Dethlefsen v. Weddle
| Decision Date | 15 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 33,660 (Consolidated),No. 33,540,33,540,33,660 (Consolidated) |
| Parties | LYLE A. DETHLEFSEN and VERA A. DETHLEFSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM H. WEDDLE, ARDEEN J. WEDDLE Individually and as TRUSTEES OF THE WEDDLE FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, ROBERT COCHRAN SUSAN COCHRAN, DAN WARREN, VON EVA WARREN, and THE NEW MEXICO LAND CONSERVANCY, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY
Jones & Smith Law Firm LLC
J. Brian Smith
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellants
William H. Weddle
Ardeen J. Weddle
Robert Cochran
Susan Cochran
Dan Warren
Von Eva Warren
Winston , NM
Pro Se Appellees
Domenici Law Firm , P.C.
Peter V. Domenici, J.R.
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellees The Weddle Family Revokable Trust
A. Blair Dunn
Alonzo Maestas
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellees New Mexico Land Conservancy and Amicus Curiae
{1} This case comes before us for the second time. In the prior appeal, Dethlefsen v. Weddle, 2012-NMCA-077, ¶ 36, 284 P.3d 452, we affirmed the district court's judgment "that an express, fifty-foot wide easement and road of some undetermined dimension burdens both the Dethlefsen and Warren Properties." However, we concluded that "the recorded property documents are ambiguous with respect to the width of the road, the location of the road within—or separate from—the fifty-foot wide easement, the use, the nature, and purpose of the road, and the permissibility of a lockable gate." Id. We therefore remanded "for admission and consideration of all relevant extrinsic evidence to determine the proper scope and use of the easement as intended by the common grantor, including a determination of the history and use ofa locked gate at Forest Service Road 157." Id. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court.
{2} Following a bench trial of two-and-a half days of testimony, the admission of close to fifty exhibits, and a visit to the property, the district court determined: (1) the easement is fifty feet in width across the Dethlefsen and Warren lands; (2) the fifty-foot width of the easement is measured as twenty-five feet to either side from the centerline of Monument Creek that runs through the Dethlefsens' property; (3) that "[w]ithin said easements, the size of the traveled and maintained roadway is the amount reasonably necessary for the uses that are intended, which is generally twenty feet, more or less, which may be slightly more around corners"; (4) that the Cochrans' easement includes ingress and egress and the movement of livestock; (5) that the Weddles' easement is limited to ingress and egress, but not to a specific vehicle type; and (6) that a locked gate constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the easement and that the Dethlefsens cannot require that the gate remain locked at all times.
{3} The Dethlefsens appeal on three grounds: (1) that substantial evidence does not support the finding that the size of the traveled and maintained roadway is twenty feet, more or less, and that ingress and egress is not limited to a specific type of vehicle type and may include vehicles that are wider than the present existing gate; (2) that the district court erred in finding that a locked gate constitutes an unreasonablerestriction on the easement and that the gate must remain unlocked; and (3) that the district court erred in awarding the Weddles' costs as "prevailing parties."
{4} We address each argument in turn. Because this is a memorandum opinion, and because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case, it is unnecessary for us to set them forth, except as required for our analysis.
{5} The Dethlefsens contend that "the road should be no more than fourteen feet in width as limited by the access gate and the historic width and uses of the road and what is reasonable and necessary for the uses of the road under the circumstances." The Dethlefsens contend that the judgment of the district court to the contrary is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to law. We disagree.
{6} In the prior appeal we determined that the recorded property documents are ambiguous with respect to the width and location of the road and the use, nature, and purpose of the road. Hence, the district court was faced with determining the meaning of the easements as questions of fact. See Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 1993-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 114 N.M. 778, 845 P.2d 1232 (); see also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 189 (2015) ().
{7} "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion." State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 12, 329 P.3d 658 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached." N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Casias Trucking, 2014-NMCA-099, ¶ 20, 336 P.3d 436 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We will not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder." Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "In determining whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings, we look only at the evidence favorable to the appellees." Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real Estate, 2004-NMCA-056, ¶ 28, 135 N.M. 641, 92 P.3d 653.
{8} The intent of the parties determines the existence and scope of an easement. Mayer v. Smith, 2015-NMCA-060, ¶ 11, 350 P.3d 1191, cert. denied sub nom. Mayer v. Jones, 2015-NMCERT-004, 348 P.3d 694. If the reservation or grant is ambiguous, "the parties' intention must be determined from the language of the instrument as well as from the surrounding circumstances." Sanders v. Lutz, 1989-NMSC-076, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 193, 784 P.2d 12. "[T]he scope of an easement, or right-of-way, is narrow and is measured by the nature and purpose of the easement." Walker v. United States, 2007-NMSC-038, ¶ 49, 142 N.M. 45, 162 P.3d 882 (). "The easement holder's right to use the property is limited to the particular purpose for which the easement was created." City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw. Inc., 2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 33, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414. An easement holder "is entitled to make only the uses reasonably necessary for the specified purpose." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 28A C.J.S. Easements § 215 (2015) ().
{9} The Dethlefsens do not dispute the existence of the fifty-foot easement or its location; the Dethlefsens only dispute the width of the roadway within the easement. According to the Dethlefsens, the road historically has been a two-track road—a single lane—where the width is eight to fourteen feet, unsurfaced. The Dethlefsens contend that the roadway should be no greater than the historic width of fourteen feet, which is reasonable and necessary for the uses under these circumstances. The evidence supports the district court's findings to the contrary.
{10} The fifty-foot width of the easement is measured as twenty-five feet to either side from the centerline of Monument Creek that runs through the Dethlefsen property. Thus, the district court reasoned that the location and size of the road depends on the conditions of the ground and the environment. The road is intertwined with the creek bottom at specific sections and closely located near the creek in others. Kristine Hawkins (Hawkins), the previous owner of the Cochran property for fourteenyears and the first person to purchase property from original grantor Kenneth Eng (Eng), testified that she would drive out of the creek for a sturdier surface when water was running through the creek. The water from the creek would change directions from one year to the next and Hawkins would need to move around depending on the flow of the water. Hawkins sometimes could not even drive on the road on certain occasions due to the water, declaring her access as impassable. Dan Warren, current owner of the Warren property, testified that such floods are not unusual in the area. Prior to the bench trial, another flood occurred.
{11} There is also evidence that other pathways have been developed on the original road, causing the road easement not to be a two-track road. William Weddle , current owner of the Weddle property, testified that certain areas within the creek had "well worn" paths when Weddle first observed the area. Hawkins gave further support by testifying that the roadway has dual pathways in which the two paths are the existing roadway. Eng testified in his deposition that he would not describe the road easement as a two-track road. The Dethlefsens even admitted that the current road has two pathways beginning at the gate at the time the district court judge conducted the second site visit. Additional testimony from Weddle demonstrates that the road that "come[s] off" Warren's property in 1996 was approximately twenty-feet wide. A previous path on the road easement was sixteen-feet wide.
{12} Another natural element also impedes the property owner's ability to access the road easement. Hawkins testified...
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