Detroit Federation of Teachers, Local 231, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. of City of Detroit

• Citation: 396 Mich. 220,240 N.W.2d 225
• Decision Date: 01 April 1976
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 14,14
• Parties: , 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2282 DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 231, AFT,, a Voluntary Unincorporated Association, and Bernadine Frazier, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF DETROIT, a schooldistrict of the first class, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 225

240 N.W.2d 225

396 Mich. 220, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2282

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 231, AFT, AFL-CIO, a Voluntary Unincorporated Association, and Bernadine Frazier, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF

DETROIT, a schooldistrict of the first class,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 1, 1976.

Marston, Sachs, O'Connell Nunn & Freid by Theodore Sachs, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Riley & Roumell, George T. Roumell, Jr., Thomas M. J. Hathaway, John F. Brady, Gregory P. Theokas, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

LEVIN, Justice.

Section 569 of the School Code provides that '(t)he board of every district shall hire and contract with such duly qualified teachers as may be required. All contracts with teachers shall be in writing * * *.' ¹

For a number of years preceding 1972, the Detroit Board of Education employed tenured and probationary teachers, who worked with written, individual contracts, and substitute teachers, including Emergency Substitutes in Regular Positions (ESRPs), who worked without written, individual contracts.

In February, 1972, the Board adopted a resolution which provided that all new teaching positions would be filled by ESRPs. ² No probationary appointments were made during the 1972--73 school year.

This class action was commenced by the Union in January, 1973 in behalf of teachers working without a written, individual contract.

The parties agree that under § 569 of the School Code 'duly qualified' teachers are entitled to written, individual contracts evidencing the employment relationship. They do not agree on the kind of contract particular teachers were entitled to receive or what is the appropriate forum and procedure for resolution of disputes concerning the contract a particular teacher should receive.

The Union contends that all teachers in regular teaching positions who are not on 'continuing' (tenure) contracts are entitled to 'probationary' contracts and that the circuit court should decide whether a particular teacher although called an 'ESRP,' is so entitled.

The Board contends that the kind of contract a teacher receives should be determined by agreement of the parties and, if they cannot agree, the dispute should be resolved through the grievance arbitration procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement.

The circuit court adopted the Union's position and ordered the Board to enter into probationary contracts with all certified ³ teachers assigned to teach in regular positions. The Order for Mandamus provides a procedure for resolution by the court of disputes regarding the kind of contract a teacher should receive. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ⁴ We reverse.

We agree with the circuit court and the Court of Appeals that the language of § 569 is 'mandatory' and the Board is required to enter into a written, individual contract evidencing the employment relationship with each 'duly qualified' teacher in its employ. We conclude, however, that (1) § 569 does not impose a legal duty on the Board to offer a teacher a particular kind of contract; (2) under § 569 the kind of contract is to be determined by agreement of the parties; (3) the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the Union states the terms and conditions of teacher employment and provides a procedure for resolving disputes arising under that agreement; (4) this is such a dispute; and (5) the circuit court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the kind of contract particular teachers wojld receive. ⁵

Before teachers unionized, the terms of a teacher's employment were set forth in a contract between the teacher and the Board embodying their agreement. Few individual teachers, however, had any real bargaining power and the contract terms were frequently imposed by the Board rather than negotiated by the parties.

Now the Union and the Board negotiate a master collective bargaining agreement which determines the rights of the individual teachers in the bargaining unit. Individual teachers are not even nominally involved in the negotiation process; they sign contracts which are derivative of the collective bargaining agreement.

Three categories of teachers are recognized in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the parties in this case: tenured, probationary and substitute. Substitute teachers are further classified as Emergency Substitutes, Class 1 and 2, and ESRPs, Class 3 and 4. ⁶

Under the collective bargaining agreement, complaints 'involving the work situation, or that there has been a deviation from, or a misinterpretation or misapplication of a practice or policy; or that there has been a violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any provision of' the master agreement ⁷ are to be resolved through the grievance procedure provided in the agreement.

The five-step procedure, culminating in binding arbitration, is mandatory, ⁸ but not exclusive. Under the agreement, grievance is 'supplementary or cumulative to * * * procedures or remedies afforded to any teacher by law.' ⁹

The Union contends that the teachers properly eschewed the grievance procedure and sought court enforcement of their rights under the School Code in this proceeding, a remedy afforded 'by law.'

We agree that the circuit court properly entertained this action and declared, pursuant to the School Code, that the Board shall enter into a written, individual contract with each 'duly qualified' teacher in its employ. But that court erred when it directed the Board to enter into probationary contracts with certain teachers and provided for hearings regarding the status of other teachers. ¹⁰

The right protected by the Code is the right to a written contract evidencing the employment relationship, not to a particular kind of contract. The Code contemplates that the kind of contract each teacher receives is to be decided by agreement of the parties. In this case, the representative of the plaintiff class, the Union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the defendant school district. That agreement spells out the terms and conditions of employment and governs the possible kinds of contracts--tenured, probationary and substitute--teachers may receive. The issue whether certain teachers, called ESRPs, are entitled to probationary contracts pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement depends on the agreement of the parties.

The interpretation of agreements is manifestly appropriate business for a court. Here, however, the parties have agreed and the collective bargaining agreement provides that contract disputes, including those concerning the interpretation of the agreement, are to be resolved through the grievance procedure.

In Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School District v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Teachers' Association, 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975), we recently reiterated the judicial policy favoring arbitration of disputes where the collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitration as the final step of a grievance procedure.

Neither the School Code nor other law requires that there be a judicial determination of the kind of contract a teacher who is a member of a collective bargaining unit shall receive.

The determination whether particular 'ESRPs' were certified and filling regular positions, and, if so, whether they were entitled to probationary contracts should be resolved by the parties themselves or through the grievance procedure.

Our limited holding that the circuit court is not the proper forum for determination of the job classification and kind of contract to which these teachers are entitled in no way portends any view of the merits of their cause.

The case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of a declaration of rights that each 'duly qualified' teacher in the Board's employ is entitled to a written, individual contract evidencing the employment relationship. The circuit court may hold this case in abeyance pending determination, either by agreement of the parties or through the grievance procedure, of the kind of contract to which each teacher is entitled. ¹¹ If any teacher is aggrieved by the job classification and contract offered by the Board, he may file a grievance. After resolution of any dispute regarding the kind of contract to which a teacher is entitled, the circuit court may, if necessary, order the Board to provide a written, individual contract of the kind awarded in arbitration.

WILLIAMS, Justice (concurring in part,

T. G. KAVANAGH, C.J., and COLEMAN and FITZGERALD, JJ., concur.

LINDEMER and RYAN, JJ., not participating.

WILLIAMS, Justuce (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

The present action is a class action suit brought by the Detroit Federation of Teachers for an injunction or mandamus to compel compliance by the Detroit School Board with § 569 of the School Code, M.C.L.A. § 340.569; M.S.A. § 15.3569 which provides in pertinent part that:

'The board of every district shall hire and contract with such duly qualified teachers as may be required. All contracts with teachers shall be in writing * * *.'

Two issues are posed in the case. First, do the teachers bringing this action have a right to a written contract under § 569 of the School Code? We conclude that these teachers do in fact have such a right.

Second, do these teachers, or any segment of them have a right to a probationary contract? We conclude that all teachers who meet the requirements for a probationary teacher and who carry the responsibility associated with a probationary teacher have a right to a probationary contract, and their individual rights as established under these guidelines may be established by the trial court.

I--FACTS

On February 8, 1972, the Detroit School Board adopted a resolution stating that henceforth 'Teaching assignments and all other assignments of new or returning personnel shall be made as ESRP ...