Development Services of America, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 66653-9
| Decision Date | 10 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 66653-9,66653-9 |
| Citation | 979 P.2d 387,138 Wn.2d 107 |
| Parties | DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC.; Services Group Of America, Inc., a Washington corporation; and Eagle Pacific Insurance Company, a Washington corporation, Petitioners, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a charter city; R.F. Krochalis, in his capacity as Director of the Department of Construction and Land Use, City of Seattle, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
John C. McCullough, Jr., Davis, Wright & Tremaine, Stephen M. Rummage, Seattle, for Petitioners.
David Bruce, Judith Barbour, Asst. City Attorneys, Seattle, for Respondents.
The City of Seattle denied petitioner, Services Group of America, Inc., a conditional use permit for a rooftop helistop. Petitioner appealed. We granted review in order to determine whether the City of Seattle lawfully found the helistop was not a "necessary element" of petitioner's business services. We affirm the City of Seattle's action denying the permit.
Services Group of America, Inc. (SGA) is a diversified family of companies including Food Services of America, Food Products International, AmeriFresh, Eagle Pacific Insurance Group, and Development Services of America. Its operations include food wholesaling, agricultural products, international trade, property development, and insurance.
In 1983, SGA began operating a helicopter from its headquarters on Harbor Island in Seattle. In 1990, SGA discontinued use of the helistop at this location and moved temporarily On September 20, 1990, SGA applied to the City of Seattle (City) for a conditional use permit to build a helistop at its new headquarters. In May 1995, the City Council denied the permit request. The City Council concluded the helistop was not a "necessary element" of SGA's business services as required under the applicable portion of former Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 23.47.006(C)(2)(c). 1 During the pendency of its application, and through to the present, SGA has been using Boeing Field as a landing site for its corporate helicopter.
to Kent to await completion of a new headquarters building in west Seattle, approximately one-half mile from its former headquarters on Harbor Island.
The pertinent facts adduced during the administrative process tended to show that SGA used its helicopter for a number of purposes related to its business operations. SGA stated its overall business strategy was to centralize operations in the new Seattle headquarters, maintain lean management staffing, use computer and telecommunications links, and high speed point-to-point travel, particularly the corporate helicopter, to transport management personnel to the company's various operations locations.
Declarations by SGA employees stated in general terms that the helicopter's Boeing Field location was unsatisfactory and the rooftop helistop was, therefore, necessary. Travel time of up to 45 minutes or one hour between SGA's west Seattle location and Boeing Field was cited as the reason for the necessity of the rooftop helistop. Evidence showed normal travel time from SGA headquarters to Boeing Field averaged 15 to 20 minutes, with occasional delays of up to one hour.
In addition to the declarations, Lincoln Ferris, SGA's vice president of community relations, and Tom Stewart, SGA's chief executive officer, testified before the City hearing examiner as to the necessity of the helistop. The essence of their testimony went to the utility of the helicopter as a tool to maximize corporate efficiency. As to the specific lack of a rooftop helistop, Ferris testified that, without the helistop, SGA "hasn't gone broke, it hasn't gone out of business, but it has been inconvenient." Transcript Before the Hr'g Examiner at 219 (Nov. 2, 1994). Similarly, Stewart testified that traveling to Boeing Field to utilize the corporate helicopter had been "very inconvenient." Transcript Before the Hr'g Examiner at 243 (Nov. 3, 1994).
The City's Department of Construction and Land Use (DCLU) initially reviewed SGA's permit application. SGA was required to meet conditions of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), as well as helistop conditional use criteria (former SMC 23.47.006). DCLU's SEPA decision was a final decision. Under the SMC, however, the City Council reserved to itself the original decisionmaking authority on whether helistop conditional use criteria had been met.
