Detling v. Chockley
Decision Date | 09 June 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 81-1192,81-1192 |
Citation | 24 O.O.3d 239,436 N.E.2d 208,70 Ohio St.2d 134 |
Parties | , 24 O.O.3d 239 DETLING, Appellant, v. CHOCKLEY, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Allan Sherry, Woodsfield, for appellant.
Sommer, Antill, Solovan & Piergallini, Keith A. Sommer and Lawrence T. Piergallini, Martins Ferry, for appellee.
This case presents the question of whether evidence that a civil defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of an automobile accident in which he has admitted negligence is alone sufficient to raise a jury question of punitive damages. For the reasons discussed herein, we answer the question in the negative.
Punitive or exemplary damages have long been allowed in civil tort actions in Ohio which involve ingredients of fraud, malice or insult. Roberts v. Mason (1859), 10 Ohio St. 277. "Such damages being punitive in their nature are an exception to the general rules that in private actions the injured party is to be made whole, and that acts deemed worthy of punishment are prosecuted by the state." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Smith (1901), 64 Ohio St. 106, 116, 59 N.E. 890.
The rationale for allowing punitive damages has been recognized in Ohio as that of punishing the offending party and setting him up as an example to others that they might be deterred from similar conduct: "The principle of permitting damages, in certain cases, to go beyond naked compensation, is for example, and the punishment of the guilty party for the wicked, corrupt, and malignant motive and design, which prompted him to the wrongful act." * Simpson v. McCaffrey (1844), 13 Ohio 508, 522. See, also, Rayner v. Kinney (1863), 14 Ohio St. 283, 286-287; Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. (1872), 23 Ohio St. 10, 18; Railroad Co. v. Hutchins (1881), 37 Ohio St. 282, 294. This form of civil punishment may be imposed even though the defendant may have been punished criminally for the same wrong. Roberts v. Mason, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus.
The operative concept in Ohio which permits the awarding of punitive damages is, in addition to fraud or insult, malice. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 471, 424 N.E.2d 568. Early reported cases defined malice only by comparison to juxtaposed synonyms: "wrongful intention," Rayner v. Kinney, supra, at page 287; "fraud, malice and other willful wrong," Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co., supra, at page 18; "wrongful act (that) was wanton or otherwise aggravated * * * willful, wanton or malicious," Railroad Co. v. Hutchins, supra, at page 294. More recent cases, however, have analyzed the malice requirement in terms of express or actual malice, Mauk v. Brundage (1903), 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152, and legal or implied malice, Flandermeyer v. Cooper (1912), 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102.
Actual malice is required for a question of punitive damages to be submitted to a jury. Smithhisler v. Dutter (1952), 157 Ohio St. 454, 105 N.E.2d 868, paragraph one of the syllabus; Pickle v. Swinehart (1960), 170 Ohio St. 441, 166 N.E.2d 227, paragraph two of the syllabus. Actual malice is " ' "that state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a spirit of revenge, retaliation, or a determination to vent his feelings upon other persons. " ' " Columbus Finance v. Howard (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 178, 184, 327 N.E.2d 654. The court recognized, however, Davis v. Tunison (1959), 168 Ohio St. 471, 475, 155 N.E.2d 904.
As pointed out by the court in Pickle v. Swinehart, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus, "(t)he terms 'legal malice' and 'actual malice' are not synonymous." Flandermeyer v. Cooper, supra, paragraph three of the syllabus.
Additionally, concepts of recklessness, wantonness, willfulness and grossness are inferred from the conduct and surrounding circumstances to support an award of punitive damages in tort actions. Columbus Finance v. Howard, supra, 42 Ohio St.2d at page 184, 327 N.E.2d 654; Rubeck v. Huffman (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 20, 23, 374 N.E.2d 411. Rogers v. Barbera (1960), 170 Ohio St. 241, 244-245, 164 N.E.2d 162.
Evidence of actual malice, therefore, must be present before a jury question of punitive damages is raised; actual malice may take either the form of the defendant's express ill will, hatred or spirit of revenge, or the form of reckless, wilful or wanton behavior which can be inferred from surrounding circumstances. In either case, the defendant's actions must have been "intentional and deliberate, or * * * (have) the character of outrage frequently associated with crime." Saberton v. Greenwald (1946), 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 ( ). This view was reiterated in Bush v. Kelley's, Inc. (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 89, 92, 247 N.E.2d 745, in which we stated that " ' * * * (m)alice in the legal sense signifies a wilful design to do another injury, and this regardless of the fact that such design was prompted by hatred or revenge, or by hope of gain. * * * ' "
An act of mere negligence does not, of itself, demonstrate the degree of intention and deliberation necessary to raise a question of punitive damages. Jones v. Wittenberg Univ. (C.A.6, 1976), 534 F.2d 1203; Petrey v. Liuzzi (1945), 76 Ohio App. 19, 61 N.E.2d 158. Prosser on Torts (4 Ed.), at pages 9-10.
Appellant argues that a jury question of punitive damages is raised in a negligence action where such negligence is so gross as to show a reckless disregard of the rights of others, citing Richards v. Office Products Co. (1977), 55 Ohio App.2d 143, 380 N.E.2d 725, and...
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