Detroit Edison Co. v. Celadon Trucking Co.

• Decision Date: 10 January 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 220391,Docket No. 224055.
• Citation: 248 Mich. App. 118,638 N.W.2d 169
• Parties: DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CELADON TRUCKING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. TNT Canada, Inc. and Dedicated Systems, Ltd., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Detroit Edison Company, Defendant-Appellant, and Comcast Cablevision Company and Ameritech, Defendants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

638 N.W.2d 169

248 Mich. App. 118

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CELADON TRUCKING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

TNT Canada, Inc. and Dedicated Systems, Ltd., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Detroit Edison Company, Defendant-Appellant, and Comcast Cablevision Company and Ameritech, Defendants.

Docket Nos. 220391, 224055.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted August 7, 2001, at Detroit.

Decided November 2, 2001, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication January 10, 2002.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Ernest R. Bazzana), Detroit, for Detroit Edison Company.

Bailey & Rossi, P.C. (by John D. Mulvihill), Bloomfield Hills, for Celadon Trucking Company.

Anselmi & Mierzejewski, P.C. (by Joseph S. Mierzejewski), Bloomfield Hills, for TNT Canada, Inc., and Dedicated Systems, Ltd.

Before BANDSTRA, C.J., and WHITBECK and OWENS, JJ.

BANDSTRA, C.J.

These two consolidated appeals involve identical factual situations, which are not in dispute. Electrical transmission equipment owned by Detroit Edison Company was affixed to or suspended from utility poles owned by Detroit Edison. The poles also carried wires owned by Comcast Cablevision Company and Ameritech. Trucks owned and operated by Celadon Trucking Company and TNT Canada, Inc.,¹ struck those wires and, as a result, caused damage to Detroit Edison's property. The lines that were struck were placed less than fifteen feet above the roadway, in violation of M.C.L. § 247.186.

Two questions of statutory construction of the no-fault act² are presented. First, is Detroit Edison subject to M.C.L. § 500.3123(3), which provides that "[p]roperty protection insurance benefits are not payable for property damage to utility transmission lines, wires, or cables arising from the failure of a municipality, utility company, or cable television company to comply with" the fifteen-foot requirement? Second, if Detroit Edison is subject to this provision, does the provision prevent payment for damage to property beyond the referenced "transmission lines, wires, or cables," for example, damage to utility poles and transformers?³

These are issues of first impression. We conclude, simply by looking at the words of the statute, that the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no. Accordingly, we hold that Detroit Edison may seek property protection insurance benefits from the self-insured truck owners here, but only for damages to equipment other than transmission lines, wires, or cables.

As intimated above, our task here is quite simple. We review questions of statutory construction de novo.⁴ Our purpose is to discern and give effect to the legislators' intent.⁵

We begin by examining the plain language of the statute. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the words used by the Legislature shall be given their common and ordinary meaning, and only where the statutory language is ambiguous may we look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent.⁶

In other words, "[i]f the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, ... judicial construction is not permitted."⁷ In the absence of ambiguity, "the statute speaks for itself and there is no need for judicial construction; the proper role of a court is to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular case."⁸

Applying these principles to the present case, resolution of the issues presented can best be accomplished by answering a couple of factual questions. First, did the property damage about which Detroit Edison complains "aris[e] from the failure of a ... utility company, or cable television company to comply with" the fifteen-foot requirement? There is no factual dispute here; the accidents occurred because Comcast Cablevision and Ameritech, cable television or utility companies, hung their wires too low.⁹ Accordingly, subsection 3123(3) applies to this case and limits the property protection insurance benefits that would otherwise be payable to Detroit Edison under the no-fault act.¹⁰ Second, did Detroit Edison suffer damage to any property other than the "transmission lines, wires, or cables" that are subject to the subsection 3123(3) exclusion of coverage? Again, without dispute, the record indicates that damage was suffered to other equipment, including poles and transformers. Accordingly, subsection 3123(3) does not apply to preclude Detroit Edison from recovering benefits for damages to that other property, otherwise payable under the no-fault act.

