Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2022
• Docket Number: AC 44180, (AC 44181), (AC 44182)
• Citation: 212 Conn.App. 274,275 A.3d 735
• Parties: Sandhya DESMOND v. YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

212 Conn.App. 274

275 A.3d 735

Sandhya DESMOND

v.YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC., et al.

AC 44180, (AC 44181), (AC 44182)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 20, 2022

Officially released May 3, 2022

Eric M. Desmond, Shelton, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Phyllis M. Pari, New Haven, for the appellee (named defendant).

Bright, C.J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.

ALVORD, J.

In these consolidated actions, the plaintiff, Sandhya Desmond, a former employee of the defendant Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.,¹ appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered following the granting of the defendant's motions to strike her complaints. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly construed her claims as alleging bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim rather than as claims made pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a and, therefore, erred in determining that her claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We begin with the relevant portions of the lengthy procedural history of these actions, which is set forth in part in this court's decision in Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. , 138 Conn. App. 93, 50 A.3d 910, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 942, 58 A.3d 258 (2012) ( Desmond I ). "[T]he plaintiff was an employee of the [defendant]. On December 30, 2004, she was injured in the course of her employment. According to the plaintiff, she suffered a spill-related fall while at work and subsequently was diagnosed with bilateral, acute posttraumatic carpal tunnel

injuries. Her physicians have advised her that, absent medical treatment, she permanently will be unable to use her hands.

"Subsequently, she filed a workers’ compensation claim with regard to her injury, and the [self-insured defendant] accepted the claim. On March 6, 2008, she filed a federal action in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged various claims under state law and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. On March 23, 2009, the District Court granted the [defendant's] motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's state law claims, allowing the action to proceed only on her claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.²

"On May 20, 2010, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court the operative complaint [of the first appeal] .... [That] complaint contained ten counts, alleging ... workers’ compensation fraud, statutory negligence, breach of contract, unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes 42-110a et seq. ] and delay in the delivery of benefits under the act in violation of the plaintiff's state constitutional right to due process. The complaint alleged that the [defendant] had made various filings with the workers’ compensation commission (commission) in a bad faith and fraudulent attempt to delay treatment. The complaint alleged that these bad faith attempts to delay treatment caused the plaintiff's condition to worsen, as she did not receive necessary treatment." (Footnote added.) Id., at 95–96, 50 A.3d 910.

Following the defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss, the court, relying on our Supreme Court's decision in DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. , 273 Conn. 487, 870 A.2d 1066 (2005) (holding that causes of action alleging bad faith processing of workers’ compensation claim are barred by exclusivity provision of act), dismissed the action on the ground "that the plaintiff's claims did not allege conduct that was sufficiently egregious to remove the claims from the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission."³ Desmond I , supra, 138 Conn. App. at 96, 50 A.3d 910. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to this court. Id.

On appeal in Desmond I , this court held that, despite the labels the plaintiff placed on her claims, "[a]pplying the rule articulated in DeOliveira to the facts of [the] case, it is clear that the plaintiff's claimed injuries, allegedly caused by the [defendant's] bad faith delays in medical treatment, arose out of and in the course of the workers’ compensation claims process. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiff's alleged injuries fall within the jurisdiction of the commission and that, accordingly, the court properly granted the [defendant's] motion to dismiss." Id., at 102, 50 A.3d 910. Accordingly, this court in Desmond I affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's action. See id., at 105, 50 A.3d 910.

Following our decision in Desmond I , the plaintiff, in August, 2013, brought a new action (2013 action) against the defendant. This court, in Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. , 181 Conn. App. 201, 185 A.3d 665, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 902, 191 A.3d 1001 (2018) ( Desmond II ), set forth additional procedural history related to the 2013 action. "On October 3, 2013, the plaintiff filed her [first] amended complaint ... wherein she again set forth ten counts against the [defendant], claiming statutory theft, common-law fraud, violation of CUTPA, breach of contract and statutory negligence. The [defendant] moved to strike all of the plaintiff's claims on the ground, inter alia, that they are barred by the exclusivity provision of the act, and thus that the trial court had no jurisdiction over them. The plaintiff filed an objection, arguing, inter alia, that her claims were not barred by the exclusivity of the act. ...

