Detroit Club v. State

• Decision Date: 11 October 1944
• Docket Number: 43.,Nos. 42,s. 42
• Citation: 309 Mich. 721,16 N.W.2d 136
• Parties: DETROIT CLUB v. STATE et al. DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB v. LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

309 Mich. 721

16 N.W.2d 136

DETROIT CLUB

v.STATE et al.

DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB

v.LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al.

Nos. 42, 43.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 11, 1944.

Actions by the Detroit Club against the State of Michigan and the Liquor Control Commission of the State of Michigan, and by the Detroit Athletic Club against the Liquor Control Commission of the State of Michigan, to recover discounts on purchases of alcoholic liquors. From adverse judgments the defendants appeal. The cases were consolidated on appeal.

Affirmed.

NORTH, C. J., and STARR and BUTZEL, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Court of Claims; Chester P. O'Hara, Circuit judge.

Before the Entire Bench, except BUSHNELL, J.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Meredith H. Doyle, and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Attys., for appellants.

Dickinson, Wright, Davis, McKean & Cudlip, of Detroit (Selden S. Dickinson and John G. Garlinghouse, both of Detroit, on the brief), for appellee Detroit Club.

David H. Crowley, George A. Kelly, and Walter E. Kelly, all of Detroit (Stanley E. Beattie, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellee Detroit Athletic Club.

WIEST, Justice.

The judgments should be affirmed.

The provisions carried over from the old act operate wholly under the new act and not the old one. The act of 1943 speaks too plain to admit of judicial construction. It specifically lifted the time element in the former act by the proviso: ‘That claim or notice of intention of filing any claim which has accrued prior to the effective date of this amendatory act may be filed within one year after the effective date thereof.’

It is true the same proviso was in the former act, but we are confined to consideration of the act as it now stands and its operative effect upon the claims at bar.

The effective date of the act was July 30, 1943, and the accrued claims were timely presented and judgments thereon properly rendered. The applicable rule of law in the premises was settled by this court in People v. Lowell, 250 Mich. 349, 230 N.W. 202, 204. We there said:

‘An amendatory act has a repealing force, by the mechanics of legislation, different from that of an independent statute. Repugnancy is not the essential element of implied repeal of specifically amended sections. The rule is:

“Where a section of a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist, and the section as amended supersedes it and becomes a part of the statute for all intents and purposes as it the amendments had always been there.' 25 R.C.L. [p.] 907. * * *

‘The provisions carried over have their force from the new act, not from the former. Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), 237.

‘It is plain from the authorities in this state and elsewhere that the effect of an act amending a specific section of a former act, in the absence of a saving clause, is to strike the former section from the law, obliterate it entirely, and substitute the new section in its place. This effect is not an arbitrary rule adopted by the courts. It is the natural and logical effect of an amendment ‘to read as follows.’ It accomplishes precisely what the words import. Any other construction would do violence to the plain language of the Legislature. * * *

‘Nowhere in the act did the Legislature, by words or in the manner provided by any rule of construction, express an intention to save the prosecution of former offenses. On the contrary, both by the natural meaning of the language used and in accordance with the acknowledged and long-established rules with which it was presumably familiar, it affirmatively and appropriately expressed an intention to obliterate the amended section. A contrary conclusion is private speculation, not judicial construction.

“The result may or may not be conformable to the actual intent of those who passed the latter statute. We can only ascertain the legal intent of the legislature, by the language which they have used, applied and expounded conformably to the settled and well known rules of construction.' Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. [373], 38 Mass. 373.

“Even though the court should be convinced that some other meaning was really intended by the law-making power, and even though the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, still the explicit declaration of the legislature is the law, and the courts must not depart from it.' Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 36. * * *

‘At bottom, the argument against repeal is socialogical rather than legal, that the effect of repeal will be injurious to the public welfare, in excusing offenders from punishment, and that such ‘mischievous and absurd consequences' justify this court in saving the prior penalties by construction. The argument is temptingly forceful, and if Act No. 114 were ambiguous, its meaning being sought, and more than one construction of its language reasonable, it would be persuasive. However, Act No. 114 is construed, whether prospective, retroactive, or both, its effect of repeal on amended sections is the same, because, on a day certain, by the language of the law, they were abrogated and new sections ‘to read as follows' were substituted for them.

