Depuy v. Hoeme

Decision Date15 March 1989
Docket NumberNo. 67423,67423
Citation775 P.2d 1339,1989 OK 42
PartiesChauncy Ray DEPUY and Paul E. Depuy, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Roland HOEME, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

On appeal from the District Court, Texas County; James F. Lane, Successor Trial Judge.

In a postdecree proceeding before the successor trial judge to secure compliance with a mandatory injunction, the defendant (a) claimed that the plaintiffs continued to be in noncompliance with the terms of the permanent injunction and (b) sought additional enforcement relief. When the plaintiffs had previously been found in noncompliance with the same mandatory injunction, the deceased predecessor judge had announced in open court certain postdecree, midappeal enforcement directives, which were neither memorialized nor otherwise reduced to a record entry signed by that judge. The successor judge held that the earlier, open-court directives had res judicata effect. He denied the relief sought by the defendant except for a portion of compliance work which, in his view, had previously been ordered to be done at the option of the defendant.

THE TRIAL COURT'S POSTDECREE ORDER IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Andrew T. Dalton, Jr., Tulsa, and Larry L. Field, Guymon, for defendant-appellant.

John G. Spires, Cherri Farrar, Grove, Grove & Associates, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs-appellees.

OPALA, Vice Chief Justice.

The issue tendered for our decision is whether the deceased predecessor trial judge's 1977 oral postdecree, midappeal directives--specifying the work required to satisfy the command of a previously issued mandatory injunction--had res judicata effect in the instant enforcement proceeding before the successor judge. Disposition of this question requires that we initially focus on the previous midappeal enforcement directives. Because no journal entry was ever prepared of this 1977 judicial ruling whose unmemorialized terms vitally affect the inquiry into issues presently on appeal, the trial court's postdecree decision now before us must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to settle the journal entry of this critical disposition in an adversary hearing to be conducted on due notice to the parties. After the memorialization process has been completed, the trial court shall then decide if the predecessor judge's ruling constituted a final and appealable postdecree order; if so, the memorialized disposition shall be given res judicata effect insofar as the ruling defined the details of the work that must be performed to comply with the mandatory injunction decree of November 29, 1976.

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

This appeal arises out of a settled dispute that culminated in this court's pronouncement in Depuy v. Hoeme. 1 There, we affirmed the trial court's 1976 decree 2 denying the Depuys' quest for injunctive relief and granting Hoeme a mandatory injunction. 3

The case dealt with the parties' competing claims to the use of water from Wild Horse Lake, a natural playa lake located partly on both of their adjoining premises. During the course of the controversy the Depuys constructed a road dike designed to prevent drainage water from reaching the portion of the lake which was located on During the pendency of the earlier appeal from the 1976 decree, but before this court's mandate in Depuy I, the predecessor judge held a contempt hearing to determine whether the Depuys had complied with the then-unstayed injunction's command. 5 Hoeme's counsel requested at that hearing that the judge view the premises because that would be "the quickest way, the most illuminating way ... to resolve this issue once and for all. " 6 Though the court found the injunction decree had not been fully satisfied, it reserved a ruling with respect to any punishment and admonished the Depuys that they were "not relieved of the penalty of contempt until ... [they accomplished the indicated directives]." 7 It is then that the judge announced certain directives concerning work to be done for complete compliance with the injunction decree. 8 According to the transcript, the predecessor judge had directed that certain dirt be removed 9 and the pipe installed to permit free water flow. 10 While during this hearing the judge indicated his intention to have these directives memorialized, 11 no journal entry appears in the record and, so far as we can ascertain, none was ever prepared. 12 According to a later "bench docket" entry, the predecessor judge's personal inspection of the premises revealed that the required dirt removal had been accomplished, but the pipe had not been installed "due to a conversation with counsel." 13 No ruling was ever issued imposing any sanction for the pressed contempt charge.