After its initial review, DCLU determined neither SEPA nor the City's conditional use criteria were met based on its conclusion the helistop would result in noise and land use impacts that could not be mitigated, and the helistop was not a business necessity. Accordingly, DCLU issued a decision denying the helistop under its SEPA authority, and recommended the City Council deny approval of the helistop under the City's conditional use criteria.
DCLU's negative recommendation under the City's conditional use ordinance was automatically referred to the City hearing examiner. In addition, SGA appealed DCLU's SEPA decision. The hearing examiner consolidated the hearing on the conditional use recommendation with the hearing on the related SEPA appeal. After taking additional evidence and hearing witnesses, the hearing examiner reversed DCLU's SEPA decision, finding there were no unavoidable significant impacts and, therefore, concluding the proposal In a separately issued decision, the hearing examiner addressed the adequacy of SGA's proposal under the City's conditional use criteria for helistops, former SMC 23.47.006. The hearing examiner made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The hearing examiner made numerous findings regarding the various business uses to which SGA put its helicopter. However, only a single finding of fact relates to the necessity of the helistop as opposed to the overall usefulness of the helicopter.
could not be denied under SEPA authority. That decision was not appealed and is now final.
The additional time expended by SGA personnel in traveling to and from Boeing Field to access the helicopter, could be considerable from a cumulative view. By way of example, if on average 3 SGA personnel traveled to Boeing to ride on the helicopter, and the trip to Boeing took on average 20 minutes each way, if there was only one trip per month during a year, unnecessary travel time would be the equivalent of 3 weeks.
Findings and Recommendation of the Hr'g Examiner, CF No. 298068, writ at 15 (Dec. 21, 1994). Based on the findings of fact, the hearing examiner concluded the helistop was a "necessary element" of SGA's business and, contrary to DCLU, recommended the City Council approve the project.
On March 28, 1995, the matter came before the City Council's Housing, Community Development and Urban Environment Committee (Committee). The Committee heard oral argument from the parties of record (Pigeon Point Community Council, DCLU, and SGA). On April 25, 1995, after allowing additional time for the members to review the record, the Committee voted 2 to 1 to recommend to the full City Council that approval be denied.
On May 8, 1995, the matter came before the full City Council (council member Donaldson recused at the request of SGA). The City Council adopted the hearing examiner's findings of fact as they related to mitigation pursuant to SEPA. Based on its conclusion that the hearing examiner's findings focused almost exclusively on the usefulness of the helicopter rather than on the necessity of the helistop, the City Council did not adopt the hearing examiner's findings as they related to the "necessary element" criterion under former SMC 23.47.006(C)(2)(c).
Based on its own findings and conclusions, the City Council denied the permit. Primarily, the City Council based its decision on SGA's proximity to Boeing Field, the average commute time saved by moving the helistop to SGA's headquarters, and whether the types of uses described by SGA were of a kind that required a rooftop helistop.
The City Council concluded the average 15- to 20-minute commute time gained by permitting the helistop did not equate to a business necessity, that general statements regarding lost productivity and inefficiency did not prove necessity, and that SGA's continued business growth belied the necessity of the helistop. Additionally, the City Council concluded SGA had proven only that a rooftop helistop was a business convenience, "but convenience does not equate to necessity." Clerk's Papers at 37 (Findings, Conclusions and Decision of the City Council, C.F. 298068, at 12 (May 8, 1995)). Accordingly, the City Council found SGA had not shown the helistop itself was necessary to SGA's business and denied the conditional use application.
On May 19, 1995, SGA sued the City in King County Superior Court for damages under constitutional, statutory, and tort theories; petitioned for constitutional and statutory writs of certiorari and mandamus pursuant to chapter 7.16 RCW; and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The City removed the cause to federal district court. The federal district court took jurisdiction of all damages claims but remanded the writ issues to the superior court. The superior court upheld the City Council's decision denying the helistop conditional use permit and dismissed the writs.
The only issues before this court are those properly falling within the writ of certiorari (writ of review) under chapter 7.16 RCW...
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