DeRusse v. State
Decision Date | 11 April 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 56070,No. 3,56070,3 |
Citation | 579 S.W.2d 224 |
Parties | Joe Henry DeRUSSE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Robert D. Thorpe and Michael G. Morris, Corpus Christi, for appellant.
William B. Mobley, Jr., Dist. Atty. and Eric G. Brown, Asst. Dist. Atty., Corpus Christi, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before DALLY, W. C. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder. The punishment is imprisonment for twenty-six years.
Appellant contends that: (1) a psychiatrist was erroneously permitted to testify to statements made by appellant during a competency examination; (2) the prosecutor improperly referred to the order of the trial court finding that appellant's confession was voluntary; (3) testimony concerning an unrelated crime was erroneously introduced; (4) the prosecutor offered in evidence photographs which had previously been ruled inadmissible; (5) evidence as to appellant's lack of a prior criminal record was erroneously excluded; (6) the trial court erroneously refused appellant's requested charges on assault and on the presumption of innocence; (7) the trial court erroneously charged the jury on the offense of injury to a child; (8) the prosecutor engaged in improper jury argument; (9) the district attorney should have been required to honor a pretrial plea bargain agreement; and (10) the State should not have been allowed to have two attorneys present its case.
The evidence establishes that appellant and his wife fatally beat their three-year-old son with their hands, a board, a belt, and an electric cord. 1 The child was pronounced dead on arrival at the Robstown Riverside Hospital on October 4, 1975. Two of the nurses on duty in the emergency room at the time testified that the child appeared to have been run over by a car.
The Nueces County Medical Examiner testified that:
Asked the cause of death, the Medical Examiner testified:
Appellant's defense was that he was insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Henry Hammer, a clinical psychologist, testified that he had examined appellant in October, 1975. He described his conclusions, based upon this examination, as follows:
Dr. Hammer testified that appellant did not intend to harm his son when he beat him:
. . . He was busy attacking the behavior of a demon, in his own mind, he was. As extra baggage to that, as something that happened inadvertently, he undesirably, perhaps, undesirably is a better term, he was also causing physical harm to his son. He saw that as very undesirable. He did not want to cause harm to the son. He did want to correct this demonic behavior he perceived."
Dr. Hammer testified that, in his opinion, appellant's delusional belief that his son was possessed by a demon was a mental disease or defect and appellant, as a result, did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 8.01.
In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Joel Kutnick, a psychiatrist who had been appointed by the trial court to examine appellant as to his competence to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. Art. 46.02, Sec. 3, and Art. 46.03, Sec. 3, V.A.C.C.P. Dr. Kutnick testified that appellant had not beaten his son to get rid of a demon, but as means of discipline:
Moreover, Dr. Kutnick did not believe that appellant's religious beliefs constituted a mental disease or defect. He expressed his disagreement with Dr Hammer as follows:
As a basis for his testimony, Dr. Kutnick described the history of the case as related to him by appellant during the course of his examination. Most of this testimony was a repetition of testimony by other witnesses, including witnesses called by appellant, but this testimony also included certain facts which were not otherwise in evidence. Specifically, Dr. Kutnick testified that appellant had told him that he had burned the soles of his son's feet with matches; that appellant and his wife had poured jalapeno pepper juice in the boy's eyes; and that on the night he died, the child had been left tied to a door so that he could not raid the refrigerator, a habit which his parents were trying to break.
Prior to Dr. Kutnick's testimony, a discussion as to the admissibility of any statements made by appellant during the doctor's examination was held outside the presence of the jury. At that time, appellant contended, as he does now on appeal, that such statements were inadmissible under the terms of Art. 46.02, Sec. 3(f), as it read at the time of the trial. 2 The trial court overruled appellant's objection, and held that Dr. Kutnick could testify as to the contents of his report.
Art. 46.02, Sec. 3(g), supra, reads:
"No statement made by the defendant during the examination or hearing on his competency to stand trial may be admitted in evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding."
There is no comparable provision in Art. 46.03, supra, relating to examinations on the issue of sanity at the time of the offense.
Art. 46.03, Sec. 3(g), V.A.C.C.P., provides that experts appointed to examine a defendant with regard to the insanity defense may also examine the defendant with regard to his competence to stand trial. Appellant's pretrial motion for a psychiatric examination, which is in the record, expressly requests such a dual purpose examination, and the order appointing Dr. Kutnick directs that he conduct such an examination.
We are presented with the question of whether Art. 46.02, Sec. 3(g), supra, applies to statements made by a defendant during an examination pursuant to Art. 46.03, Sec. 3(g), supra. We hold that it does not.
Any psychiatric examination with regard to the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, and any testimony by the psychiatrist based on that examination, must necessarily deal with the defendant's conduct, and his perception thereof, at the time of the offense. The statements of the defendant to the psychiatrist concerning that conduct are, therefore, highly probative on the issue of...
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Hawkins v. State
...to grant a form of hybrid representation was not error. See Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).16 Immediately preceding the quoted instruction the jury had been told:"Defendant representing self. You should know t......
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...statements made by the defendant during a competency exam. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 § 3(g); see also DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)(article 46.03, pertaining to sanity examination does not contain prohibition against use of defendant's statements simi......
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...The offer of a plea and the circumstances surrounding that offer are generally within the discretion of the prosecutor. DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). If the prosecutor chooses not to be sufficiently persuasive in making his offer, for whatever reasons, or if he makes n......
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Hawkins v. State
...record reflects that Wall was appointed by the court to examine appellant relative to the questions of competency and sanity. In DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, this Court "Any psychiatric examination with regard to the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, and any testimony by t......
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Punishment phase
...(evidence concerning the sociological, economic, political and overall conditions of the defendant’s neighborhood); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence of rate of occurrence of similar crimes within the county); Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. A......
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Punishment Phase
...(evidence concerning the sociological, economic, political and overall conditions of the defendant’s neighborhood); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence of rate of occurrence of similar crimes within the county); Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. A......
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Punishment Phase
...(evidence concerning the sociological, economic, political and overall conditions of the defendant’s neighborhood); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence of rate of occurrence of similar crimes within the county); Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. A......
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Punishment Phase
...(evidence concerning the sociological, economic, political and overall conditions of the defendant’s neighborhood); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence of rate of occurrence of similar crimes within the county); Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. A......