These conclusions seem inevitable in light of the language of the statute and the clear directives we must follow regarding application of that language to the facts at hand. Nonetheless, both sides of this dispute argue that, for various reasons, we should come to a conclusion that better suits their purposes. We briefly review and reject these arguments.

Detroit Edison argues that subsection 3123(3) should not apply in this case to limit its benefits at all. Detroit Edison argues that this "unfortunate result" is clearly inconsistent with the purpose and policy of the no-fault act because "the intent of the [L]egislature was surely not to penalize innocent utilities who do comply with the statutory minimum height requirements with respect to their lines." Again, even if our goal is to implement the intent of the Legislature,¹¹ we do this simply by applying the terms of the statute to the facts at hand when statutory language is unambiguous, as it is here. In other words, we need look no further for the "intent" of the Legislature; if the intent was somehow found to be different than the unambiguous language of the statute, the language would still control.

Further, even if some analysis of legislative intent was permissible here, we are unconvinced by Detroit Edison's arguments. Detroit Edison relies on a legislative analysis of the bill that ultimately became subsection 1323(3).¹² From that analysis, Detroit Edison emphasizes language stating that "[t]he bill would amend the no-fault insurance law to exclude payment of property protection benefits for damage to utility lines when those lines are not maintained at the legally prescribed 15 feet above the road.¹³" On the basis of this language, Detroit Edison argues that, because it was not responsible for "those lines" that caused the accident here, its rights to seek property protection benefits are not affected by subsection 1323(3).

We recognize that, although legislative bill analyses are not official statements of legislative intent, both our Court and the Supreme Court have considered them to be "of probative value."¹⁴ While that may be the case in some situations,¹⁵ it is not true in a case, like that presented here, where the statutory language is unambiguous. "Where the statutory text is unambiguous ..., that ends the matter[;] `we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.'"¹⁶

Further, we note that, even if use of legislative history was appropriate here, the legislative history contradicts itself. While Detroit Edison relies on the portion of the bill analysis quoted above, Celadon Trucking points to the portion of that same analysis that states that "[w]hen a motor vehicle strikes utility lines, wires, or cables that are hanging illegally close to the road surface, the vehicle's owner or operator's insurance company pays for the damage under the property protection insurance benefits of the insurance policy. Some persons think that this is unfair...."¹⁷ Accordingly, Celadon Trucking argues that "the Legislature intended that the drivers of trucks not be held liable if an accident is caused by a low hanging wire," without regard to which party was responsible for placement of that wire.

To sum up, Detroit Edison points to language in the bill analysis suggesting that the legislative intent was to penalize parties responsible for hanging wires too low and, accordingly, subsection 1323(3) should be interpreted as providing relief to drivers only for damages to property owned by those guilty parties. Celadon Trucking stresses bill analysis language suggesting that the legislative intent was to protect the motoring public more generally, meaning that drivers should never have to pay for any damages arising out of accidents involving low-hanging wires. Fortunately, we need not resolve this inconsistency in the legislative history; the statute is clear and we must apply it against the argument advanced by Detroit Edison.

On the other hand, we also reject arguments advanced by Celadon Trucking and TNT Canada regarding the extent of the protection afforded them by subsection 3123(3). The statutory language itself protects them only with respect to damages to "transmission lines, wires, or cables."¹⁸ To conclude that the statute encompasses damages beyond those specifically mentioned would violate the well-recognized canon of statutory construction that "[t]he express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of other similar things."¹⁹ In other words, because the statute mentions only "lines, wires, or cables," it does not apply to other similar Detroit Edison equipment (poles, transformers, and so forth) that was damaged. To avoid these results, Detroit Edison, Celadon Trucking, and TNT Canada all argue that applying the statute in this fashion produces an absurd, illogical, and unjust result. We need not consider whether it would ever be appropriate to ignore clear statutory language for these reasons,²⁰ because here we do not conclude that application of the clear language leads to that kind of result. As we understand the statute, it provides some protection to drivers who cause property damage when they strike utility lines that are placed too low above the roadway. That protection is afforded by the statute even against those who were not at fault for placing the lines too low. On the other hand, the protection afforded is not complete. It applies only to...