Benson v. State

• Decision Date: 02 December 1946
• Docket Number: No. 34.,34.
• Citation: 316 Mich. 66,25 N.W.2d 112
• Parties: BENSON et al. v. STATE et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

316 Mich. 66

25 N.W.2d 112

BENSON et al.

v.STATE et al.

No. 34.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 2, 1946.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Court of Claims; Fred T. Miles, Judge.

Suit by Ernest J. Benson, assignee of Willy S. and Ina J. Hansen and others, against the State of Michigan and others, for damages alleged to have been caused to property of plaintiff's assignor by certain inmates of the Lapeer State Home & Training School. From a judgment dismissing the claim, the plaintiff appeals.

Order set aside and case remanded.

Before the Entire Bench, except Dethmers, J.

Anthony Nelson, of Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Foss O. Eldred, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shephered, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Meredith H. Doyle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellees.

BOYLES, Justice.

On October 18, 1944, plaintiff Ernest J. Benson, as assignee of the other persons named in the caption, filed in the court of claims a statement of claim against the State of Michigan, the State hospital commission, and the Lapeer State home and training school. In it the plaintiff asked for damages alleged to have been caused to the property of plaintiff's assignors by certain inmates of said home and training school. The statement of claim alleges that plaintiff's assignors are the owners of certain cottages located elevated grounds near the State home and training school (for feeble-minded) at Lapeer; that on December 10 and 11, 1943, a certain number of the inmates of said home and training school escaped therefrom, trespassed upon and damaged the property of plaintiff's assignors. Plaintiff's statement of claim further alleges that the home and training school is a State agency to confine feebleminded persons, many of whom are unsafe persons to be at large, that it was the duty of its officers, doctors, superintendents and agents to prevent their inmates from escaping, entering upon the property of plaintiff's assignors and committing vandalism, that they were fully aware of the tendencies of such inmates and their mental deficiencies, that they knew that inmates had previously escaped, trespassed on plaintiff's assignors' property and committed acts of vandalism, that it was the duty of the State, and the State hospital commission, to engage careful and competent officers, agents and employees, and for them to take the necessary precautions to prevent such escapes and damage to property, all of which duties plaintiff claims have been breached by the defendants, wherefore plaintiff's assignors have suffered the damage for which recovery is sought. It was stated that the cause of action was based on Act No. 135, Pub.Acts 1939, Stat.Ann.1940 Cum.Supp. § 27.3548 (1-25), as amended by Act No. 137, Pub.Acts 1941, and Act. No. 237, Pub.Acts 1943, Stat.Ann.1944 Cum.Supp. § 27.3548 (1-25).

The last mentioned (1943) act purports to waive the State's defense of governmental immunity from liability for torts of its officers and employees, and the sole question presented in the instant case is whether this act is constitutional. Upon the filing of plaintiff's statement in the court of claims, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the 1943 act was not covered by the title of the court of claims act, was unconstitutional, and that as a matter of law the defendants could not be held to respond in damages for the tortious acts complained of. The circuit judge, presiding in the court of claims, held with the State and dismissed the claim. Plaintiff appeals.

The precise question for decision is whether Act No. 237, Pub.Acts 1943, supra, purporting to amend section 24 of the court of claims act, thereby waiving the defense of governmental immunity, violates that part of section 21, article 5, of the State Constitution (1908), wherein it is provided:

‘No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.’

The title ofAct No. 135, Pub.Acts 1939 (court of claims act), has never been amended. It provides:

‘An Act to create a court of claims; and to prescribe its jurisdiction, powers and duties, the practice and procedure therein, and the time within which actions against the state and any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof may by brought.’