"By way of a memorandum of decision filed on November 26, 2014, the court granted the [defendant's] motion to strike the plaintiff's entire complaint on the ground that all of the plaintiff's claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission. The court reasoned that the alleged misconduct of the [defendant], which the court found to be ‘identical to that alleged in Desmond [I ] ... but for the addition of some conduct by the [defendant] postdating the prior suit,’ was not so egregious to invoke the exception to exclusivity.

"The plaintiff did not appeal from the trial court's ruling striking her complaint. Rather, on December 11, 2014, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, the plaintiff, in her view, as advanced before this court, filed a substitute complaint ‘in an effort to plead additional facts and to amplify the allegations such that viability of the ... [General Statutes] § 52-564 [statutory theft] claim (and associated claims) would be sufficient to allow the claim to proceed to the merits.’

"On February 5, 2015, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend her substitute complaint, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60, to incorporate a claim for retaliatory discrimination pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a. ... On April 23, 2015, the court, Nazzaro, J. , denied the plaintiff's request for leave to amend, and sustained the [defendant's] objection thereto. ...

"On May 7, 2015, the [defendant] filed a request to revise the plaintiff's substitute complaint, which she had filed on December 11, 2014. The [defendant] sought to have the plaintiff's entire substitute complaint deleted because the allegations of the substitute complaint were substantially similar to those contained in the plaintiff's previously stricken complaint and the allegations added to the substitute complaint failed to cure the deficiencies of the earlier complaint." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 205–207, 185 A.3d 665. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's request to revise. Id., at 207, 185 A.3d 665.

"On March 4, 2016, the court, Ecker, J. , issued an order overruling the plaintiff's objections to the [defendant's] request to revise and rendered judgment dismissing her complaint. In so doing, the court held, inter alia: ‘[I]t is the court's opinion that the substitute complaint is not, in substance, materially different from the ... stricken ... complaint. In other words, the new allegations in the substitute complaint do not cure the legal deficiencies that caused Judge Nazzaro to strike the [amended] complaint. The substitute complaint contains many more pages of allegations, but those allegations, in this court's view, do not change the nature or character of the underlying claims in a manner that would alter the outcome of Judge Nazzaro's memorandum of decision striking the [amended] complaint.’ The court also explained that it was disinclined to revisit Judge Nazzaro's decision striking the plaintiff's complaint, but that, even if it did so, it would agree that the plaintiff's allegations could not overcome the exclusivity of the act. The plaintiff subsequently sought reargument, which the court denied." Id., at 209, 185 A.3d 665. The plaintiff then appealed. Id.

In Desmond II , this court declined to review the plaintiff's appellate claim that the trial court erred in determining that her claims were barred by the exclusivity of the act, concluding that the claim was inadequately briefed. See id., at 213, 185 A.3d 665. This court did determine, however, that the trial court "considered the wrong complaint when it denied the plaintiff's request for leave to amend" her substitute complaint in order to add a claim for retaliatory discrimination under § 31-290a, and, therefore, this court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings on her request to amend the complaint and the defendant's objection thereto. Id., at 215, 185 A.3d 665.

In the meantime, in 2015, and later, in 2016, the plaintiff filed two additional actions (2015 and 2016 actions) against the defendant arising from the same conduct, both captioned as seeking relief pursuant to § 31-290a.

On remand from Desmond II , on October 19, 2018, the court, Young, J. , issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the plaintiff's request for leave to amend her complaint in the 2013 action to add retaliation and discrimination claims under § 31-290a. In the same memorandum of decision, the...