Descalakis v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 16 April 1923 |
| Citation | 139 N.E. 168,244 Mass. 568 |
| Parties | DESCALAKIS v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court; Suffolk County.
Paul Descalakis, alias Paul Pappas, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and on petition for writ of error the judgment was permitted to stand by a single justice, and petitioner brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled, and judgment to stand.
See, also, 137 N. E. 879.
Defendant assigned error on the ground that, under St. 1922, c. 508, he was illegally sentenced, because sentenced within one year from the date of the trial and conviction on the indictment. On the hearing on the petition for writ of error, he requested a ruling that as a matter of law sentence at an earlier time than one year from the date of the conviction was illegal and contrary to the statute, which ruling the court refused.
St. 1922, c. 508, G. L. c. 278, s 29, and providing that superior court may grant new trial in capital cases within one year, or at any time before sentence, does not prohibit imposition of sentence within one year; the word ‘may’ not being mandatory.
[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, May.]
Delay for one year of execution of all sentences would so greatly impair efficiency that words of unmistakable import would be required to express any such legislative intent.
Words of statutes are to be interpreted in accordance with common and approved usages of the language.
A statute as a whole is to be construed so as to make it an effectual piece of legislation, in harmony with common sense and sound reason.John W. Schenck and Matthews, Williams & Schenck, all of Boston, for plaintiff in error.
Henry P. Fielding, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Dorchester, and Frank S. Deland, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Jamaica Plain, for the Commonwealth.
[1] This is a petition for a writ of error. The plaintiff in error was convicted of murder in the first degree in the superior court of Suffolk county on June 15, 1922, and was sentenced to death on January 16, 1923. The plaintiff in error assigns as the single error that his sentence was illegal, in that it was imposed at an earlier time then one year from the date of trial and conviction, contrary to St. 1922, c. 508. The contention of the plaintiff in error is that by virtue of this statute he is entitled as of right to one full year at least for seeking out and discovering new evidence upon which to base a motion for a new trial and to present such motion to the court in which he was convicted.
The pertinent words of St. 1922, c. 508, G. L. c. 278, § 29, are:
‘The superior court may, at the sitting in which an indictment is tried, or within one year thereafter, or, in capital cases, within said year or at any time before sentence, upon motion in writing of the defendant, grant a new trial for any cause for which by law a new trial may be granted or if it appears to the court that justice has not been done, and upon such terms and conditions as the court shall order.’
The effect of said chapter 508 was simply to amend the pre-existing statute by inserting the words which are italicized in the quotation just made. The new statute enlarged the authority of the court theretofore conferred by extending to capital cases power to grant a new trial at any time before sentence in the event that sentence was not imposed within one year after the sitting at which the indictment was tried. A statute of the same force and effect and in the identical words in its essentials as was G. L. c. 278, § 29, before the amendment of 1922, has been a part of our law respecting certain courts exercising criminal jurisdiction including capital cases at least since Rev. St. c. 138, § 10. It was decided in Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, that this court by reason of its general jurisdiction and independently of any special authority conferred by statute had power to grant new trials even in capital cases. The matter, soon after that decision was regulated in whole or in part by statute. The history of those statutes is traced in Commonwealth v. Rollins, 242 Mass. 427, 136 N. E. 360, and need not be repeated. Reading St. 1922, c. 508, in the light of that history makes plain the purpose of the Legislature to extend and not to restrict the pre-existing power of the court. It may well be that the act of 1922 was passed in view of the situation disclosed by the record in Commonwealth v. Rollins, 242 Mass. 427, 136...
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