There is no question but that the State, by enacting the court of claims act, thereby consented that the State, and its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms and agencies might be sued in the court of claims on claims and demands, liquidate and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto. Section 8 of the act so provides, and the right has been recognized by this court in subsequent decisions. Manion v. State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mcih. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527;Abbott v. Michigan State Industries, 303 Mich. 575, 6 N.W.2d 900;McNair v. State Highway Department, 305 Mich. 181, 9 N.W.2d 52;Hersey Gravel Co. v. State Highway Department, 305 Mich. 333, 9 N.W.2d 567;Detroit Club v. State of Michigan, 309 Mich. 721, 16 N.W.2d 136;W. H. Knapp Co. v. State Highway Department, 311 Mich. 186, 18 N.W.2d 421;Western Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 312 Mich. 582, 20 N.W.2d 734.

As originally enacted in 1939, section 24 of the court of claims act provided:

‘This act shall in no manner be construed as enlarging the present liabilities of the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies.’

Under the above provision, it has been held that the State might avail itself of the defense of governmental immunity, in an action brought against it in the court of claims.

‘Under provision of the court of claims act that it should in no manner be construed as enlarging the present liabilities of the State, the State's immunity from liability while engaged in a governmental function is preserved because the waiver of such defense would enlarge the present liabilities of the State (Act No. 135, § 24, Pub.Acts 1937). * * *

‘Since the existing liabilities of the State were not enlarged by the court of claims act, all those defenses which might have been interposed in actions at law and chancery remain unchanged save only the immunity from suit (Act No. 135, § 24, Pub.Acts 1939).’ Manion v. State Highway Commissioner (syllabi), supra.

‘The doctrine of sovereign immunity exists under the common law of the State and may not be held to have been waived or abrogated except that the result has been accomplished by an express statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a statute.

‘Statutes relating to claims for damages arising from negligence, malfeasance or misfeasance of State officers, departments, subdivisions, or employees, relating to negligence in construction or maintenance of trunk line highways or relating to court of claims did not expressly or impliedly evince an intent to abolish defense of sovereign immunity as to claim against State highway department for alleged negligent maintenance of former United States highway then being repaved (1 Comp.Laws 1929, §§ 237, 238; Act No. 135 Pub.Acts 1939).

‘The authority to waive defense of sovereign immunity is in the legislature and until there is legislative action authorizing an officer or agent of the State to waive such defense, it may not be done by any officer or agent.’ McNair v. State Highway Department (syllabi), supra.

However, the precise question involved in the instant case, as to whether section 24 or the 1943 amendment is unconstitutional as being in violation of section 21, article 5, of the State Constitution, has not heretofore been raised or decided. In 1943 the legislature amended section 24 of the court of claims act, and, with certain exceptions, thereby abolished the defense of governmental immunity in actions brought in the court of claims. Section 24 was amended by Act No. 237, Pub.Acts 1943, Stat.Ann. 1944 Cum.Supp. § 27.3548(24), to read as follows:

‘Upon the happening of any event subsequent to November 1, 1943, which gives rise to a cause of action, the State hereby waives its immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees and consents to have its liability for such torts defermined in accordance with the same rules of law as apply to an action in the circuit court against an individual or a corporation, and the state hereby assumes liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the state to recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused by the misfeasance or negligence of the officers or employees of the state while acting as such officer or employee. Such claim must be submitted pursuant to procedural provisions of the court of claims act. The provisions of this act shall not apply to (a) any claim for injury to or death of a prisoner, or for services rendered while an inmate of a penal institution; (b) any claim arising out of the injury to or death of an inmate of any state institution in connection with the rendition of medical or surgical treatment; (c) any claim for property damage or personal injury caused by the Michigan state troops and/or the national guard when called into the service of the state.’

Under and by virtue of this waiver of the defense of governmental immunity plaintiff brought the present suit in the court of claims. In moving to dismiss, the State admits the enactment of the amendment, but claims it is void, being in violation of section 21, article 5, of the State Constitution. Does the court of claims act, as thus amended by Act No. 237, Pub.Acts 1943, embrace more than one object not expressed in its title?

At the outset, we must recognize certain fundamental rules of law which govern decision, where the question of the constitutionality of a statute is involved. These have recently been stated as follows:

“No rule of construction is better settled in this country, both upon principle and authority, than that the Acts of a State Legislature are to be presumed constitutional until the...