
DePuy Orthopaedics is an Indiana corporation, and its principal place of business is located in Warsaw, Kosciusko County, Indiana. From 2005 to 2010, DePuy sold a prosthetic hip implant
throughout the United States known as the ASR™ XL Acetabular System. Plaintiffs are nineteen individuals who had the ASR™ XL System implanted during hip replacement surgeries (eighteen in Virginia, one in Mississippi). Plaintiffs have filed suit in the Marion Superior Court, alleging negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and fraudulent concealment, after DePuy issued a voluntary global recall on the ASR™ XL System. DePuy filed a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 4.4(C)
,1 asserting that Virginia and Mississippi were the proper fora. Following extensive briefing by both parties and oral argument, the trial court summarily denied DePuy's motion to dismiss. DePuy filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the motion, given the matter's stronger connection to Virginia and Mississippi. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. v. Brown, 10 N.E.3d 567, 575 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). We now grant Plaintiffs' petition for transfer, thus vacating the opinion below. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We affirm the trial court.
Pursuant to Trial Rule 4.4(C)
, the trial court exercises discretion with respect to motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, and our review is thus limited to abuse of that discretion. Anyango v. Rolls–Royce Corp., 971 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Ind.2012).2 Under an abuse of discretion review, “we presume that the trial court will ‘act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case,’ and thus we will only reverse ‘if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.’ ” Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind.2013)
(citing McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind.1993) ). We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we determine whether the evidence before the trial court can serve as a rational basis for its decision. Matter of Grissom, 587 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind.1992) ; Fry v. Schroder, 986 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ind.Ct.App.)
trans. denied, 989 N.E.2d 782 (Ind.2013).
imposes no mandatory obligations upon trial courts in dismissing a case on forum non conveniens grounds; rather, the court may dismiss “under such reasonable conditions as the court in its discretion may determine to be just.” See also
Anyango, 971 N.E.2d at 663 ( ). Moreover, Rule 4.4(C)'s enumerated list of factors is merely permissive, to the point of including a catch-all provision of “any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.” Accordingly, the trial court's summary dismissal was adequate as a matter of law.3
Inman, 981 N.E.2d at 1208 ( )(emphasis added in Inman ).
Our review is therefore limited to whether the decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Wright 989 N.E.2d at 330
. The record on appeal reveals, at a minimum, the following facts supporting retaining Indiana as venue:
; McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 [78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223] (1957) ;
;
(. )
We agree with DePuy that there is, indeed, ample evidence supporting venue in Virginia or Mississippi rather than Indiana. That does not mean, however, that we are entitled to reweigh the evidence on appeal. The record here reveals sufficient evidence for the trial court to have reasonably concluded that Indiana was the appropriate forum for this litigation, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of DePuy's motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
, C.J., and DICKSON, RUCKER, and DAVID, JJ., concur.
2 In their pursuit of zealous advocacy, both parties attempt to describe this familiar standard to their advantage.
First, DePuy asserts that we “must independently review the record” using the factors listed in Trial Rule 4.4(C)
because Judge Hanley's order denying DePuy's motion to dismiss was summary in nature. Appellant's Br. in Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 2–3; see also Appellant's Br. at 10; Appellant's Reply Br. at 4. DePuy bases this argument on Hefty v. All Other Members of the Certified Settlement Class, 680 N.E.2d 843, 852 (Ind.1997), where we held a heightened review was necessary under Trial Rule 23(E) because “a trial court is required to explore comprehensively all relevant factors when approving a class action settlement agreement,” and had failed to do so. However, our court routinely applies the traditional abuse of discretion standard to summary denials by trial courts in discretionary contexts. See
Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 175 (Ind.2013), reh'g denied (Nov. 21, 2013) (applying abuse of discretion standard to summary denial of portion of motion to correct errors); Inman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 981 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind.2012) ( ). A summary denial is also distinct from where the trial court's articulated reasoning is contrary to law or otherwise in error, thus warranting reversal. See
Alsheik v. Guerrero, 979 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ind.2012) () (internal citations omitted); City of Elkhart v. Middleton, 265 Ind. 514, 518, 356 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1976) ().
Second, Plaintiffs claim that “Indiana Courts have emphasized time and again that the underlying purpose of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to ‘permit...
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