Devaney v. St. Thomas More Catholic Church

• Decision Date: 21 October 2020
• Docket Number: C. A. WC-2017-0054
• Parties: JOHN DEVANEY v. ST. THOMAS MORE CATHOLIC CHURCH, ST. PETERS BY-THE-SEA EPISCOPAL CHURCH, and ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PROVIDENCE
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

JOHN DEVANEY v. ST. THOMAS MORE CATHOLIC CHURCH, ST. PETERS BY-THE-SEA EPISCOPAL CHURCH, and ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PROVIDENCE

C. A. No. WC-2017-0054

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Washington

October 21, 2020

For Plaintiff: John Devaney, Pro Se

For Defendant: Howard Merten, Esq., Amanda Prosek, Esq.

DECISION

CARNES, J.

Before this Court for decision is Defendants St. Thomas More Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, and St. Peters By-The-Sea Episcopal Church's (collectively Defendants) motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 37 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter arises out of this Court's August 23, 2019 Conditional Order of Dismissal instructing Plaintiff John Devaney (Plaintiff) to respond to expert interrogatories by September 25, 2019. Defendants allege that, although they received an answer to the relevant interrogatory, the disclosure was not served in compliance with the Court's Order and is on its face entirely improper. As a result, Defendants ask this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 37. The Court heard oral arguments by the parties on September 23 2020. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 37.

I Facts and Travel

This case arises out of the periodic playing of amplified electronic bell sounds from St. Peters By-The-Sea Episcopal Church and St. Thomas More Catholic Church, both located in the Narragansett Pier neighborhood.^[1] Plaintiff purchased a home in the same Narragansett Pier neighborhood in 1995, where he lived with his then wife and four children. Defs.' Ex. 1 at Nos. 7, 17. The Plaintiff alleges that, around the year 1999, the Defendant, St. Peters By-The-Sea Episcopal Church began playing amplified electronic bell sounds every hour from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m., with additional bell sounds on Sundays and during weddings and other special occasions. Id. at No. 8. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, St. Thomas More Catholic Church, also initiated an electronic bell program in approximately 2000 Id.

The Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 7, 2017, alleging that the electronic bells diminished the free use of his property, interfered with the comfortable enjoyment of life, and created mental anguish precipitating the breakup of his family. Compl. ¶ 11. To wit, the Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment that the Narragansett noise ordinance exemption for religious places of worship be "deemed ineffective." Id. ¶ 17.

On June 7, 2017, the Defendants served a set of interrogatories on Plaintiff, including standard expert interrogatory, numbered Interrogatory No. 6. The Plaintiff responded to those interrogatories on August 12, 2017 and answered Interrogatory No. 6 as follows, "Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 6 to the extent it requests information that has not been fully developed at this stage of the litigation." See Defs.' Ex. 1 at 2. Defendants then filed a motion to compel a complete response to its expert interrogatory, which the Court allowed by Order dated September 25, 2018. See Defs.' Ex. 2. Pursuant to the Court's Order, on December 12, 2018, the Plaintiff supplemented his answer to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 6 by identifying twelve individuals he called "proposed experts" and three additional "non-specified" experts to testify to various elements of his claimed damages. See Defs.' Ex. 3 at 15-18.

At a subsequent status conference, Defendants contended that Plaintiff's additional answer to their expert interrogatories continued to be deficient. The Court agreed and ordered Plaintiff to disclose all testifying experts by April 5, 2019. See Defs.' Ex. 4. On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff served the second compelled response, captioned, in part, "providing additional [e]xpert [w]itnesses." This response identified three additional individuals whom Plaintiff claimed would testify as an expert in his case. See Defs.' Ex. 5.

At a hearing on April 11, 2019, Plaintiff was unable to state which, if any, of the fifteen individuals identified in his answers to Interrogatory No. 6 have voluntarily agreed to testify. Defs.' Mem. ¶ 20. Plaintiff was also unable to provide any additional information beyond the scant information included in the disclosures. Id. On July 25, 2019, the Court ordered that Plaintiff had until September 25, 2019 "to provide full and complete interrogatory answers respecting Mr. Caswell and Dr. Gibbes that are consistent with the discussion had at the July 25, 2019, hearing . . ." See Defs.' Ex. 6. On or about September 24, 2019, in compliance with the Court's Order, Plaintiff served a Supplemental Interrogatory Response, which purports to set forth the expert opinion of Dr. Bertram Gibbes. See Defs.' Ex. 8.

