Larmel v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 November 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20535
• Citation: 341 Conn. 332,267 A.3d 162
• Parties: Phyllis LARMEL v. METRO NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

341 Conn. 332

267 A.3d 162

Phyllis LARMEL

v.METRO NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY

SC 20535

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 6, 2021

Officially released November 15, 2021^*

James P. Brennan, Waterbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Beck S. Fineman, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, was Jenna T. Cutler, for the appellee (defendant).

Robinson, C. J., and D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

KAHN, J.

This certified appeal requires us to consider whether a case that results in a judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant following a plaintiff's failure to demand a trial de novo after an arbitration proceeding pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 52-549z¹ has been "tried on its merits," thus barring a subsequent action under the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a). The Appellate Court's decision in the present case answered this question in the affirmative, and, as a result, that court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendant, Metro North Commuter Railroad Company, on a claim of negligence brought by the plaintiff, Phyllis Larmel, that had previously been the subject of mandatory arbitration in a prior civil action. Larmel v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co. , 200 Conn. App. 660, 661–62, 240 A.3d 1056 (2020). In the present appeal, the plaintiff claims that her first action was never "tried on its merits" because there was no formal trial in the first action and that, as a result, the Appellate Court's conclusion was in error. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. On October 1, 2014, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell while boarding a passenger railcar at Union Station in New Haven. In 2015, the plaintiff commenced a personal injury action alleging that her injuries were caused by a wet floor inside of the railcar and that the defendant negligently failed to prevent her fall. After the close of pleadings in that case, but before the commencement of trial, the court ordered the parties to arbitration pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549u.²

The arbitration took place on December 1, 2017, and the arbitrator, Attorney David J. Crotta, Jr., issued his decision on February 26, 2018. In that decision, the arbitrator made various factual findings "[o]n the basis of the credible evidence" submitted by the parties, including the plaintiff's deposition transcript, medical records, medical bills, and a report filed by a medical expert for the defendant. The arbitrator noted that the plaintiff's credibility was circumspect because of various factual inconsistencies in her accounts of the event, and that a defective condition may have never even existed in the first instance because the plaintiff's fall could have been caused by "water on the bottom of [her] own shoes ...." Ultimately, the arbitrator found in favor of the defendant, concluding that "the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence ...."

Notice of the arbitrator's decision was mailed to the parties’ counsel on February 27, 2018, as evidenced by a postmark, but did not arrive at the office of the plaintiff's counsel until March 13, 2018. The plaintiff's counsel was on vacation at that time, and did not return to his office until March 19, 2018. As a result of certain staffing issues at the firm, another two days passed before the plaintiff's counsel became aware of the arbitrator's decision. By that point, twenty-two days had passed since the arbitrator's decision was mailed.³

Because neither party demanded a trial de novo pursuant to § 52-549z within twenty days of the February 27, 2018 mailing of the arbitrator's decision, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant in accordance with the arbitrator's decision on March 21, 2018. The plaintiff then filed a motion to open the judgment on March 23, 2018, which was denied by the court on August 27, 2018, following oral argument. The plaintiff neither appealed from the trial court's denial of her motion to open nor sought an articulation of the court's decision.

The plaintiff then commenced the present action in October, 2018, pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute, § 52-592 (a).⁴ The complaint in this action repeated the allegations of negligence in the first action and further alleged that her failure to demand a trial de novo in the first action was due to excusable neglect. The trial court in the present case granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, and the plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal⁵ but nonetheless concluded that the action was not viable under § 52-592 (a) because the first action had been "tried on its merits" by the arbitrator and had resulted in a judgment of the court in favor of the defendant. Larmel v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co. , supra, 200 Conn. App. at 666–67, 673, 240 A.3d 1056. In its decision, the Appellate Court concluded that "[t]he judgment in the first action was rendered on the arbitrator's decision as a matter of law and, therefore, the plaintiff may not take advantage of § 52-592 because she has not met the factual predicate that the first action was not tried on its merits." Id., at 671, 240 A.3d 1056. On the basis of this reasoning, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the action and remanded the case with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendant. Id., at 661, 679, 240 A.3d 1056.

Writing in dissent, Justice Eveleigh disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiff's first action was tried on its merits for purposes of § 52-592 (a). Id., at 679, 240 A.3d 1056. According to Justice Eveleigh, the majority incorrectly concluded that the phrase "tried on its merits" could be satisfied by an adjudication of a claim by an arbitrator, rather than by a more formal judicial proceeding. Id., at 683–84, 240 A.3d 1056 (Eveleigh, J. , dissenting). Citing Nunno v. Wixner , 257 Conn. 671, 680–81, 778 A.2d 145 (2001), Justice Eveleigh argued that arbitration proceedings have "procedural deficiencies" that make them inadequate to be considered "trials," such as a lack of live testimony, cross-examination, and objection to evidence. Id., at 682, 240 A.3d 1056 (Eveleigh, J. , dissenting). As a result of those deficiencies, Justice Eveleigh concluded that cases sent to arbitration under § 52-549u are not "tried on [their] merits" for purposes of § 52-592 (a) and, therefore, that the present action should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the plaintiff's failure to demand a trial de novo within twenty days of the arbitration decision caused the first action to fail as a "matter of form." Id., at 679–84, 87, 240 A.3d 1056 (Eveleigh, J. , dissenting). This certified appeal followed.⁶

In the present appeal, the plaintiff renews her contention that her second action may be saved by § 52-592 (a) because her first action was not "tried on its merits ...." The plaintiff argues that the Appellate Court's conclusion to the contrary was incorrect and that the case must be remanded to the trial court to decide whether her failure to demand a trial de novo in the first action was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and was, thus, a matter of form, allowing the plaintiff to utilize the accidental failure of suit statute to bring the same claim in a second lawsuit. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the phrase "tried on its merits" means a formal trial and cannot be fulfilled by a judgment of the court following mandatory arbitration under § 52-549u. In response, the defendant argues that the Appellate Court properly interpreted the phrase "tried on its merits" to include a proceeding resolved in such a manner.

Because our resolution of this action involves a question of statutory construction, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc. , 314 Conn. 773, 782, 105 A.3d 103 (2014). "When presented with a question of statutory construction, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ; see also General Statutes § 1-2z.

We begin our analysis with the language of the accidental failure of suit statute. Section 52-592 (a) provides in relevant part: "If any action, commenced within the time limited by law, has failed one or more times to be tried on its merits because ... the action has been otherwise avoided or defeated ... for any matter of form ... the plaintiff ... may commence a new action ... for the same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action ...." (Emphasis added.) A plaintiff may obtain relief under this provision only if the original action has "failed one or more times to be tried on its merits ...." General Statutes § 52-592 (a). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a judgment of the trial court rendered following arbitration pursuant to § 52-549u has been "tried on its merits" within the meaning of the accidental failure of suit statute.

To understand the phrase "tried on its merits" as used in § 52-592 (a), we must first review the definition of the term "tried." See, e.g., State v. Webster , 308 Conn. 43, 53, 60 A.3d...