DeSonier v. Sullivan

• Citation: 906 F.2d 228
• Decision Date: 14 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1167,89-1167
• Parties: , 30 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 297, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15510A Denise DeSONIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Amanda M. DeSonier, Plaintiff, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 228

906 F.2d 228

59 USLW 2023, 30 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 297,

Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15510A

Denise DeSONIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Amanda M. DeSonier, Plaintiff, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human

Services, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-1167.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted March 15, 1990.

Decided June 22, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Sept. 14, 1990.

T.J. Hartman, Legal Aid of Western Mich., Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Donna Morros Weinstein, Chief Counsel, Jerald S. Post, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of Gen. Counsel, Region V, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before WELLFORD and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge.

LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services which denied child's insurance benefits to her ten year old daughter, Amanda DeSonier. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d) (1988). The Secretary concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that Amanda was the "child" of a deceased wage earner, Russell D. Phillis, as defined in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(e). The district court held that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was legally correct. We reverse for the reasons hereinafter stated.

I.

The plaintiff and Phillis were never married. They lived together, however, from September 1977 until July 1979, when the plaintiff left Phillis. She was pregnant when she left, and Amanda was born on October 31, 1979. The plaintiff and Phillis lived together, first in Florida, and later in Ohio. After leaving Phillis because of his alcoholism, the plaintiff returned to Michigan where her family lived. She did not enter a name for Amanda's father on the birth certificate and she never sought court-ordered support from Phillis. The plaintiff testified that Phillis paid her prenatal medical expenses and purchased a cradle for the baby. Phillis visited the plaintiff one time after Amanda was born and gave her a check for $155. The check was drawn on a joint account she and Phillis had maintained while living together and which she had closed after they separated. Thus, the check was not honored.

Phillis died on January 29, 1986, and the plaintiff filed an application for child's insurance benefits on September 8, 1986. After her application was denied originally and upon reconsideration, the plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing in October 1987, the plaintiff attempted to establish that she and Phillis were joined in a common law marriage while living together in Ohio between July 1978 and July 1979. Amanda was conceived during this period. The ALJ found that the plaintiff and Phillis did not enter into a valid common law marriage under Ohio law, and that Amanda did not qualify as a "child" of Phillis under any other provision of the Social Security Act. The decision was filed December 24, 1987.

The ALJ recognized that a claimant's relationship to a deceased wage earner is determined by applying the laws of the state in which the worker was domiciled at the time of his death. Phillis was living in Texas when he died. Determination of a claimant's family status is made by applying the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h). One of the ways an illegitimate child may qualify as the "child" of a wage earner eligible for insurance benefits is by satisfying the requirements of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A), which provides in pertinent part:

In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death.... Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.

The ALJ considered Texas intestacy law as it existed up to August 27, 1979, the last amendment before Phillis's death, and concluded that "Amanda M. DeSonier is not the 'child' of the wage earner under Texas State law as required by section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A) ]."

The plaintiff appealed to the district court. The Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment to which the plaintiff did not respond, and as a result the case was submitted on the administrative record. The district court found that Amanda did not qualify for insurance benefits under several provisions of the Act and granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the district court noted that:

Amanda could qualify for CIB if she could inherit Phillis' personal property as his natural child under State inheritance laws. To determine the relationship between Amanda and Phillis, the ALJ looked to the laws that were in effect at the time Phillis died, in the State where he made his residence. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.354(b). After reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Amanda was not the "child" of Phillis under Texas law, the State where he died.

There are numerous instances in which a minor can acquire the status of "child" under Texas law.... The ALJ properly concluded that no common-law marriage had been established under Ohio law, which leads to the conclusion that Amanda was not the "child" of Phillis under Texas law.

While the district court did not specifically consider whether Amanda qualified as one who would take under the Texas law of intestate succession pursuant to Sec. 416(h)(2)(A), the plaintiff's failure to satisfy this section of the Act was one of the bases of the ALJ's decision, and the correctness of that determination is properly before us on appeal.

II.

As framed by the plaintiff in her brief, the issue is what Texas law should be applied to determine whether Amanda qualified as the child of Phillis. The Texas law of intestate succession was amended effective September 1, 1987. The amendment added a new provision by which an illegitimate child may be found legitimate for the purpose of inheritance from its father and other paternal kindred.

In 1986, the year of Phillis's death and of the plaintiff's application, the statute read as follows:

For the purpose of inheritance, a child is the legitimate child of his father if the child is born or conceived before or during the marriage of his father and mother or is legitimated by a court decree as provided by Chapter 13 of the Family Code, or if the father executed a statement of paternity as provided by Section 13.22 of the Family Code, or a like statement properly executed in another jurisdiction, so that he and his issue shall inherit from his father and from his paternal kindred, both descendants, ascendants and collaterals in all degrees, and they may inherit from him and his issue.

Tex.Prob.Code Ann. Sec. 42(b) (Vernon 1980).

The 1987 amendment, in effect at the time of the hearing and of the ALJ's decision, added the following:

A person claiming to be an illegitimate child, or claiming inheritance through an illegitimate child, may petition the probate court for a determination of right of inheritance. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the purported father was the father of the child, the child is legitimate for the purpose of inheritance and he and his issue may inherit from his paternal kindred, both descendants, ascendants, and collaterals in all degrees, and they may inherit from him and his issue. This section does not permit inheritance by a purported father of an illegitimate child, whether recognized or not, if the purported father's parental rights have been terminated.

Tex.Prob.Code Ann. Sec. 42(b) (Vernon Supp.1988).

A.

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have applied the law of Texas in effect at the time he rendered the decision in December 1987. She relies on the familiar rule "that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary," quoting Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974). She asserts that application of current Texas intestacy law would not result in manifest injustice, and that there is no direction or history indicating that current law should not be applied. Further, neither the statute nor the amendment contains a nonretroactivity provision.

The plaintiff presented evidence at the hearing that she contends provided clear and convincing evidence that Phillis was Amanda's father. Thus, she argues, if the ALJ had applied current Texas intestacy law as of the time of the hearing and of his decision, he would have been compelled to hold that Phillis was Amanda's father and that Amanda was legitimate for purposes of inheritance. Since this evidence was fully developed at the hearing, the plaintiff asks this court to make the necessary determination on the basis of the administrative record.

B.

The Secretary relies on the language of Sec. 416(h)(2)(A), his regulations, and court decisions applying state law in effect at the time of the wage earner's death. As we have noted, Sec. 416(h)(2)(A) provides that if the insured worker is dead the Secretary must apply such law as would be applied "by the courts of the state in which he was domiciled at the time of his death." The Secretary argues that "at the time of his death" modifies "such law as would be applied" as well as "the State in which he was domiciled." The Secretary adopted this construction of the statute in a regulation promulgated...