Desmond v. Charter Communications, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-CV-2392-AJB-MDD |
| Parties | STACY DESMOND, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(DOC. NO. 25.)
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant Charter Communications Inc.'s (“Charter”) motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, for partial summary judgment against Plaintiff Stacy Desmond (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. No. 25.) Plaintiff opposes Charter's motion. (Doc. No. 39.) Charter replied. (Doc. No. 43.) The Court held a hearing on Charter's motion on July 1, 2021. (Doc. No. 44.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Charter's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
This is an employment case, alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff argues she was terminated on the basis of her gender and disability, and in retaliation for her complaints to Charter's Employee Relations Department. In defense, Charter's asserts it terminated Plaintiff's employment because she failed to meet her sales quota for five consecution months. (Doc. No. 25-1 at 9.)
In November 2010, Plaintiff commenced employment with Time Warner Cable, Inc. (“Time Warner”)-the predecessor entity to Charter. (Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff was employed as a Direct Sales Representative (“DSR”), a door-to-door salesperson responsible for selling Charter's products and services. (Id. ¶ 6.) On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff began work in the Multi-Dwelling Unit Concierge (“MDU”) position, in which she sold Charter's products and services to apartment buildings, condominiums, and other multi-dwelling communities. (Doc. No. 25-1 at 11.) Plaintiff states that the MDU position was less strenuous, as walking was confined to multi-dwelling units instead of residential neighborhoods.
In 2016, Charter merged with Time Warner. (Id.) This merger resulted in the restructuring of some of Charter's departments, including downsizing the MDU department. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff was transferred back to the DSR department along with two other male MDU employees.[1] (Id.)
From November 16, 2016, through May 3, 2017, Plaintiff experienced medical issues related to a neck and shoulder injury she sustained in 2001, prior to working with Time Warner. (Plaintiff Desmond's Deposition (“Plaintiff's Depo.”), Doc. No. 25-2, at 107:12-111:5.)[2] Due to these health issues, which Plaintiff alleges was exacerbated by Plaintiff's work as a DSR, Plaintiff was placed on a medical leave of absence at Charter. (Id.)
While still out on leave in March 2017, Plaintiff applied for an open MDU position. (Doc. No. 25-1 at 12.) At the time of her application, Plaintiff was medically restricted to a part-time schedule with limited hours in the field, and limited walking. (Id.) The medical restrictions were: (1) Plaintiff would require a one-hour break for every three hours of field work; (2) Plaintiff could only carry ten pounds per hand; and (3) Plaintiff could only work five days a week. (Id. at 120:7-121:7.) Charter rejected Plaintiff's MDU application, and deemed Plaintiff unsuitable for the MDU job because the role was full-time, and required more activity in the field than Plaintiff's medical restrictions would permit. (Plaintiff's Depo., at 115:3-24.) On May 4, 2017, Plaintiff returned from leave to her prior DSR position-the same position she held before her leave of absence. (Doc. No. 25-1 at 13.)
All DSRs at Charter, including Plaintiff, were required to meet a monthly sales quota of 23 sales. (Id.) According to Charter's policies, the transaction would only qualify as a sale if the installation of Charter's product or service occurred during the same cycle as the sale. (Doc. No. 39 at 17.) In addition to this quota, DSRs were required to meet a ten sales threshold in order to earn commission and avoid corrective action. (See Declaration of Jose Hernandez (“Hernandez Decl.”), Doc. No. 25-2, at ¶ 8.) This ten sales minimum could be adjusted downwards if a DSR did not work a full month due to absences, leave, or vacation. (Id.) Charter alleges Saturdays were not required workdays for DSRs, however, many DSRs worked on Saturdays to meet their 23 monthly sales quota. (Id.)
To maintain employee performance, Charter implemented a strict discipline system. (Id. at 14.) Employees who failed to meet their minimum quotas were subject to a progressive discipline system including a “Coaching, ” a “Verbal Warning, ” a “Written Warning, ” a “Final Written Warning, ” and then ultimately, termination. (See Hernandez Decl. ¶ 10.) According to Charter, Plaintiff failed to meet her minimum quotas for the months of May, June, July, August, and September of 2017. (Id. ¶¶ 11-14.) After being issued a “Final Written Warning, ” Charter issued an Incident Investigation Report and termination recommendation on September 26, 2017. (See Id. ¶ 14.) On October 13, 2017, Charter officially terminated Plaintiff for failing to meet her sales quota for five consecutive months. (Id.)
On September 22, 2017, prior to her termination, Plaintiff filed an Open Door complaint against Sales Manager Chris Workman (“Workman”), alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, and harassment on the basis of alleged offensive comments made by Workman. Then, on October 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). (See Exhibit 13 to Declaration of Casey Morris.) The DFEH claim alleged harassment, gender and disability discrimination, and retaliation based on Plaintiff's requests for accommodation and complaints to management. (Id.) The DFEH issued an immediate Right to Sue notice, and took no further action on the DFEH charge. (Id.)
On October 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a civil action in San Diego Superior Court. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts fifteen causes of action:
The state action was removed to this Court on December 12, 2019. (Doc. No. 1.) No motion to dismiss was filed. Charter filed this instant motion for summary judgment on April 9, 2021, which was opposed by Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 25.) The Court held a hearing on the motion on July 1, 2021. (Doc. No. 44.)
A court may grant summary judgment when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing a court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” as to a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading but must instead produce evidence that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before a court must be drawn in favor of...
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