‘No reason can be urged against the rule itself. If observed in making laws, it certainly and accurately expresses the will of the Legislature according to the natural meaning of the words used. No principle of sociology would warrant the abrogation of a rule upon which legislation has been enacted and construed since the establishment of the state because, in a single or a few instances, misfortune follows, not its observance, but its disregard. Nor can it confer upon the court legislative power to correct mistakes in unambiguous laws. * * *

‘Nor, upon the grounds of ultimate public good, as distinguished from the immediate consequences, is the sociological argument entirely without answer. There are such offsetting considerations as the overruling of a long line of decisions of this court, upon which personal and property rights have been established; the abrogation of a certain and reasonable rule of statutory construction which accurately mirrors the language of the Legislature; the substitution for it of an uncertain or no rule, with confusing effect; the encouragement of carelessness in lawmaking, with the idea that this court will legislate virtue into or evil out of the law as enacted by the Legislature; and, of the first importance, the departure of the court from its constitutional judicial function to usurp legislative power by supplying a saving clause which the Legislature has purposely or inadvertently omitted.’

The opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice Fead and concurred in by Mr. Justice North, is a scholarly exposition and can be read with profit.

The judgments are affirmed, with costs to plaintiffs.

SHARPE, BOYLES, and REID, JJ., concurred with WIEST, J.

NORTH, Chief Justice (dissenting).

This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment granted to the respective plaintiffs by the court of claims of the State of Michigan. Although each of the plaintiffs filed separate suits and the factual situation as to dates and amounts differs, yet the questions of law involved are identical, and the cases on appeal are consolidated.

Each plaintiff is a Michigan corporation properly licensed to sell certain alcoholic liquors for consumption on the premises, under the provisions of the Liquor Control Act, Act No. 8, Pub.Acts 1933 [Ex. Sess.], as amended. Prior to November 25, 1942, both plaintiffs had purchased large quantities of liquors from the defendant, Liquor Control Commission, but had been refused a 15% discount on such purchases. On that date, this Court granted to plaintiff Detroit Athletic Club a writ of mandamus compelling the Liquor Control Commission to grant the discount on all such purchases, under § 16, Act No. 8, Pub.Acts 1933, Ex.Sess., as amended (Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 9209-31, Stat.Ann.1942 Cum.Supp. § 18.987). See Detroit Athletic Club v. Liquor Control Commission, 303 Mich. 444, 6 N.W.2d 740.

The present actions are to recover from the State discounts which the State withheld from the plaintiffs during three years prior to the filing of the respective claims, March 1, 1943, for the Detroit Club, and February 23, 1943, for the Detroit Athletic Club. This period is within the general limitation of Act No. 135, Pub.Acts 1939, as amended by Act No. 137, Pub.Acts 1941. The trial court gave the Detroit Club a judgment for $5,594 and the Detroit Athletic Club a judgment for $59,920.14 as being the agreed amounts of the discounts withheld during that period.

The Court of Claims Act, Act No. 135, Pub.Acts 1939, was amended by Act No. 137, Pub.Acts 1941, and this amendment added a section designated 11a, which reads in part as follows:

‘No claim shall be maintained against the state unless the claimant shall, within 1 year after such claim shall have accrued, file in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place where such claim arose and in detail the nature of the same and of the items of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained * * *.

‘Provided, That claim or notice of intention of filing any claim which has accrued prior to the effective date of this amendatory act may be filed within 1 year after the effective date thereof.’

It is to be noted that under this amendment a claimant whose claim had accrued prior to January 10, 1942, the effective date of the amendment, was allowed one year, or until January 10, 1943, to file such claim or written notice of intention to file a claim. In the instant case neither plaintiff filed such a claim or written notice thereof within the year; and it is obvious that at this point plaintiffs had failed to comply with...