Hoeme's land. The trial court's decree of mandatory injunction required that the Depuys remove the offending "road dike from the bed of the lake, or ... construct culverts under it to enable passage of the water under the road." 4

This court affirmed the November 29, 1976 mandatory injunction by its February 19, 1980 pronouncement in Depuy I. On May 9, 1985 Hoeme filed below his "motion for execution." He invoked the successor judge's assistance for postappeal enforcement of the November 1976 mandatory injunction and of this court's mandate in Depuy I. At the enforcement hearing Hoeme asserted that because the Depuys were still blocking the water flow he needed a "writ of assistance", to be carried out by the sheriff, for the removal of the entire impeding road dike. In defense the Depuys urged that except for the pipe's placement they had fully complied with the directives the predecessor judge had

                given in open court during the 1977 hearing. 14  The successor judge thereafter determined that the Hoeme-raised issue--with respect to the steps the Depuys must take to comply fully with the mandatory injunction--had been completely litigated before the predecessor judge and stood resolved by the latter's May 16, 1977 ruling.  Applying res judicata, the successor judge concluded that the matter before him could not be relitigated.  Hoeme brings this appeal, urging error in the trial court's application of the preclusive bar. 15
                
I

THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY HOEME

Although characterized as one for contempt, the 1977 hearing focused primarily on the conditions necessary for compliance with the November 1976 mandatory injunction. The present postdecree proceeding, brought below before the successor judge, was triggered by Hoeme's "motion for execution." The parties later agreed Hoeme sought relief under the provisions of 12 O.S.1981 § 902. 16 His object was to seek enforcement both of the injunction decree and of this court's mandate in Depuy I 17 by a ruling that further performance--the removal of the entire road dike--was necessary for the Depuys to comply with the injunctive relief's command and with this court's mandate in Depuy I.

Hoeme now seeks reversal of the trial court's decision insofar as it gives res judicata effect to the 1977 oral directives and precludes judicial reexamination of the nature of work required of the Depuys to comply with the injunction decree's command. The decision presently tendered for our review necessarily requires that our attention be focused both on the terms and on the legal effect of the predecessor judge's 1977 ruling. While the successor judge's decision stands memorialized by a formal journal entry, that of his predecessor is not. Inasmuch as no written memorial of the predecessor judge's ruling was ever entered of record, we must first decide whether the unmemorialized directives of 1977 are entitled to res judicata effect.

II

A WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 1977 RULING IS AN INDISPENSABLE PREREQUISITE FOR THE REVIEWING COURT'S APPRAISAL OF ITS PRECLUSIVE EFFECT

A superior court of common law speaks only through its record. The appealing party bears the burden of procuring The absence of a written memorial is not essential to the validity or finality of a judgment or order, nor does the failure promptly to file the entry render a ruling ineffective or unenforceable. 20 A judgment or order is rendered and begins its legal life as soon as it is pronounced from the bench and before it is ever reduced to writing for entry of record by the clerk. 21 While any judgment or order is operative from the moment it is announced, the only legitimate evidence of the adjudication's legal existence, of its terms and of its legal effect is the record entry bearing the judge's signature. 22

                a record sufficient to support the corrective relief which is sought. 18  That record must always include a written memorial of the judicial action which either triggered the appealable event or that which is essential to its appellate review. 19
                

The doctrine of res judicata, 23 which applies with like force to judgments or decrees of the court as it does to its postjudgment and postdecree rulings that stand in law as "final," 24 teaches that when the appeal time expires a decision under this rubric becomes impervious to reconsideration and hence binding and conclusive upon the parties. In short, terminal judicial rulings--whether they be judgments or postjudgment dispositions--reach a final determination stage, settle the parties' rights and by force of law are placed beyond the trial court's power to alter, except only Before a reviewing court can determine the res judicata effect of any prior adjudication by a trial court, the ruling to be gauged for its preclusive effect must stand memorialized. 28 No preclusive effect may be accorded to a judge's ruling unless the decision's existence and its terms be established by its record entry. 29 The proof necessary for a record entry's preparation can be supplied and its provisions settled in an adversary hearing. 30

                upon resort to §§ 1031 and 1031.1 25 remedies which prescribe vacation or modification procedures. 26
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