Detert v. Lefman

• Decision Date: 08 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 51132,No. 1,51132,1
• Citation: 395 S.W.2d 216
• Parties: Russell G. DETERT et al., Respondents, v. Fred J. LEFMAN et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 216

395 S.W.2d 216

Russell G. DETERT et al., Respondents, v. Fred J. LEFMAN et al., Appellants.

No. 51132.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

Nov. 8, 1965.

H. Townsend Hader, Lexington, D. W. Sherman, Jr., Lexington, of counsel, for respondents.

W. R. Schelp, Ike Skelton, Jr., Lexington, Skelton & Bradley, Lexington, of counsel, for appellants.

HIGGINS, Commissioner.

Respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged title in defendants to a lot and title in themselves to an adjoining lot in Higginsville, Missouri. They alleged also that a driveway seven feet wide ran from the street between and partially on both of the lots, and that for more than thirty years plaintiffs, defendants, and their tenants and predecessors used the driveway for ingress and egress. Plaintiffs charged that defendants placed an obstruction in the driveway which deprived them of their use of the driveway to their great damage and, after further allegation of no adequate remedy at law, prayed for injunctive relief.

Defendants' answer set up failure to state a claim, res adjudicata, and license, and otherwise denied the paragraphs of plaintiffs' petition.

On trial, the judge stated in his requested memorandum opinion that the manner of use of the driveway had resulted in 'reciprocal easements by prescription.' The judgment and decree declared the driveway to be a common driveway and, after further finding plaintiffs to be entitled to the relief prayed for in their petition, enjoined defendants and their successors from obstructing or interfering with use of the driveway by plaintiffs or their successors.

Appellants seek the jurisdiction of this court on the authority of Dalton v. Johnson, Mo.App., 319 S.W.2d 66. In that case the prayer was for an adjudication that plaintiffs had acquired an easement across defendant's farm, and there was no prayer for injunctive relief. The Springfield Court of Appeals, in transferring the cause to the Supreme Court, recognized that an easement is an 'interest' in land, and held that the direct effect of the judgment appealed from was to deny plaintiffs an easement interest in defendant's land, and that title was thus directly involved.

Our case is different, however, and Judge v. Durham, Mo., 274 S.W.2d 247, is directly in point. That action was also for an injunction to prevent interference with an alleged driveway easement and, in granting the injunctive relief sought, the trial court found that 'plaintiff and her predecessors...