Desjardins v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 18 May 2017
• Docket Number: Docket: Cum–15–365
• Citation: 162 A.3d 228
• Parties: Dana DESJARDINS v. Michael REYNOLDS
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

162 A.3d 228

Dana DESJARDINS

v.Michael REYNOLDS

Docket: Cum–15–365

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: April 5, 2016

Decided: May 18, 2017

John S. Campbell, Esq. (orally), Campbell & Associates, P.A., Portland, for appellant Dana Desjardins

Daniel J. Murphy, Esq. (orally), Bernstein Shur, Portland, for appellee Michael Reynolds

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

Dissent: JABAR, J.

GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Dana Desjardins appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J. ) dismissing his complaint against Michael Reynolds for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Desjardins contends that the court erred by concluding that his complaint was barred by application of Maine's anti–SLAPP ("Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation") statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2016). We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] In August of 2013, Desjardins, a town official for the Town of Raymond, instituted a lawsuit in the Superior Court against Michael Reynolds,¹ a Town selectman, alleging that Reynolds had made various false statements to the Cumberland County Sheriff's Office about Desjardins's alcohol use for the purpose of humiliating and harassing Desjardins. Desjardins also alleged that as a result of those reports, Desjardins was stopped on his way to a Town meeting on January 8, 2013, by a sheriff's deputy who was investigating him for possibly operating under the influence. See 29–A M.R.S. § 2411 (2016). Desjardins asserted causes of action for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light invasion of privacy, and sought damages for his "humiliation," "emotional distress," and "loss of reputation," as well as punitive damages and injunctive relief. Desjardins also asserted two claims based on federal statutes—for Reynolds's violation of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115–30), and seeking attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115–30).

[¶ 3] Reynolds removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Maine. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115–30). The District Court (Torresen, J. ) dismissed the federal claims, and Desjardins agreed to the dismissal of his claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Desjardins v. Willard , No. 2:13-cv-00338-NT, 2014 WL 2815698, at *1, *19, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84782, at *2–3,61–62 (D. Me. June 20, 2014). The court also granted Reynolds's special motion to dismiss the State claims pursuant to section 556. Id. at *16–*18, *19, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84782, at *52–57, 62.

[¶ 4] On Desjardins's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Desjardins's federal claims, but vacated the dismissal of his state law claims on section 556 grounds, concluding that those "issues are better resolved by the state courts, where this case began." Desjardins v. Willard , 777 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, when the matter was returned to the Superior Court's jurisdiction in February of 2015, only Desjardins's claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy remained.

[¶ 5] Before the Superior Court, Reynolds reasserted his special motion to dismiss on anti–SLAPP grounds, with accompanying affidavits and various exhibits. Desjardins opposed the motion, submitting affidavits and exhibits of his own. By judgment dated June 29, 2015, the Superior Court (Warren, J. ) granted Reynolds's special motion to dismiss both remaining causes of action on anti–SLAPP grounds. Desjardins appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] In this matter, we are called upon to consider the reaches of Maine's anti–SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556, which provides as follows:

§ 556. Special motion to dismiss

When a moving party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims or cross claims against the moving party are based on the moving party's exercise of the moving party's right of petition under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maine, the moving party may bring a special motion to dismiss. The special motion may be advanced on the docket and receive priority over other cases when the court determines that the interests of justice so require. The court shall grant the special motion, unless the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party's exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that the moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding party. In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleading and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

The Attorney General on the Attorney General's behalf or on behalf of any government agency or subdivision to which the moving party's acts were directed may intervene to defend or otherwise support the moving party on the special motion.

All discovery proceedings are stayed upon the filing of the special motion under this section, except that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery remains in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the special motion.

The special motion to dismiss may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms the court determines proper.

If the court grants a special motion to dismiss, the court may award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the special motion and any related discovery matters. This section does not affect or preclude the right of the moving party to any remedy otherwise authorized by law.

As used in this section, "a party's exercise of its right of petition" means any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the right to petition government.

Thus, Maine's anti–SLAPP statute, like those of other jurisdictions, provides a procedure for the expedited dismissal of lawsuits that are brought not to redress a legitimate wrong suffered by the plaintiff, but instead solely for the purpose of dissuading a defendant from exercising his First Amendment right to petition the government or punishing him for doing so. See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party (Nader I ), 2012 ME 57, ¶ 14, 41 A.3d 551 ; Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster , 2001 ME 70, ¶ 10, 772 A.2d 842 ("The typical mischief that the anti–SLAPP legislation intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at individual citizens of modest means for speaking publicly against development projects." (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Nader v. Me. Democratic Party (Nader II ), 2013 ME 51, ¶ 12 n.9, 66 A.3d 571. Such cases are filed "solely for delay and distraction, and to punish activists by imposing litigation costs on them." Morse Bros., Inc. , 2001 ME 70, ¶ 10, 772 A.2d 842 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, because the SLAPP plaintiff's goal is not necessarily to win in the litigation, but, through the cost of litigation, to punish or deter petitioning activity, "defendants' traditional safeguards against meritless actions, (suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, requests for sanctions) are inadequate to counter SLAPPs." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶ 7] To further the goals of the statute, section 556 allows the moving party to file a special motion to dismiss that may be given priority on the docket as the interests of justice require. 14 M.R.S. § 556 ; Morse Bros., Inc. , 2001 ME 70, ¶ 10, 772 A.2d 842. In another case issued this month, Gaudette v. Davis , 2017 ME 86, ¶¶ 18–22, 160 A.3d 1190, we established some additional procedural steps for the trial court to undertake to decide special motions to dismiss filed on anti–SLAPP grounds. Notwithstanding those new procedural elements for which Gaudette provides, the analysis of a special motion to dismiss in Gaudette begins with the same requirements as those set out in our prior anti–SLAPP decisions. Id . ¶¶ 16 –17.

[¶ 8] As we have consistently stated, section 556 imposes a burden-shifting procedure between the moving and nonmoving parties. E.g., id. ¶¶ 8–9 ; Camden Nat'l Bank v. Weintraub , 2016 ME 101, ¶ 8, 143 A.3d 788 ; Schelling v. Lindell , 2008 ME 59, ¶ 7, 942 A.2d 1226 ; Morse Bros., Inc. , 2001 ME 70, ¶¶ 19–20, 772 A.2d 842. First, in a motion with accompanying affidavits, the moving party (usually the defendant² ) must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the anti–SLAPP statute applies to the conduct that is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint by establishing that "the suit was based on some activity that would qualify as an exercise of the defendant's First Amendment right to petition the government."Schelling , 2008 ME 59, ¶ 7, 942 A.2d 1226 ; see Gaudette , 2017 ME 86, ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190. If the defendant fails to meet his initial burden, the special motion to dismiss must be denied. Gaudette , 2017 ME 86, ¶ 16, –––A.3d –––– ; Nader I , 2012 ME 57, ¶ 15, 41 A.3d 551 ; see Schelling , 2008 ME 59, ¶ 7, 942 A.2d 1226.

[¶ 9] If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the...