Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Federation of Teachers

• Decision Date: 02 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 58159,58159
• Citation: 252 N.W.2d 818,95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2279,400 Mich. 104
• Parties: The LAMPHERE SCHOOLS, a Public Body Corporate, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LAMPHERE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Defendants and Appellees. 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2279, 84 A.L.R.3d 314, 81 Lab.Cas. P 55,055
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 818

252 N.W.2d 818

The LAMPHERE SCHOOLS, a Public Body Corporate, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LAMPHERE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Defendants and Appellees.

No. 58159.

400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2279,

84 A.L.R.3d 314, 81 Lab.Cas. P 55,055

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 2, 1977.

Clark, Hardy, Lewis & Fine, P.C. by Dennis R. Pollard, Birmingham, for plaintiff and appellant.

Fieger, Golden & Cousens by Mark H. Cousens, Southfield, for defendants and appellees.

Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O'Hare by Theodore Sachs, Charles Looman, Detroit, for Michigan State AFL-CIO.

Foster, Swift & Collins, P.C., Lansing, for Michigan Ed. Assn. by Lynwood E. Beekman, Karen Bush Schneider, Lansing.

MOODY, Justice.

The issue in the case at bar is limited to whether a federation (union) of public school teachers may be held liable in tort by a public school district for alleged monetary damages incurred as a result of a peaceful strike prohibited by the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), M.C.L.A. § 423.201 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.455(1) et seq.

We hold that plaintiff-appellant School District is barred from suing defendant-appellee Federations for damages under any of the traditional common law tort theories asserted infra. We arrive at this conclusion for basically three reasons.

First and foremost, after a careful study of both the specific language and the history of the PERA, we are convinced that the Legislature intended the PERA to occupy the public labor relations field completely in this context. Accordingly, except for the historical equitable relief of injunction, the Secondly, upon careful examination of existing Michigan case law, we find no applicable precedent for the cause of action pled by plaintiff School District. Michigan common law provides no foundation for the remedy sought under these circumstances.

remedies of discipline-discharge provided for under Section 6 of the PERA are intended to be the sole and exclusive remedies available to a school district in dealing with a peaceful strike by a teachers' federation.

Finally, we are convinced that public policy considerations interdict the creation of a new cause of action, which would unsettle an already precarious labor-management balance in the public labor relations sector.

Accordingly, we affirm both the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.

I FACTS

There is no material dispute as to the facts in the instant case. This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant Lamphere Schools (hereinafter "School District") from a trial court order granting the defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the School District's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff School District reinstituted suit on December 4, 1974, against the following defendants-appellees: the Lamphere Federation of Teachers as the collective bargaining representative of the teachers employed by the School District; Allan Coulter as President of the Lamphere Federation; the Michigan Federation of Teachers; and Arsch Derbabian as agent and representative of the Michigan Federation (hereinafter "Federations"). The School District sought to recover in tort both compensatory and punitive damages for two strikes conducted by the teachers in September and October of 1973. The predecessor to this case was initiated on September 10, 1973, dismissed without prejudice for reasons not pertinent here, and then refiled.

In January, 1975, the defendant Federations filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1), alleging that the School District's complaint failed to state a cause of action. The motion was granted by the Oakland Circuit Court on February 5, 1975, and an order of dismissal was entered accordingly on February 14, 1975. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on February 10, 1976. 67 Mich.App. 331, 240 N.W.2d 792 (1976). This Court granted leave to appeal on May 27, 1976.

Briefly stated, the plaintiff School District and defendant Federations were parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the approximately 270 teachers employed by the School District. Prior to the expiration of that agreement on September 3, 1973, the parties commenced negotiations for a successor agreement. However, they had not reached agreement by September 3, 1973. The teachers, thereafter, went out on strike and stayed out from September 4, 1973, through September 24, 1973. No classes were conducted during the strike.

The teachers returned to their teaching duties on September 25, 1973, pursuant to an injunction obtained in a separate action filed by a student's parent in the Oakland Circuit Court. The teachers briefly renewed their strike on October 15, 1973, but returned to work the next day, following an order issued by the court to show cause why the teachers should not be held in contempt.

The terms for a successor collective bargaining agreement were ultimately reached and the agreement was signed in February of 1974. The injunction was dissolved. However, this tort suit was independent of the injunctive action and was expressly left standing by the successor agreement.

The School District alleged in its complaint that the conduct of the aforementioned Federations caused substantial damages to the School District. Count I of the complaint asserted that the Federations, by their conduct, caused their member-teachers to strike contrary to an alleged common law duty. Count II alleged that the conduct of the Federations in recommending and subsequently calling the strike constituted a tortious interference with existing individual contractual relationships between

the School District and its teachers. Count III of the complaint asserted a claim of recovery for civil conspiracy against the Federations for planning and implementing the strike in violation of the PERA.

II THE PERA: LANGUAGE, INTENT, HISTORY

It is axiomatic that in resolving an issue involving any statutory schema, this Court will first look to the specific language of the statute itself. Dussia v. Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971). Furthermore, in interpreting a statute, this Court has the duty to ascertain and declare the intention of the Legislature; that intention, once ascertained, is then controlling. Aikens v. State Department of Conservation, 387 Mich. 495, 198 N.W.2d 304 (1972).

In determining whether a public school district can maintain a civil tort action against the federations representing its teachers, where the federations allegedly precipitated a strike in violation of the statutory prohibition, this Court must examine the specific language and history of the PERA.

The purpose of the PERA, 1947, P.A. 336, as amended by 1965 P.A. 379, is well stated in the title of the statute:

"AN ACT to prohibit strikes by certain public employees ; to provide review from disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances and the holding of elections; to declare and protect the rights and privileges of public employees; and to prescribe means of enforcement and penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act." ¹ (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)

Thus, it requires little extrapolation to ascertain the Legislature's intent in enacting the PERA. The Legislature intended to proscribe strikes ² by public employees and to prescribe the means of enforcement and penalties for such strikes.

The plaintiff School District does not deny that the Legislature intended to prescribe the remedies for illegal strikes by public employees such as teachers. Rather, in a bifurcated argument, the School District maintains that remedies provided for by the PERA were not intended to be the exclusive remedies for illegal teachers' strikes when precipitated by teachers' federations. Furthermore, the School District claims that the PERA remedies in fact provide school districts with no remedies whatsoever against teachers' federations which foment teachers' strikes. Therefore, plaintiff asserts that school districts should be allowed to maintain the aforementioned common law tort actions against teachers' federations which precipitate such strikes.

However, when we review the extensive enforcement procedures regarding illegal teachers' strikes as outlined in Section 6 of the PERA, we find that the Act's careful wording does indeed provide for exclusive, after-the-fact statutory remedies as to both teachers and their federations for participation in such strikes:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any person holding such a position who, by concerted action with others, and without the lawful approval of his superior, wilfully absents himself from his position, or abstains in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of his duties for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation This Court discussed the exclusivity of Section 6 sanctions in Rockwell v. Crestwood School District Board of Education, 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975). The issue in that case was whether school teachers who strike may be discharged without a prior hearing. The case turned upon the resolution of an alleged conflict between the PERA and the Teachers' Tenure Act. M.C.L.A. § 38.101; M.S.A. § 15.2001.

or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment shall be deemed to be on strike but the person, upon request, shall be entitled to a determination as to whether he did violate the provisions of this act. The request shall be filed in writing, with the officer or body having power to remove or discipline such employee, within 10 days after regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed. In the event of such request, the officer or body shall within 10 days commence a proceeding for the determination of whether the provisions of this act...