The Defendants argue that Plaintiff's further answer remains deficient because, following the second day of Plaintiff's deposition, conducted on February 19, 2020, Plaintiff acknowledged that (1) he had prepared the supplemental interrogatory answer disclosing Dr. Gibbes as an expert; and (2) the answer was never provided to or reviewed by Dr. Gibbes prior to Plaintiff filing the answer with the Court. Defs.' Mem. ¶¶ 24-28. According to his deposition testimony, Plaintiff simply relied upon "conversations" with Dr. Gibbes and a draft report that Dr. Gibbes had prepared in drafting his interrogatory answer. See Defs.' Ex. 9 at 34:14-19; 42:16-24. Plaintiff also admitted to adding content to the answers on his own. Id. at 40:9-16. Additionally, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he did not know if the answer contained the complete and accurate opinion to which Dr. Gibbes was expected to testify. Id. at 43:1-14.

Due to this revelation, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and allege that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 26 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 26). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's responses neglect to provide anything more than his own opinion of the purported opinion of his expert Dr. Gibbes, and it remains unclear still as to exactly what Dr. Gibbes will testify about and the summary of the grounds for each of his opinions. Defs.' Mem ¶¶ 36-37. Defendants additionally note that Plaintiff's expert is still insufficiently disclosed despite the several warnings this Court has provided Plaintiff regarding the requirement that he provide a complete and full expert disclosure. Id. ¶ 35.

Plaintiff contends his responses are in compliance with the Court's August 23, 2019 Order because they are consistent with the discussion at the July 25, 2019 hearing and the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A). Pl.'s Mem. 3. Plaintiff argues that his response contains what he expects Dr. Gibbes to testify on and he has not disregarded, willfully disobeyed, or failed to comply with the Court's Order. Id. at 4. Plaintiff additionally questions why Defendants made no effort to form an agreement with Plaintiff for supplementation of the interrogatories. Id.^[2]

II Standard of Review

Rule 37 provides the Superior Court with the tools necessary to achieve a smooth functioning of the discovery process by allowing the trial justice to enter orders for failing to comply with discovery demands and to sanction a noncompliant party. Super. R. Civ. P. 37. The assortment of tools provided by Rule 37 includes (i) permitting a party to file a motion for an order compelling discovery and (ii) providing the trial justice with authority to sanction a party for failing to comply with a court order, attend a deposition, serve answers to interrogatories, or respond to a request for inspection. Id.

Should the nonmoving party fail to comply with an order compelling discovery, Rule 37 itemizes the potential sanctions that the Court, in its discretion, can impose. Id. The Court may hold the nonmoving party in contempt. Super. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1). Additionally, the Court may order that the facts at issue be deemed established thenceforth; preclude the disobedient party from either supporting or opposing the designated claims or defenses; strike out certain pleadings; or stay the proceeding until the order is obeyed. Super. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1), (2).

The Rule also affords the Court the discretion to enter either a final judgment dismissing the action or a judgment by default. Super. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). There is nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure to suggest that final judgment can only be imposed after other, less severe, sanctions are employed. See id. "[A]t some point a defendant is entitled to a dismissal of a complaint in an action in which a [party's] persistent failure to comply with discovery requests and related court orders causes inordinate delay, expense, and frustration for all concerned." Mumford v. Lewiss, 681 A.2d 914, 916 (R.I. 1996). Such a situation is characterized by "continuous and willful noncompliance with discovery orders," Goulet v. OfficeMax, Inc., 843 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 2004) (mem.), that rises to the level of "persistent refusal, defiance or bad faith." Flanagan v. Blair, 882 A.2d 569, 573 (R.I. 2005) (internal quotation and emphasis omitted).

III Analysis

A trial justice has the ability to protect the integrity of the judicial system by penalizing those whose conduct may warrant dismissal and deterring others from engaging in similar conduct. See Lett v. Providence Journal Co., 798 A.2d 355, 365 (R.I. 2002); see also National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 643 (1976) ("[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the [superior] court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such...