Detroit Chamber of Commerce v. Goodman
| Decision Date | 31 July 1896 |
| Citation | 68 N.W. 295,110 Mich. 498 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | DETROIT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. GOODMAN. |
Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Fred H. Aldrich, Judge.
Action by the Detroit Chamber of Commerce against Ulenna H. Goodman. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Albert J. Chapman, for appellant.
Griffin & Warner, for appellee.
The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover for an amount due on a subscription reading as follows: Then follow the conditions and list of subscribers. The subscription was not paid. The plaintiff sued the defendant and obtained judgment. The defendant appeals.
There were two counts in the plaintiff's declaration. A copy of the subscription sued upon was set up in the declaration. The defendant pleaded the general issue, but did not by affidavit deny the execution of the subscription. All those assignments of error relating to the signature of the defendant, the refusal of the judge to allow the comparison of handwriting as to the signatures, the cross-examination of Mr. Cozzens growing out of his testimony as to the defendant's signature, and the charge of the judge in which he charged the defendant must be deemed to admit the execution of the instrument, under the pleadings, are none of them well taken. By failing to file an affidavit, denying the subscription, the defendant admitted its execution. Cir. Ct Rule 79. The only important question upon the record is, was it competent for Mrs. Goodman to make this subscription? When it was made she was a married woman, who owned the Griswold House, worth, with the real estate, about $100,000. This property was about a block away from the proposed Chamber of Commerce site. The plaintiff claims that defendant's subscription, with others, was the moving cause of their purchasing the site. That it was believed by the defendant that, if the old livery stable occupying the site was torn away, and a fine building erected thereon, it would increase the value of defendant's property many times more than the amount of her subscription, and for that reason the subscription was made by her. It is also argued that the erection of the Chamber of Commerce Building did increase the value of her property, that her separate estate was benefited, and that she is not under disability under the statute. On the part of the defendant it is claimed that under the common law she could not make this contract, and that the married woman's act (How. Ann. St. � 6295) does not allow her to make such a contract. It is claimed that she may contract, sell, transfer, convey devise, or bequeath her real and personal estate, and cannot do more; that her power is not general, but statutory; that possible incidental benefits cannot support a contract made by her,-citing Russell v. Bank, 39 Mich. 674; Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich. 179; Emery v. Lord, Id. 431; West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464; Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579. The relations of husband and wife towards each other and their property rights under the common law are very exhaustively discussed in the case of Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. Justice Cooley also gives an interesting history in this case of the early legislation in this state in relation to the rights of married women, by which it was made to appear that the purpose of this legislation was to preserve to the wife all her rights in her own property, with as full power of control and disposition as if she had remained unmarried. It has been uniformly held by this court that our statutes do not authorize a married woman to become personally liable on an executory promise, except concerning her estate already possessed, or referring to it, or in relation to the property to be acquired by the contract, or in consideration of it. A note given for any other consideration is void ( Insurance Co. v. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564, 6 N.W. 88), and unless the consideration for this subscription relates to her separate estate already owned by her, or referring to it, or in relation to property to be acquired by the contract, or in consideration of it, it would be void. On the other hand, if the consideration of this subscription was that the estate which she then possessed was to be increased in value, and if, as a result of what was done, her estate in fact was increased in value, would it not be a sufficient consideration for the contract, and make it valid? In Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447, it was held that, where a married woman keeps a boarding house with the consent of her husband, and controls the entire business, contracts or purchase made by her for the purposes of the business must be considered as contracts in relation to her sole property, and therefore binding upon her. In Campbell v. White, 22 Mich. 185, it was held that a married woman residing with her husband, and owning a separate estate, could be held liable for the merchandise purchased by her on her individual credit, though the merchandise was family necessaries, and was actually used by the husband's family, and in his household. Her liability was not contingent upon her ownership of other separate estates, or on the character of the goods bought, or their disposition. It depended on the fact that the property was obtained upon her credit. Her promise to pay for the articles was an undertaking to pay for her separate property. In Rankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195, it was held that a married woman could carry on a meat market in her own name, and that an agreement to pay for stock furnished to supply the market was valid, though the business was carried on by her husband acting as agent. In Hirshfield v. Waldron, 83 Mich. 116, 47 N.W. 239, it was held that a married woman living with her husband is liable for the price of clothing purchased by her for a minor son, and charged to her by her direction, she agreeing to pay for the...
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