Desrosiers v. Diageo N. Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 19039.,19039.
• Citation: 31 A.D. Cases 26,314 Conn. 773,105 A.3d 103
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mireille DESROSIERS v. DIAGEO NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al.

314 Conn. 773

105 A.3d 103

31 A.D. Cases 26

Mireille DESROSIERS

v.DIAGEO NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al.

No. 19039.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 15, 2014.

Decided Dec. 16, 2014.

John T. Bochanis, Bridgeport, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kenneth W. Gage, with whom, on the brief, was Erin E. LaRuffa, for the appellee (named defendant).

Charles Krich, principal attorney, filed a brief for the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities as amicus curiae.

Michael J. Soltis and Justin E. Theriault, Stamford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Business Industry Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

Opinion

ESPINOSA, J.

Under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a–51 et seq., employers may not discriminate against certain protected classes of individuals, including those who are physically disabled. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the act also prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals whom they perceive to be physically disabled. The plaintiff, Mireille Desrosiers, claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's partial summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants Diageo North America, Inc. (Diageo), and Lawrence D. Levine,¹ her employer and manager, respectively, on the ground that “ ‘a cause of action based on a perceived [physical] disability is not a legally recognized action in Connecticut.’ ” Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., 137 Conn.App. 446, 451, 49 A.3d 233 (2012). The plaintiff contends that although the express terms of General Statutes § 46a–60 (a)(1)² protect only individuals who have a physical disability, the legislative history of the act, considered in conjunction with Connecticut case law and the interpretation of the act by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), compels the conclusion that § 46a–60 (a)(1) also protects individuals who are regarded by their employers as having a physical disability. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion. “Diageo is a producer of alcoholic beers, wines and spirits. The plaintiff began working for Diageo in 1993. [After] Diageo merged with another alcoholic beverages company ... the plaintiff's position was eliminated, however, Levine allowed the plaintiff to serve in the position of a value added packaging buyer.³

“Diageo had a formal performance evaluation program in place in which an employee could receive a ranking of below expectations, satisfactory, fully meets expectations or exceeds expectations. In February, 2004, the plaintiff was rated as satisfactory. In April, 2004, the plaintiff was still struggling in the new position; therefore, Levine drafted a document entitled ‘Mireille's Key Criteria and Deliverables,’ which listed five areas where the plaintiff needed to improve. In the August, 2004 evaluation, Levine rated the plaintiff's performance as below expectations. In September, 2004, the plaintiff was evaluated and informed that certain aspects of her job performance were still inadequate as she had only met two of her five goals. The plaintiff thereafter was placed in a ninety day performance improvement plan prepared for her by Levine. On November 17, 2004, the plaintiff met with Levine to talk about her progress. According to the plaintiff's affidavit, Levine informed her that her progress was satisfactory, she was no longer in need of the performance improvement plan and she no longer had to worry about the criteria stated in the document delivered to her in September, 2004.

“The plaintiff took vacation time from December 21, 2004 through January 4, 2005. When the plaintiff returned to work on January 4, 2005, she informed Levine that she would need to take time off from work to undergo surgery for a tumor on her right shoulder. On January 5, 2005, Levine informed the plaintiff that her employment was terminated. The defendants' stated reason for terminating her employment was that her performance had not sufficiently improved.

“The plaintiff's amended complaint sets forth five counts against the defendants. The first three counts alleged disparate treatment discrimination under [§ 46a–60 ].⁴ The third count of the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her physical disability and/or her perceived disability. The fourth and fifth counts of the complaint alleged negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel, respectively.

“On May 3, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment ... [and] the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on counts one, two, four and five. As to count three, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment to the extent that it alleged a cause of action based on a perceived physical disability, but denied the motion as to the allegation of discrimination based on a physical disability. In its memorandum of decision on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court expressly determined that ‘a cause of action based on a perceived disability is not a legally recognized action in Connecticut.’ A jury trial was held on the remainder of count three, resulting in a verdict in favor of the defendants.” (Footnotes in original.) Id., at 449–51, 49 A.3d 233.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had rendered summary judgment in part on count three of the amended complaint on the basis of its improper conclusion that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for discrimination on the basis of a perceived physical disability.⁵ Id., at 452, 49 A.3d 233. In order to assess whether individuals who are perceived to be physically disabled are protected by the act, and may therefore bring a claim alleging employment discrimination, the Appellate Court considered the text of § 46a–60 (a)(1), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on the basis of that individual's physical disability. After determining that § 46a–60 (a)(1) is silent as to whether it prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual who is regarded as having a physical disability; id., at 453, 49 A.3d 233 ; the Appellate Court examined the definitions of “ ‘[p]hysically disabled’ ” and “ ‘[m]ental disability’ ” in General Statutes § 46a–51 (15) and (20), respectively.⁶ The court noted that whereas the definition of “ ‘[p]hysically disabled’ ” only includes “any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment”; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 46a–51 (15) ; the definition of “ ‘[m]ental disability’ ” also includes individuals who are “regarded as having one or more mental disorders....” General Statutes § 46a–51 (20) ; Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., supra, 137 Conn.App. at 454–55, 49 A.3d 233. Emphasizing that “the use of the word ‘has' by the legislature [in § 46a–51 (15) ] evinces the intent to protect those who actually suffer from some type of handicap, infirmity or impairment, not those whose employer may incorrectly regard as being disabled”; Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., supra, at 455, 49 A.3d 233 ; the Appellate Court determined that “the language clearly demonstrates that it protects those who are physically disabled, and no language is used to support an interpretation that it also protects those who are regarded as physically disabled.” Id., at 456, 49 A.3d 233. As a result, the Appellate Court concluded that “the text of § 46a–60 is clear and unambiguous in that it does not cover claims of discrimination based on a perceived physical disability,” and rejected the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly had granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the count alleging discrimination on the basis of a perceived physical disability. Id., at 457, 49 A.3d 233. We then granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal to this court on the sole issue of whether “the Appellate Court properly affirm [ed] the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant [s] on the basis that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for discrimination based on a perceived physical disability.” Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., 307 Conn. 916, 54 A.3d 180 (2012).

In her appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the basis of its determination that § 46a–60 (a)(1) only protects individuals who are physically disabled from employment discrimination. The plaintiff contends that because § 46a–60 (a)(1) is silent as to whether it also protects individuals who are regarded as physically disabled, the Appellate Court should have considered the legislative history of the act and the decisions of the commission in construing the statute. According to the plaintiff, these sources compel the conclusion that § 46a–60 (a)(1) protects individuals who are regarded as physically disabled from employment discrimination. The plaintiff further argues that even if the text of § 46a–60 (a)(1) is plain and unambiguous, an interpretation that § 46a–60 (a)(1) protects individuals who are physically disabled from employment discrimination but does not protect individuals who are regarded as physically disabled from employment discrimination, would yield absurd results. Diageo counters that the clear and unambiguous terms of § 46a–60 (a)(1) do not provide a cause of action for discrimination premised on perceived physical disabilities because individuals who are perceived to be physically disabled are not within the protected class of physically disabled individuals, and that even if the language were ambiguous, the trial court's ruling is consistent with the legislative history of the act. As an...